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INTRODUCTION 
Whatr kind of ma.n was Admiral Jean Francois 
Darla.n? Was he merely a.n ambitious and crafty politician, 
a Nazi collaborator and opportunist, or a true French 
patriot? To facilitate understanding it is necessary 
to describe some of the events surrounding the fall of 
France and the formation of the Vichy government. 
The chief purpose of such a study is to analyze 
the actions of Admiral Darlan from the fall of France 
until the Allied invasion of North Africa on November 8, 
1942 and his assassination on Christmas Eve_ slightly 
more than a month later. By an examination of Darla.n's 
part in the Vichy regime and an explanation of the man's 
motives, whenever possible, one ca.n hope to.strip at 
least part of the enigma from the man and his career. 
The navy did not share the French Army's defeat. 
It was still intact on Armistice Day, and the very survival 
of France as a nation seemed to depend on it. The French 
Army, regarded by niany as the best in Europe a.nd perhaps 
the world, succumbed quickly to the German onslaught. But 
France's defeat was not the army's alone. The turbulence 
of the interwar period created increasing corruption and 
divisiveness in French social and political life. Strategic 
bankruptcy of the French military soon followed. 
5 
By the very act of saving his navy Darlan assumed 
a tremendous burden of hatred, When France fell, both 
Churchill and Roosevelt wanted Darlan to become the leader 
of Frenchmen who would fight against Germany, It is more 
likely that they simply wanted the French Navy brought into 
the war on the side of the Allies, At this time there is 
no question that the loyalty and allegiance of·the French 
naval officers and men belonged to Darlan, He had but to 
give the order and they would obey, Darlan 1 s refusal to 
commit the French fleet -- his sole possession and source 
of bargaining power with the Nazis -- to the Allied cause 
brought widespread indignation in England, The British 
radio, press and political leaders, Churchill included, 
branded him a traitor, renegade and pro-Nazi, Lesser 
criticisms included being called an ambitious opportunist, 
Darlan was certainly a politician, for he had struggled 
for years with the government, seeking naval appropriations, 
More than any other person he was responsible for making 
the fleet the most powerful in France's history, It is 
true that he had but to sail to any Allied port to become 
the leader of France, His error and miscalculation was 
the belief that Great Britain as well as France was beaten, 
It would be only a matter of weeks until England too was 
defeated, By suing for peace and maintaining his control 
6 
of the navy Darlan hoped to reserve for France a leading 
role in Hitler's New Order for Europe, 
This paper deals with many of the more important 
incidents, decisions and events leading up to Darlan 
joining the Allies in November, 1942, It discusses some 
of the more significant diplomatic moves.on his part in 
his association with both the Germans and the Allied envoys 
to Vichy and North Africa, Finally, it includes a dis-
cussion on Earlan 1 s presence in North Africa and the 
consumation of his deal with the Allies which brought 
his approval and cooperation to the "Torch" landings 
there in November, 1942, 
CHAPTER I 
THE FALL OF FRANCE 
The defeat of France in 1940 had its roots in the 
great victory a score of years before. In 1919 France 
was worn-out, battered and devastated. She had lost 
1.5 million men in the First World War and had another 
300,000 permanently disabled. Following the First World 
War French military leaders preached the superiority of 
defensive warfare. The offensive should be taken only 
when having a vast superiority in firepower and numbers. 
The defensive psychology that the Maginot Line created 
helped to undermine France's will to resist in 1940 by 
creating a false sense of security. To the French military 
World War I had taught two lessons. The first was the 
superiority of defense over attack, and the second, the 
value of permanent fortifications capable of resisting 
the most sustained attacks. This doctrine was practiced 
throughout the 1930 1 s. Despite the relative decline in 
population and inferiority of industrial strength, France 
insisted on following a program of military preparedness. 
Whatever the political complexion of the government, 
civil-military relations were characterized by mutual 
1 
distrust from the very beginning of World War II. 
1 I John Steward Ambler, Soldiers 
French Jli,m~ in Politics (New York: 
1968), p, 8-. 
Against the State: The 
Do~bleday and Company, 
8 
The long-delayed act of 1938 governing the "Organization 
2 of the Nation in time of War" failed to solve the problems 
developing between the high command and government. The 
respo~sibility of operations was given to the high command, 
miile the general conduct of the war was reserved for the 
government, The fear of concentrated military authority 
prevented a tight centralization of defense organization 
under the Ministry of Defense and a chief of staff for 
national defense, Entangling political and military 
rivalries were to affect the French War effort. 
When Paul Reynaud replaced Edouard Daladier as 
Premier in March, 1940, civilian-military tensions mounted 
rapidly. Reynaud dared not replace General Maurice-Gustave 
Gamelin as chief of staff of national defense, for Gamelin 1 s 
defender, Daladier, had to be kept on as minister of defense 
in order to draw the support of his Radical Socialist party 
3 into the government. Gamelin accused Reynaud of encroaching 
on his powers over operations in the Norwegian campaign, 
but the French defeat in the Netherlands finally enabled 
Reynaud to replace Gamelin as well as Daladier. By re-
placing Gamelin with the formerly retired General Maxime 
Weygand on May 9, 19~0, Premier Reynaud embraced an even 
3Philip C. F. Bankwi tz, "Maxime Weygand and the Fall 
of France: A Study in Uivil-Military Relations," Journal 
~ Modern History, Volume XXX, Number 3, (September, 1959), 
P• 229. 
9 
more dangerous rival than Gamelin. Just the day before, 
Reynaud had invited Marshal Petain to join the govern-
ment as vice-president of the cabinet. Unknowingly, the 
two men who would contribute most to the fall of the 
government were brought into the fold by the Premier himself. 
General Weygand was a militant Catholic obsessed 
with a hatred and fear of collllllunism and only scorn for 
politicians.4 His abiding distrust of French politicians 
was the result of his encounters with an unsympathetic 
national assembly in the 1930 1 s. Weygand has been accused 
in some circles~~ being a Fascist, owing no doubt to his 
extreme hatred of collllllunism, but it seems more likely that 
his accusers mistook his authoritarianism for totalitarianism. 
The German offensive launched on May 10, 1940 broke 
through the French front and concluded the battle of France 
within six weeks. The overwhelming and humiliating defeat 
produced a series of events which eroded the foundation 
of future military discipline. It signaled the beginning 
of the end of unquestioning obedience to civil authority. 
With the exception of collllllander-in-chief, General Maxima 
Weygand•~,and Aomiral Jean De.rlan 1 s clashes with the 
economy minded ministers in the 1930's, civil-military 
4 Ambler, .2E.• cit., p. 60. 
relations had been comparatively peaceful during this 
period. But the crisis of June, 1940 far outweighed 
10 
all previous tensions between the general staff and 
political leaders, and with the outbreak of the war 
tensions gradually mounted as the weakness of the French 
military machine became apparent. 
Unlike Weygand, who upon taking command thought 
the situation no matter how unfavorable could be reversed, 
Philippe Petain harbored no doubts that the wan was 
virtually lost. As he left his embassy post in Spain to 
assume his new duties as vice-president, he was already 
convinced that his role in the government would not be so 
much to conduct the war, but to conduct its conclusion, 
and if possible negotiate an acceptable peace.5 He fully 
shared Weygand 1 s distrust of the politicians. However, 
there is no reason to believe that the marshal supported 
or participated in any of the right-wing activities during 
the interwar period, and it is doubtful that he ever 
plotted to overthrow the Third Republic as has been charged 
in some quarters. Although ambitious and eager to exercise 
power, despite his eighty-four years, he was probably as 
De Gaulle described him, 11Too proud for intrigue, 116 
5 
Robert Aron, ~ g'ichy Regime 1940-1944 
Beacon Press, 1969), p, • 
(Boston: 
6charles De Gaulle, The Call To Honor (New York: 
Viking ·Press, 1966), p. llb. -- -
11 
From the day the disasters began with the German 
7 o££ensive on May 10, France had lost 100,000 men, Gen-
eral Weygand, never one to mince words, demanded that the 
govermnent £ace the consequences 0£ the greatest disaster 
ever su££ered by the French Army, By June 10 the battle 
0£ France was lost and General Weygand demanded that the 
government sue £or peace immediately, Petain, ready to 
accept the word 0£ the military, voiced the same opinion, 
Thus the minister and President 0£ the Republic met at 
Chateau 0£ Cange, in the vicinity 0£ Tours, to decide 
8 
the country's £ate, The military situation was already 
so grave the government had been £orced to £lee £rom Paris, 
Af'ter the council heard Weygand's report, it postponed a 
decision pending a meeting between Reynaud and Churchill, 
at Tours the next day, The Tours meeting broke up without 
any tangible result, The French were asking £or planes 
to continue the war, convinced that the army was already 
beaten, Churchill re£used to send planes £earing their 
destruction on French air£ields be£ore they could be 
brought into use, As he le£t the meeting Churchill turned 
to Admiral Darlan who had accompanied Reynaud, and asked 
that he not surrender the French fleet, Darlan replied 
that this would constitute a· breach 0£ naval tradition 
7 




and honor, and that he would give the order to scuttle in 
the event the fleet was in danger of capture. Churchill 
advised that his country would neither condemn nor approve 
of a separate armistice with Germany, and suggested again 
a joint appeal to President Roosevelt to bring America 
into the war. 9 
Reporting back to Cange that Churchill had spoken 
so as not to either accept or reject the French proposal 
of a separate armistice, Reynaud encountered a rebellion 
10 
on the part of Paul Baudouin and Yves Bouthillier. They 
had persuaded their colleagues in the Reynaud cabinet during 
the Premier's absence at the Tours conference, that an 
innnediate armistice was necessary and desirable and expressed 
their wishes to conclude an armistice and retain the govern-
ment in France rather than carrying on the war from the 
colonies in Africa. Although adamantly opposed by Premier 
Reynaud, this proposal was supported by both Petain and 
Weygand. In a stormy session that lasted far into the 
night Weygand and Petain reiterated their decision not to 
leave France, at any cost. When reminded that the removal 
of the seat of government was a political question and out-
side the military command, Weygand abruptly left the room, 
slamming the door behind him. The meeting ended with no 
9w1nston s. Churchill, Their Finest 1!QB!: (Boston: 




Aron, .2£• cit., p. 9. Baudouin was Undersecretary 
State for Foreign Affairs and Bouthillier was Minister 
Finance in Reynaud 1 s cabinet reorganization of June 6. 
13 
decision being reached and the following day the govern-
ment fled to take refuge in Bordeaux. With the French 
Army only a ghost of its former self the German advance 
was gathering speed. 
Upon arrival at Bordeaux, and the political and 
military situation growing graver by the hour, Reynaud 
drew up a final appeal to President Roosevelt in the 
early morning hours of June 14. It read in part: 
In the most tragic hour of her history 
France is faced with a choice. Is she to go 
on sacrificing her youth in a hopeless struggle? 
Is her government to leave her soil to avoid 
falling into enemy hands and to be able to 
continuEl the fight at sea from North Africa? 
The only chance of saving the French Nation, 
the advance guard of the democracies, and 
hence of saving Britain, at whose side France 
will be able to remain with her powerful fleet, 
lies in throwing the wefught of flerican power 
into the balance this very day. , 
Drexel Biddle, who had replaced William O. Bullitt 
as the United States ambassador to the French government 
when the latter remained in Paris to represent American 
interests as German forces occupied the capital, was 
given to understand at the time the cable was transmitted 
that unless American declared war within forty-eight hours, 
France would have no alternative but to surrender. He 
urgently cabled the conversation to Roosevelt. A cabinet 
meeting was postponed until Roosevelt's reply was received, 
11Paul Reynaud, In The Thick of The Fight (New Yo:ruc: 
Simon and Schuster, 19~)~. 511. - --
14 
for everything depended on the President's answer, During 
the interlude Petain sent a note to Weygand informing him 
of the discussion that followed his sudden departure the 
day before, and invited him to attend the meeting scheduled 
for Bordeaux on June 15, 
At 11 a,m, on June 15 Roosevelt's negative reply 
was received: 
In these hours, so heart-rending for the 
French people and yourself, I assure you of my 
deepest sympathy, and I can furthermore assure 
you that, so long as the French nation continues 
to defend its liberty, and in so doing the cause 
of democratic institutions in the world, it can 
rely upon receiving from the United States in 
ever increasing quantities of materials and 
supplies of all kinds. 
I know that you will understand that these 
declarations imply no military commitments. 12 
Congress alone can undertake such engagements. 
This strengthened the hand of those advocating an armistice 
and Reynaud played for time in requesting that Churchill 
be consulted for his views once again. When the British 
Prime Minister had not replied by 10 a.m. on June 16, 
Reynaud could stall the·cabinet no longer, When asked 
what the reaction of the Nation Assembly would be to 
transferring the seat of government to North Africa, Reynaud 
received their approval. But the approval of the council 
of ministers was a more difficult matter. When informed o~ 
12 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses 
6f Franklin D, Roosevelt. War :-:-And Aid to Democracies 
TNew York: Macmillan Company, 194iJ~Number 59, exchange of 
cablegrams between Roosevelt and Premier Reynaud, June 14-15, 
1940. pp. 266-267. 
the decision to once more delay the request f'or terms of' 
an armistice and further discussion on moving the govern-
ment, Petain stunned the cabinet by announcing his intention 
13 
to resign f'rom the government. But the majority of' the 
ministers begged the Marshal to continue on and af'f'ord the· 
government the benef'it of his prestige, He agreed to stay, 
but only on the o~ndition that a decision be reached soon, 
Meanwhile, Sir Ronald Campbell, the British ambassador, 
arrived with a telegram f'rom the f'oreign of'f'ice giving 
England's f'ull consent to an inquiry to determine terms 
of' an armistice, provided the French f'leet sailed to a 
British port, This was the f'irst of' two telegrams, that 
day, which later led to colossal misunderstandings between 
Vichy and Great Britain, 
Admiral· Darlan considered the f'leet his private domain 
and interpreted the message to mean that the British wished 
to take his f'leet hostage in return f'or allowing France to 
14 conclude a separate peace. To of'f'er up the French f'leet 
would have lef't the North Af'rican colonies unprotected and 
. 
closed the door to an exile government. Although at this 
time, probably undecided as to which course of' action he 
might approve, the surrender qf' the French rreet certainly 
was not included in his plans, Expecting to keep the f'leet 
13Jules Roy, The Trial of' Marshal Petain (New York: 
Harper and Row, 196b), p. xiii. 
14Alec de Montmorency,~ Enigma of' Admiral Darlan 
(New York: E.P, Dutton, 1943), P• 59. 
16 
out of German hands, England had used the wrong strategy. 
Premier Reynaud, by now de~perately playing for time, nor 
1.5 an Anglophobe such as Darlan, would entertain the suggestion 
of turning over the French fleet to England, In the final 
analysis· the ultimate decision regarding the French fleet 
would rest with Admiral Darlan.16 The British proposal 
:Cunthered Reynaud 1s complications in holding his govern-
ment together, for it now confirmed the fact that England 
17 
was prepared to sanction an armistice, 
As the Premier prepared to convene a cabinet meeting 
on the afternoon of June 16, the British Foreign Office 
appeared to have saved the day after all. Churchill was 
calling to voice his approval of a proposed Declaration of 
U 
• 18 
nion between the two government and their citizens, To 
Reynaud it now seemed that France could stay in the war. 
1.5 
Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New 
York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p. 12~. Also see 
De Montmorency, .QE.• cit., pp. 118-119. 
16 Sir Edward L. Spears, Assi~nment to Catastrophe 
(New York:' A.A. Wyn, 19.5.5), p. 30. Also see Churchill, 
.2E.• cit., p. 202. 
17 Sppars, .QE.• cit., pp. 290-291. 
18churchill, .212.• cit., p. 210. 
Lf 
The declaration was a product of the imagination of Jean 
Monnet, head of the French economic delegation in London, 
and General Charles De Gaulle, then Undersecretary of State 
for War. De Gaulle was chosen to press the idea on Churchill 
during a luncheon engagement, It provided for the two 
countries to pool their entire resources under a single 
cabinet to do battle against the Axis. Reynaud at once 
submitted the proposal to the cabinet where it was rejected 
without discussion or vote. 
None of the cabinet took time to consider or analyze 
the declaration, simply dismissing it after brief mention. 
Petain charged that it was just another trick by the British 
to delay an armistice and gain time for themselves. Others 
charged that under the proposal France would become hardly 
more than a British colony, There might be a degree of 
truth in both charges, but their assessment of the grave 
situation before them could not allow for an overall and 
far-reaching view of the advantages, The proposal had 
arrived at a most inopportune time, By now the cabinet 
had divided into two factions, those insisting on an 
armistice, and those dedicated to continuing the war from 
the colonies, When it became apparent that the impasse 
could not be resolved, Reynaud had no choice but to offer 
his resignation, but the President of the Republic, 
Albert Lebrun, refused to accept it and adjourned 
the meeting. 
18 
Reynaud remained adamant and Petain was called 
upon to form a government; thus those supporting the 
policy of opening negotiations for an armistice had 
carried the day. Among the newly appointed ministers 
in the Petain cabinet were General W~~gand as Minister 
of National Defense and Admiral Darlan as Minister of 
Marine. Sometime after midnight on June 16, the new 
government inquired, through the Spanish ambassador, 
19 
under what terms hostilities might come to an end. 
Hitler kept the French cabinet in~uspense for 
three days before replying. During this time he was 
conferring with Mussolini, for Italy had declared war 
on-'France, June 12. When he finally answered, the message 
proved only instructions to name delegates to a meeting. 
They would be notified later as to the time and place. 
During the critical periodl'Petain wavered at least onee 
and considered moving the government to Algiers. He 
ordered Darlan to prepare a ship for departure, but at 
the last minute Petain was persuaded by Laval to retain 
L. 20 
the government in France. 
19 
Aron, EE• cit., pp. 46-47. 
20 
William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 4f; 
19 
Since Hitler's foreign policy concerning France had 
been neither long-ranging nor specific, the request for 
21 
an armistice came quite unexpected. The three days 
wait permitted Hitler to formulate a new program. It 
seems that the hopes for an early peace with England were 
uppermost in his mind when the armistice terms were dictated, 
for he hoped to arrive at an agreement with Britain with-
out further military operations. His immediate objectives 
were to keep the French government from continuing the war 
from the colonies, and to keep the French fleet in French 
hands where it would be out of the war. The armistice 
terms-allowed an area of France to be governed and admin-
istered by Frenchmen, plus a standing army of 100,000 men. 
The two conditions that loomed so large for the future were 
that North Africa was to remain unoccupied and the fleet 
was to remain under French control. 
The Allies' main concern regarding the armistice 
issue was the control and disposal of the French i'leet. 
Great Britain coveted the French fleet for their arsenal 
of defense. Darlan and his countr-ymen were greatly relieved 
that Hitler did not ask for its surrender. In the end Darlan 
saw it as his only effective bargaining tool. 
20 
Hitler thought it politically unwise to occupy the 
whole of France and had little interest in French colonies. 
This reasoning may have been one of the Fuhrer•s great 
strategic mistakes in the war, for from southern France 
it would have been possible to sweep into the Mediterranean 
and head for North Africa at once. Men such as Weygand 
and Darlan were quick to point this out, and just before 
his death Darlan stated, 11 In getting Hitler to sign the 
armistice, France at least succeeded in making him commit 
the first and possibly the most serious of his military 
blunders. 1122 This however cannot be used in Darlan•s 
defense, for in 1942 he enjoyed hindsight, and it in no 
way suggests sagacity on his part in the decision made 
two years earlier. 
Darlan considered himself honor bound to his 
sailor's word to both the British and the Nazis in accord-
ance with the terms of the armistice, He promised the 
Germans that the fleet would not be brought into the war 
against the Axis and the British that the fleet would never 
surrender to her enemies. Apparently unable to accept the 
German's word of honor, Darlan issued specific instructions 
that the fleet be scuttled if Germany attempted to seize it, 23 
22 
Langer, .EE.• ill•, p. 61. Quoted from "Darlan: 
Message To Amei>ica,11 (Cosmopolitan. Magazine, January, 1943). 
23 ~ Aron, .212.• ill•• PP• 49-✓0• 
21 
Yet Darlan could only offer his word to the British and 
this they did not consider a sufficient guarantee, The 
propaganda efforts immediately issuing from Great Britain 
were directed at Darlan and the fleet rather than the 
armistice and the Petain government. The admiral voiced 
his belief to Ambassador Bullitt that England could hold 
out only a matter of weeks under the heavy air bombardment 
and thus he saw no reason to turn over the Frenuh fleet 
to Great Britain when it would be of no consequence in the 
war effort, Churchill later recalled this in a speech to 
the Canadian Parliament, December 30, 1941, 
When I warned them (the French government) 
Britain would fight on alone whatever they did, 
their generals told their Prime Minister-and 
his divided cabinet: 1 In three weeks England 
will have her neck wrung 1ike a chicken.• 
Some chicken! Some neck124 
But even if England survived and won the war, 
Darlan doubted that a single vessel would be returned or 
treatment accorded France by Great Britain would be more 
generous than that accorded by Germany, Darlan believed 
that Germany would probably win the war and that a Ge!lll1an 
victory was desirable from the French point of view, He 
was confident of a leading role for France in Hitler's 
2'1. . 
""v/inston S. Churchill, The Unrentlentin ustru.ggle 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 19 , p. 367. 
22 
.Europe. Darlan feared Great Britain's post-war ambitions 
in the French empire in the event of an Allied victory, but 
these fears later proved quite unjustified and the British 
i f t t . f d b • 25 prom ses o the res ora ion o France ha een sincere. 
Thus, when the armistice was signed between France 
and Germany at Rethondes on June 22, four days after Charles 
De GaUlle had proclaimed a rival French government in London, 
France in effect had interests on both sides of the war. 
For the time being she was~1.allowing herself to play both 
ends against the middle. But her empire and fleet were 
intact, and she had avoided annihilation -- the fate of 
Hitler's previous conquests. 
25 
Adrienne Doris Hytier, !!!Q_ Years 2f. French Foreign 
Policy, Vichy 1940-1942. Etudies d 1 Histoire Economique, 
Politique et Social, Volume XXV (Paris: Librairie Minard, 
1958), p. 271. 
CHAPTER II 
SIX MONTHS OF CRISIS 
The Petain cabinet selected Vichy as its seat or 
government, It is still not clear why, but probably they 
expected this to be only a temporary arrangement ror the 
Germans had promised at Rethondes to allow the government 
to return to Paris, The resort city or Vichy, ramous ror 
its medicinal mineral water, orrered its many spacious 
hotels, casinos and villas to the new arrivals. Here, 
the dazed government, staggering under catastrophic 
military reverses tried to pull itselr back together, 
The ministers and their leader abandoned Clermont-Ferrand, 
to which they had rled rrom Bordeaux, and arrived at Vichy 
July 1, During the next ten days Pierre Laval devoted his 
full attention to the rinal destruction of the Republic, 
and on July 10, 19~0 the National Assembly, by the necessary 
constitutional majority, committed suicide by legally deleg-
1 
ating to Marshal Petain the power or revising the constitution, 
Af'ter Laval.engineered the surrender or the National Assembly, 
Petain was named Head or State and charged with carrying out 
2 
a National Revolution, The Vichy government's political 
philosophy or "work, ramily, country" replaced the once 
cherished motto or "liberty, equality, rraternity, 11 This new 
1
William L, Shirer,~ Collapse or the Third Republic: 
1fil. Inquiry .!!rt£ the Fall .Q.f France in 19[07New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 19b9>, pp, 29-30. 
2Andre Geraud, The Gravediggers of France (New York: 
Doran and Company, 19m, p, 4o/i. 
24 
philosophy rang more true to the ear of military officers 
serving in political posts of the Vighy regime after the 
armistice, During the following week the Marshal moved 
to consolidate his powers, He reduced the number of his 
cabinet from fifteen to twelve and named Laval his eventual 
successor, Petain now ruled by executive decree and the 
Third Republic came to an end, 
The first six months of the Vichy regime com.Prised 
its most critical period, It was during this time that 
decisions were made which determined its character, 3 In 
spite of its somewhat precarious position, it was almost 
universally recognized, and tlJt_r,ty-two goveI'Ilillents, including 
the Soviet Union and United States maintained diplomatic 
relations,4 Diplomatic pressures brought by the British 
as well as the Germans served to bring Paul Baudouin, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Pierre Laval, as Vice-
Premier, to the front in the cabinet, Laval was an out 
and out Naziphile and wished to see France drawn into 
the Axis camp, 5 Baudouin on the other hand sought to 
negotiate with the British and ease the blockade, 
3Paul Farmer, Vichy Political Dilemma (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1955), p, 177. 
¾1illiam D, Leahy,,! Was There 
House, 1950), p, 16. 
' (New York: Whittlesey 
5
Michael J asperson, "Laval and the Nazis: A Study 
of Franco-German Relations," (Unpublished Ph, D, dissertation, 
Georgetown University, 1967), P• 63. 
25 
Oddly enough it was the British who were the first to 
eXpress a firm attitude t~ward the Vichy regime. Through a 
rupture of diplomatic relations and communications, the two 
governments lost oontact. Campbell, the British ambassador, 
had left Bordeaux immediately after the armistice, fearing -
he would be taken prisoner by the Germans. The French 
ambassador had left London at the same time, although the 
two countries had not as yet severed relations. This was 
done on the afternoon of July 3, following the British 
attack on a part of the French fleet anchored off Mers-el-Kebir, 
6 Algeria. 
During the night of July 2-3, the Royal Navy Command 
Force H under the command of Admiral Sir James Somerville 
appeared off Mers-el-kebir, the French naval base located 
in the naturat harbor near the _Algerian city of Oran. Shortly 
after midnight of July 2, Churchill's War Cabinet sent 
Somerville a carefully conceived communication to relay to 
the French Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul. 
York: 
It is impossible for us••• to allow your 
fine ships to fall into the power of the German 
or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight 
on to the end, ••• we shall never forget that 
France was our ally••• and that our common 
enemy is Germany. For this purpose we must make 
sure that the best ships of the French Navy are 
not used against us by the common foe. In these 
circumstances, His Majesty's Government has in-
structed me to demand that the French Fleet now 
at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance 
with one of the following alternatives: 
6
Leon Ma~chal, Vichy, Two Years of Deception 
Macmillan Company, 19ffi, P• 73. 
{New 
(1) Sail with us and continue to fight for Vic-
tory against the Germans and Italians, 
(2) Sail with reduced crews under our control 
to a British port, The reduced crews will be 
repatriated at the earliest moment. 
If either of these courses is adapted by 
you, we will restore your ships to France at 
the conclusion of the war or pay full compensa-
tion, if they are damaged meanwhile, 
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(3) Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate 
that your ships should not be used against the 
Germans or Italians unless these break the arm-
istice, then sail them with us with reduced 
crews to some French port in the West Indies --
Martinique, for instance -- where _they can be 
demilitarised to our satisfacti_on, or perhaps 
be entrusted to the United States and remain 
safe until the end of the war, the crews being 
repatriated, 
If you refuse these fair orders, I must 
with profound regret, require you to sink your 
ships within six hours, 
Finally, failing the above, I have orders 
of His Majesty's Government to use whatever 
force may be necessary to prevent your shi:i,s 
from falling into German or Italian hands, 
Faced with this ultimatum, Admiral Gensoul replied 
in writing that in no case would the French warships be 
allowed to fall intact into German hands, and that force 
would be met with force, All day negotiations continued 
between Captain Holland of the Royal Navy and Lieutenant 
de Vaisseau Dufay representing Admiral Gensoul, They 
had once been classmates and were still on friendly tenns, 
It was hoped their friendship might offer some basis of 
8 
adverting the impending disaster, Admiral Somerville was 
then informed of Darlan 1 s secret orders transmitted to the 
7churchill, Their Finest Hour, QE, cit,, pp, 234-235, 
8 Aron, -2.P.• cit,, p. 76. 
27 
fleet on June 20, and again on June 24. The text of the 
orders were: 
You will be clearly notified elsewhere of 
the armistice terms. I am availing myself of 
this final connnunication, which I transmit in 
code, to make known my thoughts on the matter. 
These orders will remain in force, regardless 
of any orders to the contrary you might receive 
in the future, even if they are signed by me. 
(1) The demobilized warships must remain French, 
under French colors, with reduced French crews-, 
and remaining in French Metropolitan or colonial 
ports. 
(2) Secret precautions against sabotage must be 
undertaken so that an enemy or former ally seizing 
the ship by force will not be able to use it. 
(3) If the armistice commission should arrive at 
an interpretation decidedly different from that 
in the first article above, at the moment of this 
new decision the warships should be taken without 
new orders from me to the United States, or if 
nothing else can be done, they should be scuttled 
to deprive the enemy of them. In no case should 
they be left intact to the enemy. 
(4) Vessels seeking refuge with foreigners ought 
not be used in war operations against Germany or 
Italy without orders from the Chief of French 
Naval Forces. 
(5) :tn no case should you obey orders from a 
foreign adrniralty.9 
These orders were reissued from time to time to remind 
the fleet that it must never deliver itself to a ~oretgn 
power, and these last secret instructions, issued before 
the armistice, seem to prove the good faith of the French. 
In the eyes of French sailors these orders rendered the 
attack at Mers-el-Kebir still more unjustifiable. 
9 Hytier, QE.• cit., p. 37. 
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Somerville was in continual contact with the War 
Cabinet throughout the day in hopes of averting a clash 
of arms. It was all to no avail, however, since by the 
time the admiralty 1 s final message was received, the battle 
had actually begun. That message read: 11French ships 
must comply with our terms or sink themselves or be sunk 
10 by you before dark. 11 
The British mined the harbor to prevent escape. 
Caught in the trap and shelled at point-blank range, a 
portion of the fleet was virtually destroyed and the battle 
over in less than fifteen minutes. The Strasbourg was the 
cruiser to successfully evade the bombardment and run the 
mine field. The battleship Dunkergue r.an aground. The 
Provence was beached. The Bretagne blew up and capsized. 
Of the big ships, only the Connnandant-Teste remained untouched 
in the harbor. 
missing, and 351 
French casual.ties came to 1,297 killed or 
11 
wounded. The dead were buried on 
July 5. British casualties were nil. 
The Mers-el-Kebir attack was only part of the Briti1;h 
strategy to seal the fate of the French fleet. On the same 
day, they seized without warning French warships and crews 
in Portsmouth; Plymouth and Southampton. French merchant 
ships in British ports were also boarded and captured. That 
10churchill, Their Finest Hour, .QI!.• cit., p. 236. 
11Rear Admiral Raymond De Belot (French Navy, Ret.), 
~ Struggle For the Mediterranean, 1939-~ (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 29. 
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part of the French fleet in Alexandria was blocked in port, 
and only a personal agreement between Admiral Andrew Cunning-
ham and Admiral Rene Godfroy prevented the same treatment 
12 
meted out to the French at Mers-el-Kebir. The French 
admiral agreed to discharge his ships' fuel oil, remove 
the fir~ng mechanisms from their guns and notify the British 
upon receiving orders to sail. The fleet was virtually in 
uaptivity, but it did not matter. Vichy was so disgusted 
with ,Godfroy 1 s actions that the naval ministry refused to 
answer his telegrams for more than two months. 
Finally, on July 8, the iqplete battle-cruiser Richelieu 
was bombarded and crippled at Dakar, where she had taken 
refuge, Her guns remained to be mounted and this task could 
not be done at Dakar, These British attacks furnished Laval 
excellent arguments in bringing the Republic to an end, and 
the government which had founded its foreign policy on an 
alliance with a nation that now attacked defenseless ships, 
was heaped with scorn. 
The Vichy response to the attacks was moderate but 
nevertheless marked an important turning point in Anglo-French 
relations, Previously an advocate of friendly relations with 
England, although never offering close cooperation, Darlan 
now became outspokenly anti-British. He openly favored 
a declaration of hostilities against England after the attacks, 13 
12Admiral Sir .Andrew B, Cunningham,! Sailor's Odyssey, 
The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham 
of H;yndhope {London: Hutchinsonand Company, 19.51), pp. 247-49. 
13 Ambler, 2P.• .Q.ll., P• 69, 
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Meanwhile, the efforts of Laval in favoring a broad 
collaboration with Germany, brought Eranco-German relations 
to a critical point. As tensions increased and German 
pressure mounted, evidence seems to indicate that France 
might have been driven into England's arms, had the British 
not attacked at Mers-el-Kebir and tightened the blockade 
as we11.14 Churchill prevented any hopes of French-Allied 
cooperation with the attack and the refusal to ease the 
blockade, despite the United States• desire that France 
be allowed to trade with her colonies. As the government 
concentrated its efforts on securing food stuffs and approving 
economic collaboration with Germany during July and August, 
it was continually undergoing internal reorganization. Laval 
took credit in realigning the cabinet, but his moves were 
15 
more in the nature of compromises than victories. General 
Weygand was sent to North Africa as Pete.in 1 s personal repre-
16 
sentative when he was dropped from the cabinet on September 7. 
Meeting with Petain on October 24, the Nazi Fuhrer 
took great pains to be cordial to the Marshal. Petain was 
l4Farmer, .QE.• cit., pp. 184-186. 
l5John M. Hyde, "Pierre Laval: The Illusions of A 
Realist, 1939-1940, 11 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1962), p. 43. 
16~-
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informed that he must surround hims elf with men Hitler 
could trust, and Laval was one of the men Hitler considered 
most trustworthy •17 The meeting, and famous handshake of 
Petain and Hitler, caused Paul Baudouin to resign his 
foreign ministry in disgust, in the belief that active 
military collaboration was soon to come. The vacancy 
permitted Laval to become Foreign Minister as well as 
Vice-Premier, pressing his case for collaboration throughout 
November and the first weeks of December. His meeting with 
German Foreign Minister van Ribbentrop in Paris and then 
18 
with Hitler in Berlin gave him added hope and courage. 
When a scheme by Laval and Otto Abetz, the German represent-
ative in Paris, was uncovered, Petain angrily dismissed 
Laval from the government. They had planned an elaborate 
welcome for the Marshal when he was to attend a ceremony 
marking the one-hundredth anniversary of the return of 
Napoleon's ashes to France. The Germans were returning 
the ashes of the Duke of Reichstadt, Napoleon's son, at the 
same time as a gesture of friendship. The warm welcome 
would persuade Petain to return the gover!ll11ent to Paris, 
where Laval could bring collaborators into the government 
more easily, and 




the real master of France, which 
The scheme failed completely, Yet 
17 · Marchal, .2£• ill•, P•. 93. 
18 Jasperson, .21!.• cit., p. 43 • 
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the real cause ror Laval 1 s dismissal is not to be round 
in his schemes, petty jealousies or intrigues, but simply 
his railure to obtain tangible results by his collaboration 
policy. Laval 1 s dismissal did not meet with Hitler 1 s 
approval and a war or nerves ensued, with Petain holding 
his ground on the armistice terms that permitted an indep-
endent government, while at the same time wishing to honor 
his pledge or collaboration. For although he had made no 
real concessions at Montoire on October 24, both Laval 
and Hitler thought Petain had committed France to a policy 
or military collaboration. 20 
When Hitler insisted upon Laval 1 s reinstatement, 
Petain sent Admiral Darlan to Paris as intermediary. The 
point was won that Petain could indeed revoke the constit-
utional act that named Laval his successor. Laval was 
orrered a choice or two minor cabinet posts in an attempt 
to please the Germans, but he wanted the ministry or interior, 
21 
which Petain refused. Laval's rorced retirement and the 
diplomatic crisis that rollowed paved the way ror the political 
triumph or Darlan two months later. 
Following Laval I s dismissal, Petain summoned Pierre 
Flandin to Vichy, where he served brierly, rrom December 1940 
until February 1941, as Minister or Foreign Mrairs. But 
20Pierre Laval, The D[B}y or Pierre Laval (New York: 
Charles Scribner•s Sons";-19 , p. 161. 
21Herbert Cole, Laval: ! Biography 
Putnam•s Sons, 1963), p. 307. 
(New York: 
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Flandin was too willing to run the risk of sharp conflict 
with Germany. 22 He adamantly opposed the Nazi idea of a 
directory which would bring Laval back into the government. 
In Paris the German representative, Abetz, was still de-
manding a position for Laval in the foreign ministry, along 
with the dismissal of the ministers who assisted in the purge 
of Lavai. 23 Finally, Flandin was pressured into tendering 
his resignation, and thus opened the .doqr for Darlan as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs after Abetz let it be known 
24 that the Admiral was acceptable to the Germans. 
In assuming his new post on February 21, 1941, Admiral 
Darlan gave further indications of his thirst for power and 
his a·ctions during these fourteen months of his career may 
ultimately prove to be history's case against him. The 
armistice in 1940 opened the door for Darlan. He rapidly 
emerged as one of the. most influential men in the French 
government. Collaboration was a risky policy at best, and no 
one realized this more than Darlan. As a thoroughly ruthless 
politician, 25 long submerged in the intrigues and bickerings 
of the Vichy gover:rµnent, he often replied to his accusers: 
"One plays politics with realities, not with sentiments. 1126 
Although Admiral Darlan 1 s sentiments were qui:te;;s:t;rongly 
22Aron, op. cit., p. 271. 
23cole, op. cit., p. 308. 
24Farmer, op. cit., pp. 206-207. 
25De Montmorency, op. cit., p. 128. 
26 Ibid. 
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anti-British., they were not as yet pro-German. Many 
real and imagined incidents caused him to harbor a great 
deal of anti-British sentiment and often the British them-
selves made his decisions much easier for him. Such 
occasions were the personal attitudes of the British Admir-
alty representatives, Sir Dudley Pound and First Lord of 
the Admiralty, Mr. A.V,A. Alexander. 
In discussing the role of the French fleet innnediately 
preceeding the armistice, Pound advised that it be put at 
the disposal of England. When Darlan would not agree to 
this, Alexander then proposed that it be dispatched to 
American waters for the duration of the war. Darlan pointed 
out that England was asking a great sacrifice on France I s 
part, which would lend nothing to the British war effort. 
Alexander stated that it was the opinion ·of the British 
government that these measures were necessary in order 
to prevent the French fleet from falling into German hands. 
Darlan replied: 
Marshal Petain has given the British govern-
ment his soldier's word that he will not surrender 
a single unit of the French fleet to the foes of 
Great Britain. You also have my wo2?. Is that not a sufficient guarantee for you? 
28 11We have no use for words, 11 said Alexander. Thus the two 
government's dipl011latic relations had declined to a personal 
27 · 
Ibid., p. 92. 
35 
level, and the incident was later recalled as vividly by 
the old Marshal as by Darlan. 
Despite continued assurance from both Petain and 
Darlan that the fleet would be scuttled before it would 
be allowed to fall into Gennan hands, the British were 
not convinced and thus attacked at Mers-el-Kebir. From 
the time he refused to hand over the fleet, which resulted 
in the British decision to attack at Mers-el-Kebir, Darlan 1 s 
relations vnth England went from bad to worse. Although 
still unwilling to ally Vichy with Nazi Germany, he faced 
the dilemma of military collaboration or annihilation as 
he assumed his new role of Foreign Minister. 
CHAPTER III 
DARLAN 1S MINISTRY: 
COLLABORATION OR ANNIHILATION? 
The official policy of the Vichy government was to 
carry out the terms of the armistice, for as Darlan pointed 
out, for France not to apply the armistice loyally and 
thereby give the victor a motive_for denouncing it, might 
1 
amount to suicide for herself and her empire. Caught 
between the Axis and Allies, Darlan made special efforts 
2 
to pursue a policy of exclusive Francophilism. The problem 
was the ultimate fate of France and her empire. To resolve 
. this Darlan pursued a policy of military collaboration with 
Germany on one hand, while reminding Great Britain of' 
France's promise that her fleet woUld never come into the 
war against a former ally. 
Military collaboration was distasteful and dishonorable 
to Darlan, 3 but in early 1941, he still believed in a German 
victory and desired a leading role for himself' and France 
in Hitler's New Europe. Moreover, since Mers-el-Kebir, Darlan 
1 Ro.bert o. Paxton, "Army Officers in Vichy France: 
The Krm:hstice Army, 11 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1963), pp. 265-266. 
2Hytier, op. cit., p. 290. As quoted in Jerome 
Carcopino•s Souveni~de Sept Ans (Paris: 1953), pp, 289-290. 
Carcopino was Secretary of State for National Education 
and Youth in the Darlan Ministry. 
3oe Montmorency, .2£• .£!:!:,., p. 128. 
5{ 
expressed a more intense dislike of the British, and 
sometimes went so far as to hope for a German victory: 
"Great Britain," he said to American Charge d 1Ai'fairs, 
H, Freeman Mathews on December 14, 1940, "would ask too 
much, probably Madagascar and Dakar, whereas Germany 
would content herself with Alsace-Lorraine, which is lost 
in any case, 114 
Darlan 1 s efforts to steer the Vichy ship of state 
along a course of exclusive French self-aggrandizement 
were off-set by two of the most momentous events of the 
war, On June 22, 1941 the Nazis launched their Russian 
campaign and six months later the Japanese attacked Pearl 
Harbor, These events turned the European coTirlict into 
a world conflagration and the role of France in world 
affairs suddenly les·sened, The survival of a sovereign 
France seemed of small consequence as the scale of the war 
changed, Only after the German army completely bogged down 
in Russia did Darlan have second thoughts about the outcome 
of the war, "What will be the outcome of the war? We do 
5 
not know, 11 he replied, With Russia involved, the Admiral 
4Forei'rw Relations of the United States, 1940. 
Volume II, Washington, n":"c7: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1957), pp. 490-491, 
5Alain Darlan, L1 amiral Darlan parle (Paris: 
Amiot-Dumont,'1952), p. 114. 
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feared an Allied victory would lead to a communist triumph 
in Europe and a victorious Germany was preferable to this. 
Especially if France were to be Hitler's favorite vassal. 
Under this illusion Darlan had pressed for collaboration 
following his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
With the helm of the machinery of government completely 
in his grasp, he entered into delicate negotiations with 
Germany in hope of preserving French sovereignity in the 
emp1re. 
6 
Petain I s first instnuctions to Darlan were to 
resume a policy of collaboration as outlined at Montoire. 7 
These instructions were quite similar to his own thoughts, 
for on January 30, he wrote, "We should think first of the 
present and, continuing the policy which led us to ask 
for an armistice, we must collaborate. 118 Just before 
Petain named him Vice-Premier and "dauphin, 11 Darlan again 
wrote on February 21, "Collaboration, is in my opinion, 
' 
indispensable not only for the recovery, but for the very 
life of the nation. 11 9 
At the onset of his ministry, Admiral D~rlan found 
himself in a most difficult position. Diplomatic relations 
had not been completely broken off with the Third Reich, 
for haggling between General Huntziger and General Wilhelm 
Keitel continued daily at the armistice commission meetings 
6George Mel ton, 11Darlan and ll'ichy Foreign Policy, 
1940-1942, 11 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University 
of North Carolina, 1963), p. 106. 
7 Darlan, op. cit., p. 90. 9 Ibid,, p. 281, 
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in Wiesbaden, while diktats and Nazi pressure for military 
collaboration increased. Neither Petain nor Darlan succeeded 
in re-establishing top-level relations and negotiations 
with Germany during March and April. Near the end of April 
unexpected political circumstances caused the Germans to 
consider French cooperation once more. A rebellion, 
fostered by Axis agents, broke out in Iraq, This was 
part of an overall German strategy for the Middle East 
which proposed a pincer movement aimed at Suez. The north-
ern drive would be launched across the Balkans, where the 
Germans occupied Yugoslavia, while the southern offensive 
would be aimed at the same objective through Tripolitania 
10 
and Egypt. By the end of April the Nazi forces were 
ready to begin their push, Rommel had crossed the Egyptian 
frontier, and Crete and Greece had been occupied, If Iraq 
fell, the British position would become untenable, Iraq 
declared war on England on May 2, 1941, and in order to 
support her new allies, the Germans had to pass through 
French mandated Syria. Thus Vichy's collaboration became 
indispensable. It was at this point that Darlan entered 
the picture. 
lOH,R, Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's War Directives 
1939-19,45 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1964), Directive 
Number 32, p. 80. 
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On May 3 he was summoned to Paris by the German 
ambassador, Otto Abetz, thus initiating the negotiations 
which Darlan had been trying to bring about for two 
11 months. It was imperative that Vichy act quickly, and 
owing to the delicate situation the negdtiations were 
shrouded in secrecy, There is no doubt that Darlan often 
acted first and 7eported to Petain and the cabinet later. 
He was willing to make concessions first in hopes of later 
attaining greater and more definite concessions from the 
Germans. Before he went to Paris Darlan had already agreed 
to make available to Rommel a number of French military 
12 
trucks stored in North Africa, General Maxime Weygand 
was furious about this, but had to accept the fact ac-
complished.13 
Delighted at being received at the conference table 
by the victors. and assured that the matter of Pierre Laval I s 
return to 
agreed to 
Vichy would be 
14 everything. 
left out of discussions, Darlan 
In addition to aiding with the 
transportation of supplies across Syria, he agreed that 
France would furnish a certain amount of arms and ammunition 
11 
Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 312. 
13Langer, .2E.• ill•, p. 148 •. Quoted from the un-
published diary of a French diplomat who was very close 
to the developments at this time, The diary co.vers the 
period April 26 to June 6 in great detail. 
14Hytier, 21?.• ill•• p. 254. 
to the Iraqi rebels, as well as a few airplanes. All 
of these were to come from French stocks in Syria and 
were readily available. France would also CJDntribute 
to the refuelling and repair of German aircraft in 
transit at the airfield of Aleppo, in northern Syria, 
1.5 and this facility was placed at German disposal. On 
May 9 the first German aircraft (three Messerschmitts and 
a Junker .52 camouflaged in Iraqi colors) landed at Damascus 
with a team of technicians whose job was to study the 
16 problem of refuelling the transit aircraft. A Franco-'German 
mission arrived at Aleppo on the same day. The group included 
a man 
whose 
bearing the name, 
17 
name was Rahn. 
Renier, but who in fact was a German 
This was a direct violation of 
Vichy's word that only Germans who were members of the 
armistice commission would be allowed in the French empire. 
The mission came to Aleppo to insure the smooth transmission 
of French arms to Iraq, and was quite active. A hundred 
German aircraft and four trainloads of munitions swiftly 
crossed into Iraq,18 At this p<i>int the Vichy government 
l.5Aron, .QE• ill•• p. 311. 
16Ibid, 
17Ibid,, p, 313. 
18Ibid, 
seems to have accepted military collaboration, although 
Darlan denied it, He based his argument on Article 10 
of the Armistice Convention,19 In his interpretation of 
Article 10, he pretended not to see the difference in 
abstaining from hostile acts and effectively aiding 
the Germans, 
In return for his military collaboration, Darlan 
was granted a relaxation of conditions at the demarcation 
line that permitted a freer flow of mail and less restricted 
20 
travel between the occupied and unoccupied zones, In 
reality this was no concession, for it was more in the 
interests of Germany than Vichy, The Germans also granted 
re8.Dmament of six destroyers and seven torpedo 




The German concession of freeing certain prisoners of 
war (~on-commissioned officers and soldiers who has served 
in World War I) was a great propaganda victory for Vichy 
22 since this amounted to approximately 83,000 men, Over and 
19 Documents of German Foreign Policy, Volume IX, Series D 
(Washington, D,C.: U,S, Government Printing Office, 1962), 
PP, 674-675, The first paragraph of Article 10 of the Arm-
istice Convention stated: 11The French Government undertakes 
not to engage in any hostile actions with any part of the 
armed forces left to it, or in any way, against the German 
Reigh," 
20 
Aron, .2£• .£11., p. 312. 
21.Thld,, p. 313. 
22Ibid. 
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above these concessions, the first important once France 
had obtained in nearly a year, the Paris talks of May 3-6, 
at last, enabled Darlan to obtain another meeting with 
the Fuhrer. 23 
Collaboration seemed to be taking a new direction 
at last when Darlan was invited to see Hitler at Berch-
tesgaden on May 11 and 21. But the Nazi Fuhrer 1 s attitude 
had changed from the congenial reception he had previously 
given Pete.in and Laval, for he was in the mood that Darlan 
so well remembered. Hitler was brutal and authoritarian. 
Perhaps his mood might be explained by the disappointing 
news of the previous day. Rudolf Hess, Cheif of the Party, 
the Fuhrer 1 s s.econd successor, had on his own initative, 
flown to Scotland on May 10, where he intended to propose 
that Great Britain conclude a separate peace with Germany.~_ 
Perhaps too, French collaboration was increasingly more 
important in May 1941, than it had been when he met Pete.in 
23 Admiral Jules T. Docteur, La Grande Enigma de la 
Guerre: Darlan, Admiral de le Flotte (Paris: Editions 
de la Couronne, 1949), pp-.-l'ob-107. Darlan had been re-
ceived by Hitler in the Fuhrer 1 s personal railway coach at 
Ferriere-sur-Epte, near Beauvais on December 25, 1940. At 
this time Darlan was acting as Petain 1 s intermediary during 
the Flandin-Laval Cabinet crisis. "Never, 11 he told Admiral 
Docteur, "have I scolded one of my officers as I. was scolded." 
24rhid., p. 120, Also s~e Aron, .212.• cit., p, 314, 
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and Laval in October 1940. To the Reich Chancellor collab-
oration was not an end in i tsel1'. "I have only the protection 
01' German interests in view," he said. 25 From then on, the 
principle 01' 11give or I take" became the basis 01' all negoti-
ations, 26 11It is high time France prepared h'e peace, She 
must decide whether she wishes to collaborate or not, 1127 
the Fuhrer stated, 
Hitler placed Darlan in the dilemma 01' military 
collaboration or annihilation, The decision came quickly. 
Darlan informed Hitler France was willing to help Germany 
win the war, Vichy, he added, had already manifested its 
desire to collaborate economically and militarily by lending 
support to the Reich in Syria. France was ,tllling to continue 
this policy, but Darlan stressed the point that it would be 
a most opportune time 1'or Germany to make certain concessions, 
The Admiral also took the opportunity to further his -mm 
interests (obtaining a leading role in the New European Navy) 
when he assured Hitler that his government would 11direct 
French policy towards an integration with the New European 
28 Order, 11 and assured continuity of this line of policy. 
Darlan did not have to be won over to military collaboration 
25Aron, £!!• cit., p, 314. 
26~. 
27Docteur, op. cit,, p. 321. Docteur discusses at 
length the territorial readjustments Hitler used to threaten 
Darlan. 
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for he actively sought it, To him this seemed the only 
acceptable course of action in order to avoid annihilation, 
He argued that it was possible for France to help Germany 
win the war without being in a state of co-belligerency 
with her, and at the same time refrain from a state of 
hostility against Great Britain, 
When he returned to Vichy on May 13, Darlan called 
an important Council of Ministers meeting for the following 
day. Four Secretaries of State29 and Petain were present 
to hear the Admiral's report on his conversation with Hitler 
and a plea favoring collaboration. As he outlined the 
points favoring a course of action to pursue collaboration, 
he stat"ed: 
(1) It is the last chance we shall have 
for a repproachment with Germany, 
(2) If we favor the policy of England, 
France will be crushed, dismembered and 
cease to·be a nation, , , 
(3) If we endeavor to maintain a policy 
of vacillation between-the two adversaries, 
Germany will create many difficulties for us 
in the exercise of our sovereignty and will 
foment unrest. In any case the peace will 
be a disastrous one. 
(4) If we collaborate with Germany, with-
out going so far as to place ourselves at her 
29 
Those present were Yves Bouthillier, Minister 
of Finance; General Charles Huntziger, Minister of War; 
Pierre Caziot, Minister of Agriculture; and Joseph 
Barthelemy, Minister of Justice, 
side for the purpose of making deliberate war 
on England, that is is say work for her in 
Lj.b 
our factories, if we give her certain facilities, 
we can save the French nation, reduce our 
territorial losses to a minimum, both metro-
politian and colonial, and play an honorable 
part, if not an important one in the Europe 
of the future.30 
In conclusion he stated, 11My choice is made, and I will 
not be ·deterred from it by the unconditional offer of a 
ship-load of wheat or a ship load of oil. 1131 This was a 
direct illusion to the Murphy-Weygand accord reached in 
32 
Algiers, February 26, 1941. The agre·ement provided that 
the United States would supply needed products to North 
Africa, as long as the shipments were not allowed to accum-
ulate there, and all such shipments were exclusively 
consumed in North Africa. Darlan presented his case for 
collaboration as the lesser of two evils. It was the 
inevitable deal which provided the means of avoiding the 
worst, for it was not a military alliance and it would 
enable the government and populace to escape annihilation. 
30 
Aron, .QE• cit., p. 316. 
31 
Hytier, op. cit., p. 260. Quoted from Weygand•s 
Recalled to Service --riiaris: Flammarion, 1950), p. 442. 
It must be emphasized that General Weygand was not present 
at the meeting, and his information could only be second 
hand at best. 
32Murphy, nn it 88 .2..:. • _c -•, P • • 
47 
There was nothing absolute or eternal about it; it was 
simply a provisional expedient which corresponded to the 
33 circumstances. Having carried the day with his policy 
favoring military collaboration to avoi'd annihilation, 
Darlan and Petain gave their decision all possible publicity 
hoping that France might eventually benefit from it. In 
three speeches, one by Petain on May 15, and by Darlan on 
May 23 and 31, they informed the public of the choice they 
had made: 
In a triumph~nt Anglo-Saxon world, France 
would only be a dominion of the second importance. 
It is a question of choosing life and dejth. The 
Marshal an_d government have chosen life. 4 
33Aron, .2£• .£!!., p. 317. De Montmorency states 
much the same thing in his defense of Darlan, and quotes 
the Admiral as saying that "nothing of vital importance 
was ceded to Germany." De Montmorency, .2E.• cit., pp. 128-129. 
34Aron, EE.• cit., p. 317. Also see Leahy, .QE.• cit., 
p. 32, and Langer, EE.• cit., pp. 151-152 for a fuller 
account of the Petain speech on May 15. Leahy wired the 
text of it in full translation to the State Department. 
An interesting note to the Darlan broadcasts is added by 
the British correspondent Sisley Huddleston in France: The 
Tragic Years, 1939-1947: An Eyewitness Account of War,--
Occupation, and Liberation (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955), 
p. 114. He~tes, "The voice of Darlan, as it came ••• 
over the radio, was unimpressive. It was high-pitched, 
without distinction. Doubtless, it is absurd to judge 
ministers by the accident of their voice but, now that 
the radio is the principle vehicle of communication of 
rulers of the masses, it is surely a handicap to be 1unradio-
phonique.1 Character is conveyed in the spoken word, in 
the enunciation, in the tone, and in the case of Darlan, 
the effect was disagreeable." 
1. The Protocols of Paris 
On May 21, ten days after his meeting with Hitler, 
the top-level negotiations Darlan had sought so long, 
opened in Paris, at the German embassy. Admiral Darlan, 
along with General Charles Huntziger who had signed the 
armistice agreement, presented Vichy's views. They were 
assisted by Jacques Benoist-Mechin and Fernand de Brinon, 
both ministers without portfolio. The agreements reached 
at this meeting, known as the Protocols-of Paris, were 
signed by Darlan and the German representative, General 
Karl Warlimont. These documents dealthessentially with 
military questions and mark 'the nearest point reached by 
35 the Vichy government to entering the war. These agree-
ments provided the Germans: 
(1) Use of the airfield at Aleppo and 
cession of Syrian stocks of munitions to the 
Iraqi rebels. (These had previously been 
agreed upon between Darlan and Abetz in Paris 
earlier in the month.) 
(2) Use of the port of Bizerta (in 
Tunisia) and passage through Tunisia to aid 
Field Marshal Erwin Romnel 1 s Afrika Korps, 
as well as the sale of French military 
vehicles and arms stored in Africa to Germany. 
(3) The right to organize a submarine 
bas~ at Dakar and Vichy cooperation to drive 
the Gaul!ist forces out of French Equatorial 
Africa.3 
35Aron, .2£• cit., P• 317. 
36Ibid. The complete text of the Paris Protocols is 
- found (untranslated) in Langer, .212.• cit., pp. 402-412, A.D. 
Hytier disputes Lange~•s claim of having been the first to 
publish the complete text of the agreements, stating that 
French historian Albert Kammerer published the documents at 
least twice in 1945. 
4-9 
In exchange for military collaboration, France would be 
allowed to take certain steps toward rearming her empire. 
But these minor concessions on Germany's part did not 
satisfy Darlan and he argued that the three military 
protocols must be subordinated to political and economic 
concessions that would justify Vichy's collaboration to 
French public opinion. 37 Darlan strengthened his own 
hand by drawing up a list of concessions he was detennined 
to extract from the Germans before giving them the bases. 
These included the reinforcement of African defenses by 
the French and political and economic concessions such as 
liberation of all French prisoners and rolling back the 
demarcation line to north of Paris. He also wanted a 
drastic reduction if not the comp.lete elimination of 
occupation costs. These concessions he felt were necessary 
to justify his military collaboration to his countrymen. 
Hoping to establish some basis for negotiation and hard 
bargaining, he had convinced himself that these demands 
were not unduly harsh on the Germans. He also felt that 
collaboration rewarded by German concessions would serve 
to enhance his own popularity and _effectiveness at Vichy. 
37Robert o. Paxton, Parades and Politics 
~ French Officer Corps Under Marshal Petain 
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 233-, 
at Vichy:. 
{Princeton: 
Although he had not been well known to the public 
bef'ore the war, those who did know him respected his 
ability in bringing the French navy to it peak of' ef'f'ici-
ency. Of'ten the object of' hostile reactions during his 
f'requent visits to Paris,. he was also not a popular man 
at Vichy. During the negotiations in Paris he was seemingly 
unanimously distrusted. 38 It was during this time that 
the Admiral's personal propaganda agents made themselves 
known and Darlan 1 s picture began to appear with greater 
f'requency in the papers. Store f'ronts in Vichy displayed 
his portrait, and those who did not were discreetly visited 
by the agents and advised to do so. 
In order f'or the collaboration to become of'f'icial, 
Petain had to ratif'y the documents. Expecting this to be 
a mere f'ormality, Darlan was taken by surprise when the 
old Marshal would have nothing to do with the agreements 
. 39 
f'ormulated behind his back. A cabinet crisis ensued 
and owing to the alleged bad f'aith of' the Germans with 
their continued haggling over occupation costs, Darlan 
gained much needed time. Petain had two alternatives. 
He could ref'use to sign the agreements, which would mean 
a disavowal of' Darlan and necessitate f'orming a new 
government with the possibility of' Laval's return; or he 
could ask even greater political concessions that would 
38 Leahy, .2£• cit., p. 34. 
39Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 318. 
51 
be wholly unacceptable to the Germans and thereby nullify 
. 40 
the agreements, If the Germans had granted even a part 
of the demands by Darlan, it is quite likely that the 
Protocols would have been ratified and carried out by 
Vichy, So the Admiral, as well as the Marshal, was in 
a most precarious position, How could Darlan continue 
to call himself collaborator, if the agreements were not 
ratified? 
Faced with this dilemma, Darlan and Petain called 
General Weygand and his Governor-Generals from Africa 
for consultation,41 It was thought by Weygand 1 s friends, 
as well as Darlan 1 s enemies, that the General was the one 
man with sufficient power and authority to successfully 
protest the Admiral 1 s actions and protect the government 
at the same time,42 In the meetings, between June 3-6, 
Weygand used his influence and personal intervention to· 
force a showdown and rejection of a collaboration policy. 
He even threatened to resign if such a policy was pursued. 
4oibid., p. :323. 
4lHytier, EI!.• _ill., p, 265, 
42 Aron, 212.• cit,, pp. 323-324, Aron contends that 
Darlan summoned Weygand from Africa to act as the scapegoat 
and shield the government from the Germans when the agree-
ments were not ratified, Indications are however that 
Darlan was sincere in his wish for collaboration, as dictated 
by his belief in a Nazi victory. 
On June 6, another cabinet meeting was held and Darlan 
outlined in more detail his demands of Germany, They 
included: 
(1) The total restoration of French sov-
ereignty over the whole of metropolitan territory, 
and taking into account the necessities of an 
occupation army, the demarcation line to be no 
more than the limit of military occupation, 
with citizens being free to move from one side 
of the line to the other; 
(2) A special statute for Alsace-Lorraine 
until the treaty of peace; 
(3) Total suppression of occupation costs 
and appropriations by the Wehrmacht from all 
branches of French production; 
(4) Suppression of all activity by the 
. X • organization 10stland'" and return to their 
lands of dispossessed proprietors and farmers; 
(5) Return to their homes of all non-Jewish 
Frenchmen; 
(6) The staggered liberation of ·all pri-
soners; prisoners necessary to the economy of 
the Reich being made free workers engaged under 
contract; ·· 
(7) A public assurance to be given by 
the Axis governments that they make no demands 
on North Africa, French West Africa and Syria 
(only the territories mentioned in.the Protocols 
were named); · 
(8) The suppression or considerable re-
duction of Commissions of Control, particul-
arly in Africa; 
(9) The cessation of all anti-French 
propaganda in Afri6a; 
~-A society of Germans and pro-Nazis who occupied 
French territory with the ultimate aim of annexation 
to Germany. 
(10) The handing back of all armament 
factorlhes of every kind and o"f assistance 
from Germany by the supply of raw materials, 
materials of all kinds, munitions and all 
varieties of fuel; 
(11) Anti-airc4~ft rearmament to assure necessary security; j 
53 
The demands appear ·to those of a victorious father than 
a vanquished nation, In fact, it might be said that they 
appear to be preposterous, but there is no indication that 
Darlan himself calculated the demands to discourage German 
acceptance, He hoped the Germans would seriously consid-
er the prop~sals and be tempted enough (especially with the 
prospect of the African bases) to engage in broad political 
talks that would enable France to once more assume an 
honorable role in the affairs of Europe, 
The fact that the main objectives (bases at Bizerte 
and Dakar) were never carried out haB given rise to the 
generally accepted belief that Vichy avoided application 
of the Protocols by means of trickery, The fact was, Vichy 
setsits demands too high for Germany to accept and Darlan•s 
frie_nds have even given him credit for the ruse that saved 
France from this disaster,44 The only point about which 
there has been disagreement or discussion is whether Darlan 
was or was not in favor of accepting the Protocols. Darlan 
probably favored their ratification, but he was not as 
43 · Aron, £.E.• cit,, p. 323, 
~ytier, ~- ~., p, 265. 
interested in how the agreements would be implements as 
how negotiations would develop. Collaboration was still 
the cornerstone of Darlan 1 s German policy, Had not Hitler 
told him, for little things, little things, for big things, 
big things745 Had Germany granted the French demands, or 
even a part of them, the agreements would probably have 
been ratified and carried out by Vichy. 
2. The Syrian Crisis 
To further complicate the problem of near co-bell-
igerency with the Germans, war began in Syria on June 8. 
As a result of the German use of Syrian airfields, Bri-tish 
forces under the command of General Sir Maitland Wilson 
and Free French Forces commanded by General Paul Legen-
tilhomne crossed the Syrian frontier, General Georges 
Catroux of the Free French Forces issued a proclamation 
ending the French mandate and declared Syria and Lebanon 
free and independent. From June 8 - July 18, 1941, French-
men who had fought the same enemy a year before, now opposed 
each other in battle •. The Vichy troops in Syria, whose 
loyalty lay with Petain, numbered some 30,000,46 but were 
aided by about 15', 000 Syrians. Free French Forces in the 
invaders ranks were in the minority (one division), but 
combined with British, Australians, Indians and an Arab 
Legion, the invaders numbered ap~roximately 45,ooo.47 Gen-· 
eral Henri Dentz, leading the Vichy forces at first refused 
the German offer to provide air cover for his troops.48 
Reconsidering, he wired Petain and Darlan for instructions. 
Realizing that German intervention could not be prompt, 
massive and continuous, they hesitated to approve it. In 
order to insure a Vichy victory, the Germans would also 
46
Aron, op. cit,, 4 p. 32 • 
47~. 
48
Paxton, .£!:!.•.£!_!.,pp. 236-237, 
have had to bomb the British fleet in Middle East waters, 
and the political repercussions of co-belligerency with 
Germany scared Darlan and the Marshal.49 At this point 
Darlan no longer sought military collaboration and sent 
a mission to Beirut, headed by General Jean-Marie Bergeret 
50 
to ask that the Luftwaffe not intervene, Germany no 
longer needed the Syrian bases (for she had launched the 
Russian invasion) and despite the Nazi pressure to destroy 
pipelines and oil depots, the fighting caused no serious 
disruption of industrial or economic life in Syria. 
An armistice on July 14 ended hostilities, About 
2,000·Vichy soldiers crossed over and joined the Gaullist 
forces, and the dead on both sides received full military 
honors, Vichy lossesnnumbered 1,038 dead, while Free French 
8 . 51 losses were put at about 00. 
The dead lie in the cemetery of Damascus 
to which I had them brought, They will not 
lie there alone, Their graves lie next door 
to those who were their adversaries, They are 
all alike and carry the same epitaph in these 
words: · 
'Died for France.,52 
49 Ibid,, p, 241, Also see Aron, .2.E• cit,, p, 326, 
50H t· "t 282 y ier, .2.E• ~-, p. • 
51 
Aron, S?E.• ,ill,, p, 324, 
52 ~., pp, 327-328, Quoting General Catroux, 
;, ( 
During the first four months of Darlan•s government, 
France faced the alternatives of military collaboration 
with the Third Reich or annihilation. Vichy seemed to 
have chosen the first, and on several occasions drew 
near to entering the war. But never deciding to do so, 
and somehow managing to avoid the worst, after four months 
she still faced the extreme danger of. Polandization.53 
Was General Wilhelm Keitel 1 s threat to be realized? Would 
France suffer the same destiny as Poland? 
53 
Aron, .21?.• cit., p. 328. 
3. Vichy's Relations With England 
The confusion and disagreement surrounding Vichy's 
attitude toward England centers around two diplomatic 
missions in the fall of 1940, both unknown to Darlan, 
The first was undertaken by Louis Rougier, a professor 
of political economy, when he arrived in London on 
October 22. 54 As the first Petain emissary to England, 
since the armistice, he stressed the anti-German attitude 
prevailing at Vichy, Ironically, the meeting was over-
shadowed by the news of Petain 1 s meeting, at the same 
time, with Hitler, Rougier was received at the Foreign 
Office and la.ter by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. 
According to Rougier,~5 agreements were reached that 
promised restoration of France's integrity and sovere-
ignty, if she did nothing to assist the Axis powers; 
the easing of the blockade and transfer of colonial 
produce to France; no attempt would be made to invade 
the colonies remaining loyal to Vichy, and the British 
radio would cease its attacks on Petain. For her part 
Vichy agreed not to attempt to recapture the colonies 
which had gone over to De Gaulle; cede no bas~s or ports 
to the Axis powers; to bring the empire back into the war 
as soon as the British could supply sufficient troops, as 
54H t· "t 101 y ier, .212.• ~•• p, • 
55
rbid, Hytier quotes Rougier 1 s works, Mission Secrete 
and~ Accords Secrets. According to the author, Rougier. 
goes into great detail, with substantial evidence, to refute 
the British denial that such agreements were reached, 
well as supplies and arms to colonial troops, and finally, 
Darlan promised to scuttle the fleet rather than let it 
fall into German or Italian hands. 
Rougier testifies that these protocols were brought 
back to Vichy for Petain to ratify, but controversy has 
arisen over the interpretation of the conversations. 
Rougier convinced himself t~at he was playing an historical 
role of utmost importance, 56 while Churchill's interpret-
ation seems to be that the professor was not of sufficient 
political importance to engage in political agreements. 57 
In the eyes of the British, Rougier was to be used as a 
58 source of information and for an exchange of views. Thus 
the British versions of the·conversations differ greatly 
from Rougier 1 s and the emphasis is altered by the British 
to the extent that no protocol existed, but simply an 
announcement which might constitute preliminary arrangements 
for agreements later on. Petain believed that these arrange-
ments were more substantial that the policy of collaboration 
he had outlined at Montoire, and it is reported that these 
two documents (the Rougier mission and the Montoire agree-
ments) were the only ones he kept in his office safe. 59 
56Louis Rougier, Mission Secrete a Londres: Les -
Accords Petain-Churchill (Paris: Les Editions du Cheval 
Aile, 1948), p. 6. 
57churchill, Their Finest Hour, 2£• cit., pp. 508-509. 
Churchill states only that he received a certain M. Rougier. 
58Aron, £E.• ,£!!,, pp, 220-221. 
59ill£., 
60 
Whether anything was really achieved in these 
Rougier-Churchill conversations remains uncertain, 
According to Rougier a gentlemen's agreement which was 
to serve as a basis ror permanent agreement later on, 
60 
was reached, According to the British there was no 
agreement, and they produced a memorandum or a supposed 
conversation between Weygand and Rougier, which was no 
more than a premature errort on Churchill's part, to 
draw French colonial troops into the war on the Allied 
side, Churchill called the proposal to Weygand, "the 
61 most brilliant opportunity ever orrered .to bold men," 
There is no way or knowing where the truth lies 
concerning these agreements, ror both sides produce excellent 
evidence to support their point or view, Prior to his 
trial, Petain stated on June 8, 1945, that the treaty 
62 
negotiated with Churchill was "intended to remain secret," 
He used this to discredit his meeting with Hitler at 
Montoire which occurred the same day that Rougier was 
in London, 
Great Britain was rinally rorced to open new avenues 
or discussion as a result or orrensive action by Ga:ullist 
rorces in the heart or equatorial Arrica when Gaullists 




~., p. 25. Photostat or page 1 
61Hytier, op, cit., quoting W~yga:nd 1 s Recalled To 
Service, .212.• cit-:-; p7"473, 
62 
Roy, .212.. cit • , p • 154. 
61 
Vichy's planned military collaboration with Germany to 
recapture the colony. Lord Halifax, the British ambass-
ador to the United States, had known Jacques Chevalier 
during their school days together at Oxford. Chevalier 
was Secretary General of the Minister of Public Information 
at Vichy, so Halifax took the opportunity to initiate 
indirect discussions,63 hoping to avoid a French-British 
clash of arms in Chad. Pierre Dupay, the Canadian Charge 
d 1Affairs at Vichy, acted as intermediary. Dupay took a 
draft of the agreements with him when he left for England 
via Madrid and Lisbon on December 9, 1941. The Halifax 
and Chevalier agreement ratified by Petain only two months 
before·naming Darlan Foreign Minister included: 
(1) A state of artificial coolness will 
be maintained between France and England. 
(2) The status quo of Gaullist colonies 
will be respected, it being understood that 
they will eventually revert to France by 
simple substitution of the police and troops. 
(3) Vichy will surrender neither fleet 
nor empire to the Axis. 
(4) The B.B.C. i-lill refrain· from inter-
vening in domestic affairs of France. 
(5) Great ·Britain will consider food 
shipments as coastwise shipping, the question 
of gasoline will be discussed by specialists 
in Madrid. 
(6) French troops in the French empire 
will protect the territory against gPY 
attack from wherever it might come.~ 
63 · Hytier, op. cit., p. 104. 
64Ibid., p. 106. 
b2 
The agreements proved satisfactory to all parties 
and since the interests of both countries were served, 
all were for the most part carried out, Other attempted 
agreements between Great Britain and Vichy failed to 
materialize and in general the relations between hhe two 
nations remained unfriendly, Motivated by his belief in 
the ultimate defeat of Britain, Dar~an made no effort to 
seek an agreement with them during his ministry. ·There 
seems no doubt that his policy of collaboration was based 
upon the same premise. In the spring of 1941 it seemed 
improbable to him that England could win the war, 65 and 
even if she did, Darlan believed her p~st-war friendship 
would be of little value, for as he told Freeman Mathews 
in December of 1940, 11A German victory is really better 
66 
for France. 11 Convinced that France could play no 
honorable role in a triumphant Angl6-Saxon world, and 
realizing France was not prepared to go to war against 
England, he maintained a policy of undeclared war and 
hostility towards Great Britain throughout his ministry. 
65 Darlan, op. cit., p. 153. 
66 
See Supra,, p. 37, 
4. Vichy's Relations With The United States 
"Above all cultivate the United States. There 
lies the future, 116.Za.n aging Joseph Caillaux advised 
Paul Baudouin at the collapse of the Third Republic. 
In 1940 the United States was the only great power with 
whom France could be on good terms. De13:pite the armistice, 
Germany was still the enemy; Russia was temporarily allied 
with Germany, and England was engaged in a life and death 
struggle with the Axis. France desperately needed a friend 
and the United States seemed to r&present their best hope 
in a world at war. Should England win the war, the United 
States could be counted on to exert herself at the.peace 
table, and if a compromise peace came, the moral pressure 
of the United States would be needed against Germany. The 
far-sighted were optimistic enough to foresee America's 
entry into the war and a tipping of the military scales. 
Whether pro-German, such as Laval, or anti-British, such 
as Darlan, most Frenchmen would agree that American friend-
ship had to be maintained. 
Attempts toward better understanding had already 
been made with the Murphy-Weygand agreements and the est-
ablishing of an American consul in Algiers headed by Robert 
D. Murphy. A new dimension to diplomatic relations was 
67 Hytier, 2P.• cit., p. 184. 
64-
added when at midnight on Friday, January 5, l94l, in 
the midst of what Frenchmen said was the coldest winter 
in ninety years, the new American ambassador arrived 
at Vichy. 68 Washington had ordered Admiral William D. 
Leahy, a military man like Petain and Darlan, to Vichy 
as a full-fledged ambassador. This represented a psy-
chological victory for the Petain regime, for it indicated 
the abandonment of Roosevelt 1 s tough policy with Vichy, 
and ushered in a friendlier one which would perhaps produce 
better results. Leahy was a sailor.and spoke the naval 
language of Darlan. Fear of the results of military 
collaboration, upon which the Darlan government had 
embarked, also brought a more conciliatory attitude 
from Washington. 
Leahy 1 s major tasks were to keep France on the 
Allied side', so far as possible and to prevent Vichy from 
extending aid to the Germans other than that required by 
the armistice. In the first category, this meant keeping 
an eversha.pp eye on the French fleet, 69 as well as efforts 
68 
Leahy, .2E• .£!1., p. 6. 
69rbid. ~lso see Kenneth Pender, Adventures In 
Diplomacy (New York: Dood, Mead and Comp~ny, 194,5"'), p. 6. 
The French fleet was indeed, as Pender, one of the American 
Vice-Consuls in North Africa put it, 11a morbid preoccupation" 
for London and Washington, 11and both·discussed it so much with 
Vichy and scolded Vichy so much about it, that you would have 
thought it was our own fleet, which the French had somehow 
managed to steal from us." 
to get American relier shipments or rood and medicine 
to the population, In addition to these duties, any 
gathering or intelligence the embassy could perrorm 
v;;, 
would be greatly appreciated by the Allies, In recognizing 
the Vichy government, the United States intended to take 
. 70 
every possible advantage rrom such recognition. 
Admiral Leahy met with Darlan ror the rirst time 
on February 24, 1941, The ilmerican ambassador had been 
surprised by Darlan 1 s succession to power, ror he had the 
impression that Petain had less than full conridence in 
the Adm].. ral. 71 n.;- • h I ti L ah ~i,,.,.ing an ours conversa on, e y sur-
mized that the Admiral was an able, rriendly and.agreeable 
man, probably the best Petain could have round, although 
he was 
toward 
quite disappointed in Darlan 1 s conciliatory attitude 
72 
the Germans. Leahy also to.ok advanta,ge or an 
opportunity in early March to meet secretly with General 
70Langer, .2£, cit., passim. The American Vichy policy 
was one or expediency, dictated by circumstances which per-
mitted no choice, Had it not been attacked viciously and 
logically by its critics, there probably would never have 
been a serious attempt on the part or the State Department 
to justiry it, For the most critical examination or this 
policy see Ellen Hammer I s "Hindsight On Vichy, 11 Poli ti cal 
Science Quarterly, Volume LXI (June 1946), pp, 175-188. 
Also see Louis Gottschalk' s 11 0ur Vichy Fumble, 11 Journal 
Qf Modern History, Volume XX (March 1948), pp. 47-56. 
71Leahy, .2E.• cit., p. 19. Aron, .2E.. cit. , pp. 308-309 
states that many men surrounding Petain apparently held 
the same view, 
bb 
Weygand on one of the General's frequent trips back to 
Vichy, The agreement reached with Murphy was discussed 
and the necessity of preventing Axis penetration of the 
African empire reiterated, Weygand also stated that 11 If 
the British come with four division, I will have to fire 
on them, If they come with twenty, I will welcome them, 1173 
The State Department was pleased with Weygand 1 s apparent 
approval of the United States economic mission in Algiers, 
headed by Murphy, although he General was quite aware that 
it was staffed with numerous spys and military agents. 
Murphy's diplomacy in North Africa was for the most part 
more successful that Leahy 1 s in Vichy, for the controlled 
press in the occupied zone continued to attack Leahy as 
the tool of Jewish bankers, a British agent, and a sailor 
friend of Darlan. As these attacks on the two admirals 
m-ounted, Vichy trembled in fear of Laval's return, 
Leahy was successful in his mission as personally 
outlined by President Roosevelt. "Popeye," the American 
State Department's code name for Darlan, had been persuaded 
to maintain the existing friendly relations with the United 
States and in some instances the ambassador was personally 
responsible for thwarting Darlan•s attempts to further 
collaboration with the Third Reich, by forcing him to 
73Ibid,, p, 23, Darlan later claimed to have 
agreed completely with Weygand. 
67 
reveal results of his talks with the Germans. This was 
accomplished by tenacity on Leahy 1 s part, for he soon 
realized that Darlan never intended him to have an audience 
alone with Petain. Leahy 1 s sources of information turned 
out to be quite accurate and Darlan soon found himself 
forcing opposition from Petain as a result of the ambassador's 
keen judgement and hard work. 
But relations with the United States was never 
Darlan•s most pressing problem. As early as August of 
1941, the Paris press renewed its attacks on him, and 
rumors of a drastic change in the Vichy government continually 
circulated. It was the Germans who presented the problems, 
and they slowly began to tighten the screws. 
CHAPTER IV 
COLLABORATION FAILS 
The German attack on Russia in June, 1941, did 
more to alter the course of Vichy policy than any other 
l 
single event, This attack changed the Nazi attitude 
toward France and.Darlan slowly came to realize that 
France was nothing more than a pawn in the vast and 
complicated conflict, As long as the war remained a 
duel between Great Britain and Germany, the French empire 
and the fleet represented a great military asset, The 
changing situation received added emphasis near the end 
of the year when the United States was drawn into the war, 
Now what Vichy did, or did not do, was of little consequence, 
Hitler neglected Vichy as he became more deeply involved 
in the Russian campaign, and even when he thought of France 
2 
it was only to wonder how she could be further exploited, 
The eastern campaign was increasing Germany's need for 
all types of food and industrial products, as well as 
a labor force, As German demands became greater and 
their attitudes grew harsher, Darlan and his supporters 
became more reluctant to cooperate, When Nazi repressive 
1Hytier, .£E_, cit, , p , 286. 
2Ibid,, p, 287, quoting German General Gustav Jodl, 
measures in the occupied zone increased, Frenchmen began 
to voice doubts about the outcome or the war. 3 The 
German victory did not seem so certain as Hitler I s army 
bogged down in Russia. 
As the Germans unleashed their military might against 
Russia, Darlan attempted to recoup his personal prestige, 
lost as a result or the riasco cau1\ed by the Paris Pro-
tocols. To accomplish this he pursued a two-pronged approach 
to his collaboration attempts. On the one hand he continued 
to assert his willingness to collaborate and advised his 
ministers to do the same, thus conceding things or a minor 
or secondary nature to the conquerors, Darlan railed to 
see, that by making these small concessions with which 
Germany could not possibly be satisried, .he ran the risk 
or nullirying his policy or resistance on the ¢ajor 
concessio~s.4 Weygand shrewdly pointed this out to the 
Admiral and Petain, in his opposition to concessions made 
in the empire.5 Although Darlan held rirm on the essential 
points and would not yield to the demands ror an Axis base 
at Bizerta, he authorized rour-hundred trucks to be sent 
3Neville Lytton, 
Macmillan and Company, 
doubts see Darlan, .2.E.• 
Lire In Unoccupied 
I9Ij2)-, pp. 74-75, 
ill• ' p. 114. . 
4Aron, .2.E.• cit., pp. 331-332. 
France (London: 
For Darlan I s own 
·5Philip C.F.· Bankwitz, 11Weygand: A Biographical 
Study," (Unpublished Ph, D. dissertation, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1952), p, 468. 
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from France to North Africa, and their use, to transport 
supplies to Lybia from the Armistice Control Comrnision 
headquarters in Tunisia. He also authorized an increase 
of commission personnel at Bizerta to forty-one. 6 Weygand 
pointed out that in fact Vichy had met Germany's demands 
for African concessions in principle, and that it would 
only be a question of their infiltrating into the remainder 
of the empire. 7 The Reich however failed to press its 
advantage or make reciprocial concessions, so during July 
and August the state of tension that had always surrounded 
Franco-German relations became even more taut. On August 1 
diplomatic relations· were broken off as Otto Abetz left 
Paris. At the same time General Otto von StujLpnagel', 
arrived, which seemed to indicate that hencef~rth all 
8 
relations would be carried on at the military level. 
This move pleased Darlan for he thought his collab-
oration policy would be more fruitful dealing at the mil-
itary level. But throughout August and September relations 
deteriorated rapidly. On August 21, a German officer was 
6 Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 331. 
7Bankwitz, loc. cit., p. 469. 
8 
Darlan, .2J2.• _ill., p, 122, 
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assassinated at Vichy and the Nazis retaliated by threat-
ening to shoot hostages and demanded a special court which 
would condemn terrorists on their orders. 9 Despite the 
court's creation, the Nazis continued to shoot hostages 
and when a German was killed in Paris on September 3, 
three were executed. Nine days later when a German was 
killed, twelve Frenchmen were shot. On the morning of 
October 20, Lt, Colonel Holz, Feld-Kommandant of Nantes 
was killed by unknown assassins, not far from the cath-
W f edral. General van Stulpnagel ordered fi ty hostages 
executed that evening, The following day sixteen hostages 
were executed at Nantes, On October 
political prisoners were executed at 
22, twenty-seven 
· 11 Chateaubriand. 
Among these was the sixteen year old Guy Mocquet, the son 
of a Connnunist leader found guilty of distributing Gaullist 
. 12 
pamphlets, Beginning with the attack on Russia, the 
Connnunists had taken a more active role in the resistance 
movement and intensified their prop,aganda efforts, 13 Von 
Stulpnagel threatened to execute fifty more hostages unless 
the assassins were arrested within forty-eight hours and 
9 . 
Aron, .Q.E_. ..£!1. , p • 3 30. 





at this point Petain conceived the idea of giving him-
self up as a hostage in order to prevent further executions, 
but at the last minute he was persuaded that the Nazis 
might force him to sign decrees which they dictated and 
14 the idea was abandoned. On October 27 in a broadcast 
he condemned the assassinations of 
out a word of protest against Nazi 
German officers with-
15 
reprisals. Two days 
later the newspapers announced Hitler's reprieve of the 
fifty hostages_ von Stulnagel was prepared to execute, but 
French public opinion was indignant over Petain 1 s failure 
to protest the Nazi slaughter. 
l4Tlle details of this scheme to have Petain give 
himself up as a hostage can be found in the diary of 
General Emile Laure. 
15
Huddleston, .2E.• cit., p. 229. Also Hytier, .2E.• .£ti., 
p. 298. The execution of hostages had aroused world public 
opinion to a fevered pitch. President Roosevelt expressed 
his indignation and denounced the murder of hostages as a 
"barbarous act." De Gaulle also denounced the Germans but 
advised the French against killing Germans because retaliation 
was too easy. 
1. The Weygand Case 
As the German-controlled French language press and 
Paris radio continued their attacks on Darlan and his 
"Vichy traitors 1116 the Admiral could sense the reins of 
power slipping from his grasp.. Despite holding the 
offices of Vice-Premier, Vice-President of the Council 
of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of 
the Interior, Minister of the Navy, and as designated 
"dauphin" to succeed Petain in case of the old Marshal I s 
incapacity or death, Darlan was prompted to shore up his 
position after the setback he had suffered with the Paris 
Protocols, 
The meetings between high ranking personalities of 
the governments, which Darlan had always relied upon to 
keep collaboration moving, were not being held. The 
opportunity to alter the situation was presented on Nov-
ember 12 by Ambassador Abetz while in Vichy to attend the 
funeral of General Huntziger. The Army's Commander-in-
Chief had been killed in an aircraft accident: while r·eturning 
from a North African inspection trip. 17 At this time the 
German demand for Weygand's dismissal, an almost continued 
request since his appointment in 
of North Africa, was repeated by 
1940 as Consul-General 
18 
Ambassador Abetz. In his 
16 ' 4 Leahy, £E.• cit,, p, 3 • 
p. 19.5. 
Also see Marchal, .2.E.• cit., 
17Bankwitz, loc. cit., pp. 34.5-346. 
18 · 
Aron, .QE., cit., p. 33.5. 
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position, Weygand had remained relatively independent 
of Vichy and by.virtue of his anti-German attitude had 
continued to thwart German penetration of the empire when 
Darlan was willing to concede it via the Paris Protocols. 
As a man of great personal prestige with many friends, 
very close to Petain, and in control of France 1 s only 
asset outside the fleet, Weygand was a man to be reckoned 
with. Because Weygand was continually reminded of the 
''undefeated navy1119 and influenced by the natural rivalry 
between the army and navy, he was always disappointed to 
see government posts handed to junior navy officers as 
senior army men were passed over. The General 1 s opinion 
was always highly respected by Marshal Petain and Darlan 
envisioned him as a rival for power since Weygand was 
opposed to any collaboration beyond the terms of the-
armistice. 
Thus Darlan had personal as well as political reasons 
for wanting the dismissal of Weygand. The antagonism 
between Darlan and the General was no secret and the two 
men were quite unlike. General Sir Edward Spears described 
Darlan as the 11 squat, strong, burly Admiral who although 
taciturn and secretive by nature, affected a vulgar joviality 
75 
to mask his timidity, ambition and wily shrewdness. 1120 
Weygand was a natty, aristocratic, domineering little 
21 general whose wit was as quick as his temper. Darlan 
did not like the General's outspoken independence, or 
his way of making himself appear more pa trioti.c than 
anyone else, Neither had much respect for the other, 
and the two had very profound religious differences. 
While Weygand was a pious practicing Catholic, Darlan 
22 was anticlerical and skeptical. It would be a gross 
oversimplification to blame Darlan ailione for Weygand 1 s 
dismissal in November, 1941, but the Admiral is not 
without his share of responisbility for the event, The 
Weygand case was a complicated affair for the Germans 
were more than suspicious of Weygand, and Darlan played 
upon this distrust which had exist'1d since the Laval 
cabinet crisis of December 1940. When they finally 
brought pressure to bear upon the Vichy government to 
dismiss him, they knew that there were men in Vichy, 
and especially on man, Admiral Darlan, who would be more 
23 than glad to do so, 
It is quite likely that Darian would have been 
satisfied with being Weygand 1 s superior, for on a number 
20spears, .QI!., cit., p. 261. 
21Ibid, 
22Ambler, .QE.• cit., p. 60. 
23Paxton, 12.£. _ill., p. 2.58. 
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of occasions he asked Petain to make him Commander of 
All French Forces -- air, land, and sea, This commanding 
position would have permitted him to gradually oust 
Weygand without fanfare or difficulty. In a letter to 
Petain on July 21, Darlan complained about Weygand.: 
I am constantly attacked and even opposed 
by men holding important posts. General Wey-
gand makes himself the willing echo of these 
attacks, kept informed by a liason agent whom 
he maintains on your staff, . His entourage and 
he·himself are hostile to the policy you have 
asked me to follow, Although General Weygand 
is faithful to you, he is only faithful in 
outward appearance to your government, 
So that I can continue to carry out 
usefully the tasks you have entrusted to 
me, I need not only your confidence, but 
the public conviction that I enjoy your 
confidence. It is necessary too that my 
authority be total, and that you be the 
sole judge of my acts, The oaths of 
fidelity to the Marshal ought also to be 
oaths of fip.elity to the person of his 
successor,24-
The last.paragraph of the letter was aimed at·wey-
gand, obviously the only official of Vichy who had any 
real independence, 
.Six days later, Darlan wrote again to the Marshan 
urging that Weygand and his three Governor-Generals be 
summoned to Vichy, and that the policy of the government 
be explained to all ministers and secretaries of state, 
They must be instructed to obey Darlan as they would the 
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Marshal, in all circumstances, and to recognize Darlan 
as Petain 1 s successor. Darlan wrote: 
He (Darlan) must have complete delegation 
from the Marshal and authority over everyone 
whatever the rank, the position, the office,25 
In a clear attempt to discredit Weygand, Darlan continued: 
A reliable person has said, IJm odor 
of Gaullism emanates from Weygand•s wake, 1 
I will add that a desire for independence 
is apparegt in the acts of the Delegate 
General. 2 
He then approached the subject from a point of view that 
he hoped would appeal to Petain I s desire to preserve 
the empire, 
You have chosen me as your eventual 
successor, I am not sure that, if the 
occasion arose, that he (Weygand) would 
respect my authority, If he by-passed it, 27 there would be separatism in French Africa, 
Darlan then followed with an ultimatum, listing several 
men from which to choose, Weygand 1 s name was the only one 
of importance on the list, Darlan had forced a showdown, 
asking Petain to express confidence in either himself or 
General Weygand, 
25Hytier, 21?.• cit,, p, 304, Both Hytier and Paxton 
use the manuscript diary of General Emile Laure as their 
source for the Darlan notes to Petain, 
26 Ibid,, p, 305, 
27 Ibid, 
The Admiral's note continued: 
If you consider that I run no longer 
qualified to carry it (my task) out, I 
beg you, Monsieur le Marechal, to replace 
me in all my duties. 
If I still enjoy your confidence, 
I ask you: 
(1) to be so good as to say so publicly 
with energy; 
(2) to convoke General Weyg§.lld, General 
Nogues, Governor Chatel, and Admiral 
Esteva, and in the presence of the Min-
isters and Secretaries of State, to be 
so good as to define the general policy 
and to ask them to obey me as your 
eventual successor. , 
If not Monsieur Marechal, or if 
they hesitate, it is I who2ijill ask you to give me my freedom. 
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Then the Admiral warned Petain what would happen if he 
did not choose him: 
I don't want to be at any price, in 
any way whatsoever, the instrument of the 
dismemberm~:ot of the French empire and of 
civil war. 'J 
Darlan added the clincher by appealing to Petain 1s vanity: 
The moment seems to me to have COjfl 
for you to save the country once more. 
Petain balked at taking the steps Darlan suggested 
and the case of Weygand remained suspended, not resolved. 
Darlan 1 s maneuvering and attempts to subordinate Weygand 
emphasizes another reason for seeking his dismissal --





differences in temperament and policy. Thil.s was Darlan I s 
fear of Weygand. Next to Petain, Weygand was the strong-
est man in Vichy. His ouster from the Ministry of Defense 
and War in 1940 had resulted in the General becoming more 
powerful and independent in his North African post. When 
the German overtures were made in November, the condition 
was made that Weygand 1 s presence in North Africa was no 
longer tolerable and Darlan jumped at the chance to 
dismiss the general and enhance his own collaboratist 
standing, at the same time. 
When Abetz let it be known that the meeting of some 
high-ranking German military person, which Petain and 
Darlan had so long been hoping for, might be arranged 
after Weygand 1 s dismissal, the General was summoned to 
Vichy on November 16. Just as he had previously offered, 
Petain once again suggested that Weygand take a political 
post and supervise the drawing up of a constitution for 
the empire. The General refused and it appeared that 
another stalemate would develop. On November 18, Weygand 
met with Darlan and Petain in the latter's office along 
with Lucien Homier and Henri Moysset, both ministers of 
state without portfolio. 31 Various compromise offers were 
made, but Weygand stood firm. He demanded a decision be 
reached, and offered the suggestion that the government 
31Aron, op. ci·t p 336 _., . . 
Bo 
either support him against the Germans, or dismiss him 
without delay. ~e matter was resolved and Weygand 
dismissed, as Darlan stated: 11It is settled. 1132 Petain 
asked Weygand to submit a memorandum on policy and per-
sonnel which would have the effect of keeping Germany 
out of the empire. The Marshal promised to execute this 
memorandum. 
32Ibid. Also see Darlan, .2E.• cit., p. 91, The 
Admiral 1sson sums up the meeting by simply stating that 
Weygand~accepted the fact that he had to retire, 
2, A Last Try At Collaboration 
Darlan 1 s obsession to rid himself of Weygand was 
only a part of the desperate power push he undertook in 
the fall of 1941, By his desire to be appointed Commander 
of All French Forces, he hoped to centralize his control 
over the ministers of the other services, This proposal 
was opposed by both Weygand and General Huntziger, who 
feared the concentration of military power in Darlan 1 s 
hands, 33 A compromise was made, whereby the post of 
Minister of National defense was re-created, for it had 
been dropped in 1940, The Minister of National Defense 
could not s:ln!ultaneously be a service chief, and Darlan, 
although recognizing his grasp for absolute dictatorship 
could not be realized, agreed that if he accepted the 
post he would appoint a successor as Minister and Commarlder-
in-Chief of the Navy "after a certain delay. 1134 Darlan 
was appointed Minister of National Defense in August, 1941, 
but failed to keep his part of the bargain, Within two 
months in an unexpected turn of events, owing to General 
Huntziger•s untimely death on November 12 and General 
Weygand 1 s dismissal on November 18, the Aclmiral was now 
Minister of National Defense and commanded two of the 
three services,35 
· 3:3Paxton , lac, cit,, p, 260. -- --
34-Foreign Relations of the United States, 1.21:bh, 
Volume II, .2£• cit,, p. 423, --
35Paxton, lac, cit,, p, 261. 
82 
The Nazis rewarded Darlan for ridding himself of 
Weygand by releasing all naval prisoners of war. 36 Also 
as a counterpart to the Weygand case, they agreed to a 
meeting between Marshal Petain and a high-ranking military 
personage. On December 1, 1941, at Saint-Florentine-en 
Bour$ogne {near Auxerre) the Marshal and Darlan met 
Reichrnarschall Hermann Goering.37 Petain came armed with 
a long list of French grievances which he proceeded to 
read to the amazed Goering. The document also repeated 
many of the same conditions attached to the ratification 
. · 38 
of the Paris Protocols. Petain went on to give Goering 
a severe tongue-lashing and it was one of the few times 
during the Vichy regime that Petain acted as a ramrod-stiff 
soldier. The Marshal reaffirmed his understanding that 
collaboration implied equal footing with Ge=any, and that 
negotiation on a victor and vanquished basis was a diktat. 39 
He reminded Goering of the disastrous peace of 1919 and 
told him the Germans were running the risk of making the 
same mistakes-the allies had made. Goering responded to 
Petain•s unexpected harsh attitude and tone in a like 
manner and flatly declined to accept the document, and even 
36Ibid., p. 262. 
37Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 338. 
3
8.fil9:. Also see Darlan, .Ql2.• cit., pp. 90-91. 
39Ibid. 
refused to allow it transmitted to Hitler. Petain calmly 
stuffed the memorandum into·Goering 1 s pocket. 
While the Petain-Goering negotiations were a 
complete failure, Darlan appeared to have put together 
another plan which would lead to renewed collaboration. 
He offered to establish contact with the German navy to 
relay British ship movements.40 This seemed most desirable 
to him, for he always thought collaboration could be realized 
throught military channels. Although he never stated such, 
Darlan appears to have preferred that 11less be asked and 
more be granted" in dealing with ·Germany. As usual, when 
putting up his trial balloon, Darlan quickly lost his 
reserve, gave vent to his .Anglophobia,41 and became open, 
comradely, intimate and warm as he proposed further avenues 
of cooperation with Germany. No doubt the Admiral envisioned 
this action as a link between himself and Berlin, but the 
German~ were concerned solely with its combative value to 
their navy. In the end this amounted to very little. Al-
though the Germans thought Darlan was offering something 
new and valuable, there was already an exchange of inform-
ation between the two naval staffs. In spite of the definite 
4°Hytier, .2.E.• .£.!1., p. 316. The author 1 s source here 
is the Nazi officer to whom Darlan made the proposal, Ad-
miral Erich Raeder, Mein Leben, Volume II, (Tubin-Neckar, 
1957), p. 281. -
4
1
Ibid. Raeder states that Da.rlan insulted the 
British at great length, calling them "hypocrites and liars." 
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prospects, nothing positive came of this proposal, for 
seemingly Hitler was just not interested in collaboration 
with Vichy, no matter what form it might take.
42 
Until this time Vichy had never made any real attempt 
to collaborate with Gennany 1 s allies (although the French 
had earlier been forced by the Japanese to accept the 
principle of co-defense of Indo-China)~ But immediately 
after the fruitless Petain~Goering conversation and Darlan 1 s 
reaffirmation of his willingness to cooperate, the Admiral 
mem with Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Fbreign Minister 
and Mussolini 1 s son~in-law.43 The Italian complaints, 
channeled to Vichy through Berlin, always centered around 
occupation of a few Franco-Italian border districts and 
the promise of goods which the French were failing to 
deliver. However, Darlan was correct in his assumption 
that the key to Rome lay in Berlin, and besides, he never 
con~idered the Italians important enough for collaboration.44 
The Darlan-Ciano conversations were held at Turin 
on December 10, but nothing came of the meeting. 45 There was 
42~. 
43Darlan, ~• cit., pp. 90-91, p. 123. 
44De Montmorency, .2E.• cit,, pp. 122-123. The author 
pictures the meeting as an immense practical joke by Darlan 
at the expense of his counterpart. 
45Hugh Gibson (ed.), The Ciano Diaries (New York: 
Garden City Publishing Company, 1947), pp. 4J.6-4l7. 
u;, 
no agenda and only generalities were discussed. The 
meeting was conducted in a cordial atmosphere with both 
men well disposed.46 Seeing no harm in spouting the 
words his Italian host wanted to hear, Darlan savagely 
attacked the British, and in between drinks went so far 
as to express his "conviction in the victory of the Axis 
and his prayers for it, 1147 Darlan 1 s efforts to get 
along with the Italians proved only momentary and 
without significance. 
The month of December altered the Admiral's thinking 
as to the eventual victors in what was now a world-wide 
conflagration. For on December 7 the attack by Japan had 
forced the United States to accept an active role and this 
may have stiffened Darlan 1 s backbone, during the meeting 
with Ciano, three days later. On the same day, as the 
meeting with the Italian Foreign Minister, word arrived 
that the British Eighth Army had definitely won out in 
the western desert and Rommel's Afrika Korps was in full 
48 
retreat. Darlan no longer believed in German victory. 
On December 13 Darlan expressed his uncertainities and Fiis 
refusal to agree to military collaboration. On that day 
he gave American Ambassador Leahy his solemn assurance that 
46Ibid, Ciano noted "my impression of the man was 
good. He is a small man, energetic, willful, and rather 
boastful, who talks without reticence ••. Is he sincere? 
I cannot say, except for one thing, he hates the British," 
47Malcolm Muggeridge 
Ciano•s Diplomatic Papers 
48,_ 't . .w.·on, op. £:!:..._. , p. 
(ed.), Stuart Hood (trans.), 
(London::, Odhams Press, 1948 ), p·. 471, 
338 • 
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Germans would never penetrate into the empire. It was 
the first time Darlan had made such a promise. 49 
49Leahy, op. cit., p. 475. Leahy stresses the fact 
that Darlan intended to defend the empire against all comers, 
including the Allies. For Leahy 1 s telegram to the State 
Department see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1.2!:l:1, 
Volume II, 2.E.• cit., pp. 502-503,- --
3. Darlan 1 s Dismissal 
The last three months (January - April, 1942) of 
Darlan 1 s government, which brought about the final rupture 
between the Admiral and the Germans, discloses the ever 
hardening 
Nazis.SO 
and firm attitude he was taking toward the 
Ironica1i7, diplomatic documents of the same 
period furnish Darlan 1 s adversaries with their strongest 
arguments that although he appeared to be resisting, Darlan 
had in fact decided to enter the war on the side of the 
51 · 
Axis. Owing to the diplomatic imbroglio produced by 
Otto Abetz and the Vichy Secretary of State, Pierre 
Benoist-Mechin, illusions, lies and contrivances made it 
appear that a triumphant diplomatic success was about to 
be realized and that Franco-German relations were about 
. .52 
to enter a new era of cooperation and reconciliation. 
Both men felt that they were destined to play a historic 
role in resolving Franco-German problems in accordance 
with their own solutions and policies. Both now felt 
their great hour had arrived. They pursued parallel dreams 
of being archatects of a policy of reconciliation in the 
interests of their o,m countries. Ambassado Abetz had 
promised Hitler the French fleet and a Vichy declaration 
.50Aron, 2E.• cit,, p, 340 • 
.5libid • 
.52Hytier, .2£., _ill,, p, 316, 
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of _war against Great Britain. Secretary Benoist-Mechin 
promised Darlan political concessions that would put his 
government on equal footing with the Germans. Abetz 1 
capacity for distorting the truth, and Benoist-Mechin 1 s 
readiness to make concessions which the Germans knew he 
was not authorized to deliver, brought Franco-German 
relations once more to the breaking point, in mid-January 
1942. While no longer believing in the certainity of a 
German vic~o~y, and tired of repeated failures to negotiate 
and collaborate, Darlan and Vichy took the opportunities 
these situations presented and began to make open and 
public protests against Nazi pressure. Finance Minister 
Yves Bouthillier published a report denouncing the diktat 
concerning occupation costs,53 When no reply was forth-
coming, Darlan addressed the same complaint to the Arm-
istice Commission at Wiesbaden. Darlan refused to agree 
to the departure from France of another 150,000 workers 
for German factories; he refused to put 9,000 skilled 
railway workers at Nazi disposal; he ordered prosecution 
of German agents and approved curtailing electric power 
t i N .54 o factories whose product on was earmarked for the azis, 
He officially protested Germany's anti-Semitic mea·sures 
in Vichy -- the ordering of all Jews to wear the Star of David -
53 Aron, ~• cit., p, 347, 
.5lJ.Ibid., p, 348, 
89 
and began to more frequently refuse the German's summons 
to P~ris. It looked, at the beginning of 1942, that he 
had chosen open resistance to the Nazis. 55 Darlan's fail-
ure to obtain beneficial collaboration and difficulties 
in domestic matters served to undermine his position in 
Vichy. The apparent course of open resistance compromised 
his government 1 s existence with the Germans, and they let 
it be known that "there could be no political conversation 
with the present French government. 1156 Clearly, Darlan 1 s 
position had suffered and the days of his government were 
numbered. 
Early in 1942 Admiral Darlan faced intrigues from 
the very men_he had 
Ambassador Abetz as 
brought 
57 well. 
into his government, and from 
The Reich ambassador in Paris 
had personal reasons for disliking Darlan, for generally 
the Admiral refused to deal with him, preferring to talk 
with military personalities. Darlan 1 s new policy also 
constituted a serious threat to Abetz 1 position, in view 
of the fact that Abetz had continually promised Hitler 
the fleet and empire. Abetz had never given up the hope 
of returning Laval to power, for he knew he could deal 
with him, his personal friend. For these reasons the Reich 
55Hytier, .2E.• cit., p. 328. Also see Aron, .2£· cit., 
p. 348. 
56Darlan, .2£• .£ii., p. 91. Also see Docteur, .2£• cit., 
p. '2:32. 
57Marchal, ~- cit., p. 195. Also see J)ar.lanr P• '72. 
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ambassador took an active hand in the increasing Nazi 
58 pressure brought to bear on Darlan 1 s government, Both 
the Nazi and.Vichy pro-Laval factions would not forgive 
the Admiral for the contempt he had shown them, So in 
February 1942, the Germans, along with supporters of 
59 Laval in Vichy, reopened the question of Laval's return, 
From that time on Petain was besieged with demands 
for Laval's return, He was continually told that only a 
government headed by Laval could appease Hitler, At the 
same time, Laval was active in his own behalf with the aid 
of Abetz in Paris, On March 20 Laval met with Goering in 
Paris and was alarmed by the thinly-veiled threats con-
cerning the fate of France made by the Reichmarschall. 
He was still more shocked by Goering's advice for him 
to remain outside of Vichy politics. 
France shall be treated as she deserves, 
If the Marshal offers to t~ke you back into 
power, refuse. For you, it will either be 
much too late or much too early, You have 
been an honorable enemy to us, Perhaps we 
shall meet agaih one day after the war, when 
peace has been signed, and then you will be 6o 
able to uphold the interests of your country, 
Laval decided to warn the Marshal of Goering's threats and 
at the same time strengthen his own position and demand a 
return to power. On March 26, Rene de Chambrun, Laval's 
58 Aron, .2.E• cit .• , p. 349. 
59Toid. 
60 4 ~ ' Laval .QE., cit,, pp, 9 -9;,, Goering felt that 
France was going to have to be dealt with severely, and 
perhaps Laval would be more valuable and more successful 
after the German's occupied the whole country and est-
ablished him as a puppet. 
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son-in-law, arrived at Vichy and arranged for Laval to 
meet with Petain at the Forest of Randan (20 kilometers 
from Vichy) the next day, in the strictest of secrecy,61 
Laval imformed Petain of the Goering interview, and blamed 
Darlan for bringing France to the brink of disaster, This 
meeting set in motion the events that would bring Laval's 
return to power in three weeks. In one of his many weak 
moments, faced with what seemed to be a tragic situation, 
Petain as usual felt powerless. Torn between his suspicions 
of Laval and Darlan 1 s failure to gain concessions, he 
wavered, 
Darlan was furious when he learned of the Laval-Petain 
meeting. Event piled upon event, P6litical blunders seemed 
the order of the day for both Darlan and Petain. Then Darlan 
lost control of the situation. Petain attempted to pacify 
Darlan by assuring him that Laval would play no political 
62 
role in Vichy, and the threat by Admiral Leahy that the 
United States would break-off diplomatic rela ti ans ( as 
Leahy delivered Roosevelt's ultimatum to this effect)63 
seemed to reassure Petain that he and the Darlan government 
would be able to turn the tide. Petain firmly refused the 
German demands, and another Laval crisis seemingly was averted. 
61 
~-, p, 95, 
62narlan, 2:2.• cit., p, 294. 
p. 233. 
Also see Docteur, 2:2.• £!..!., 
63
Leahy, 2:2.• cit., pp, 88-89, Also see Darlan, 2:2.• cit., 
pp, 294-295. 
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It is evident that the Germans had written off negotiations 
with any French govetnment, whether headed by Darlan, Laval 
or anyone else, which seems to indicate that the Nazis 
would have accepted Petain 1 s refusal to readmit Laval to 
the government, had two political blunders not occurred. 
Both were made on April 3, The first was by Petain when 
he expressed the idea of sounding out Goering concerning 
a ministerial reorganization, 64 He still had no intention 
of accepting Laval, but the Marshal 1 s·willingness to sac-
rifice Darlan was all Abetz and the Gennan 1s needed. It 
is likely that Petain was thinking of replacing Darlan with 
Joseph Barthelemy, Minister of Justice.65 On the sgme day 
Darlan made the tactical error of relating Petain 1 s fear 
of the American ultimatum to German-Consul Krug von Nidda, 
warning the Germans that their efforts to reinstate Laval 
were doomed to failure. 66 This was all that was needed 
to transform the crisis into a show of strength between 
the Germans and the United States, and,iwith Hitler holding 
all the cards, the Nazis could not lose, When faced with 
the ultimatum to choose between Nazi and American friend-
ship, Darlan did not submit immediately, His plan was to 
offer Laval the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
retain the position of Vice-Premier for himself,67 Laval 
64Aron, .2E.• cit,, p, 352. 
65
Ibid, Anon offers no evidence to support this assumptio 
66 Ibid, 
nn_ r,it. .. nn. l <0-1 <l _ 
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would simply answer 11yes 11 or "no" and under these con-
ditions be forcedto refuse. The Nazis would be notified 
of his refusal and the crisis would be resoived, But 
Laval tricked the Admiral by refusing the Foreign Affiars 
ministry, and demanded a position as Head of Government. 
Laval painted much the same picture of France for Darlan 
as he had for Petain, and like the Marshal, Darlan was 
68 prepared to capitulate. The Admiral wrote Petain suggesting 
that Laval form a new government imnediately, asking only 
for a military post for himself. Now it was Petain 1 s turn 
to refuse defeat and persuade Darlan to recons~der. The 
Marshal charged Darlan to deliver the decision to German 
authorities in Paris, stating that Laval had refused the 
Foreign Affairs post, and the government was suspending 
indefinitely negotiation with Laval. Darlan agreed to 
this, provided Petain would write a second letter reaffirming 
his support of the Darlan government, So on April 12, it 
appeared that the old sailor had weathered the severest 
storm of his career. But Abetz got wind of the solution 
and made the decision to refuse Darlan access to Paris, 
fo~bidding him to cross the demarcation line until the Laval 
69 
matter had been settled. Darlan 1 s mistake was succumbing 
68
Laval, .21?.• cit., p. 95. Also see Darlan, 2£• .£11., 
pp. 297-298 for the text of Darlan 1 s proposal concerning 
the formation of a new government. 
69 
Aron, 2£• ill•, p. 354. 
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to-Abetz' blackmail and failing to proceed to Paris. 
Laval met with the Marshal on April 14, and after the 
meeting indicated to the press that he was about to form 
a new government under his own conditions, which included 
dropping all ministers who had a part in his dismissal 
in December of 1940. The next day Darlan took the offensive 
and refused to dissolve his government. True to form, the 
old Marshal hesitated to recall Laval. Henri Moysset, 
speaking in support of Darlan, concluded with the prophetic 
warning: 
Germany has lost the war. She will drag 
into the abyss all those who have marched or 
have seemed to march in her wake. Take care, 70 
Monsieur ·1e Marechal, not to _survive your glory. 
Petain agreed to receive Laval once more in the evening and 
pose a series of questions which would draw out Laval's 
political intentions. Knowing in advance that they could not 
agree on a joint program, Petaih would refuse him. Laval 
threatened Petain with German reprisals of immediate occup-
ation of the Vichy zone, the loss of political autonomy 
and what independence the unoccupied zone enjoyed if he 
was·not recalled to form a new government, Once again 
the Marshal proved he did not have the strength and will-
power to argue with Laval, 
Friday, April 17, 1942 there was held the final 
Council of Ministers of the Darlan government, The Marshal 
circulated the collective letter of resignation, 
CHAPTER V · 
OPERATION TORCH: 
THE ALLIES INVADE NORTH AFRICA 
Admiral Darlan• s departure from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs marked the ascendancy of Pierre 
Laval in fact, if not in title, as the real Head of 
State in the Vichy regime. The Admiral retained his 
position as Petain 1 s successor, but should death remove 
the Marshal, Darlan was destined to inherit a position 
which would be that of a figurehead, Although he had 
received the promotion to Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, Navy and Air Force, Darlan had no real political 
power, not even his former prerogative to attend the 
Council of Ministers meetings. He now attended these 
meetings only when summoned to discuss strictly military 
questions. He seemed content with his work, in this 
capacity, and made frequent inspection tours to North 
Africa. Even before his dismissal, the event that would 
play the most significant role in his life and lead to 
his subsequent assassination, had already been set in 
motion, The Allies were studying maps and strategy in 
their preparations for an invasion of North Africa, Oper-
ation Torch was to serve as a rehearsal for the invasion 
of Europe, and Frenchmen were making an agreement aimed 
at driving the Germans out of France. 
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The conspiracy began to take shape near the end 
of 1941. The chief instigator was a wealthy industrial-
ist, Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil whom the Germans mistakenly 
believed to be a Nazi. Associated with him was Colonel 
Van Heck, a veteran of the Foreign Legion and head of a 
North African Vichy youth organization numbering some 
30,000, which the Germans _mistakenly believed to be:'a 
version of the Hitler Youth. Another conspirator was 
Jean Rigault, a former journalist, closely associated 
with Lemaigre-Dubreuil in the industrialist 1 s business 
empire. Also included in the 11Group of Five 111 as the 
conspirators came to be called, were Jacques Tarbet de 
Sainte-Hardouin and Captain Henri d 1Astier de la Vigerie. 
Sainte-Hardouin was a diplomat connected with the office 
of the Delegate-General in North Africa, General Alphonse 
Juin, who had replaced Weygand. Captain de la Vigerie 
was a somewhat romantic figure who had been a fixture at 
Harry 1 s Bar in Paris before the war. He was responsible 
for the conspirator 1 s security organization. 
Robert D. Murphy, President Roosevelt's personal 
representative in Algiers, talked at length with Lemaigre-
Dubreuil on December 5, 1941. He learned that the indust-
rialist was angry over the dismissal of Weygand and that 
1A complete list of the 11 Group of Five II can be 
found in Murphy, .2.E.• cit., pp. 122-123. Also in Aron, 
.2.E.• cit., PP• 393-39S:--and in Renne Pierre Gosset, 
Conspiracy in Algiers (New York: The Nation, 1945), 
pp. 34-39. 
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he desired to see some kind of provisional government in 
Algiers that would be "independent of Vichy, 112 Once this 
was accomplished, the empire might be brought into the 
war. Lemaigre-Dubreuil stated that his group represented 
no political party and would be willing to work with all 
who shared their goals, Their attitude toward Vichy would 
be determined by the government's reaction to their new 
program, The group realized that Allied assistance would 
be necessary for the success of their venture and Murphy 
offered such, The achievements of the "Group of Five" 
would to a great measure determine the Allies• success 
in the planned invasion and their cooperation would 
be of valuable assistance when troops would land to 
occupy Algiers, The problem of finding a figure of 
sufficient public stature and ability to head the 
conspirators was not so easily solved, Weygand was 
living in retirement on the French R1vie~a but declined 
to participate in the venture, replying to Roosevelt's 
personal letter that he was 11 too old to become a rebel, 113 
De Gaulle was out of consideration owing to his decided 
lack of popularity with the officers and civil servants 
in North Africa who had remained loyal to Petain and 
Vichy, 4 
2Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, 
.£E_, cit,, Vol. 11, p, 4957 
3 , 
Aron, op • .£.!.!_,, p, 396, 
4Dennis ·Fay Wachtel "De Gaulle And The Invasion 
of North Africa" (Unpublished Ph. D, dissertation, St, 
Louis University, 1964), p. 187. 
Then suddenly, in April, the escape of General 
Henri Andre Giraud offered a ready-made solution to 
the problem of finding a leader, The General met 
with Lemaigre-Dubreuil near Lyons on May 19, and 
expressed his enthusiasm for the plan,5 Giraud•s 
objective was to encourage a massive upris"ing in 
metropolitan France, but he was willing to lend him-
self to the North African invasion, and it was agreed 
that General Charles E, Mast, commander of Vichy 1 s 
Algiers Division, would be Giraud•s representative 
in North Africa. Murphy wired his assessment of 
the situation to the State Department on July 6: 
Since his escape from Koenigstein 
in May, the leaders of the North African 
group have been in touch personally with 
-General Andre Giraud, He has given them 
his authorization to continue their effort, 
and has designated certain military officers 
in French North Africa for this purpose, 
One of these officers, General Mast, is 
stationed in Algiers as Chief of Staff of 
the 19th Army Corps •• , According to 
Mast., General G:l!raud is heart and soul 
for the resumption of hostilities 
against the Axis and will take command 
of French forces either in France or 
North Africa •••• Referring to North 
Africa, Mast states the opinion that we 
could·count on the cooperation in French 
North Africa of at least 14 divisions 
composed of French officers and French 
and native troops •• , , It is refreshing 
5weygand, .QE.• cit,, p, 62, Also see Aron, 
op, cit,, p, 396, 
to have the point of view expressed 
by General Mast who, with other 
officers, insists that it matters little 
what politicians in Vichy may say or 
do during the coming t·ew months. He 
ins is-cs that they will disappear, and 
that France•s destinies will be oaken in 
hand by the military •••• The 
representative of General Giraud in 
French Morocco is General Bethouard, a 
divisional gommander now stationed at 
Ca!!ablanca. 
Giraud hoped.to rally supporters in North Arrica 
as well as in metropolitan France thus assuming 
the role of leader of the resistance movement. 
' -
On account of Giraud's maneuveri11s for position, 
and the fact that America did not trust the "Group 
99 
of Five" sufficiently to give them complete information, 
the Torch operation was a precarious undertaking from 
it!! conception. Ledc to believe that they were the 
only group the ~ericans would recognize and that 
only American troops would take part in the North 
African landings, the conspirators pressed Murphy 
to arrange a meeting with a high-ranking United 
States military.man to coordinate activities. After 
trips to Washington and London, where he briefed 
Roosevelt and Eisenhower respectively, Murphy re-
turned to Algiers with the news that a meeting would 
soon be arranged: 7 
Vol. 
6
Foreim Relations of the United States, 1942, 
II, pp. 3 1-342. 
7Murphy, .2£• cit., p. 109. 
The Allies were still avoiding the most dirricult 
or all problems surrounding the invasion, ror 
Giraud was still under the illusion that he would 
be Commander-in-Chier or the operations, He was 
also convinced that the invasion or both North 
Africa and France would take place sometime in 
early 1943, General Eisenhower was staunchly 
opposed to revealing the dates and sites or the 
invasion, 8 and when the projected meeting between 
the American military and conspirators was not 
rorthcoming, the group's anxiety increased, 
American Consul-General Felix Cole wired Washington 
rrom Algiers: 
Our saintly rriend here reports 
that the other rriends, the rxagpole 
sitter, are anxious to know what has 
become or the projected secret meeting 
or their and our "general starrs" 
which they state was tentatively 
pJa nned rar Sept~mber 15 somewhere 
in North Arrica. 
Dame rumor also had her day and di rricul ties were 
mounting as the result or a growing suspicion that 
Vichy might have discovered something about Torch, 
The rears proved groundless, 
8 
Dwight D, Eisenhowe.r, Crusade in Europe 
(Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc,, 1946), 
PP, 86-87, Eisenhower relates the details or his 
meeting with Murphy in London, when the latter 
attended military conrerences as a ricticious Lt, 
Colonel McGowan • 
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9Foreigh Relations or the United States, 1942, 
.QE., cit,, Vol, II, p, 376, The "saintly rriend 11 must be 
Sainte-Hardouin and the "rlagpole sitter" is General 
Mast, ~., p, 405, 
While Murphy was in Washington he received 
from President Roosevelt a directive spelling out 
the duties-he was to resume upon returfiing·to North 
Africa. After the landings, he was to serve as 
General Eisenhower's political adviser, and the in-
vasion was to be justified to local French officials 
on the grounds that it was necessary to prevent 
Axis occupation. Murphy was still denied permission 
to inform the conspirators of dates or sites, being 
assured only that he could give them 24 hours 
advance notice when he received a coded message 
from the President.10 Meanwhile, the suspicions of 
the conspirators as well as the suspicions of Vichy 
increased alarmingly, but for different reasons. The 
success of the "Group of Five" would depend upon 
accurate coordination of their activities with the 
Allied landings. Reports from Vichy indicated an in-
creasing concern in government circles that an Allied 
invasion of French Africa was imminent, but French 
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West Africa and Dakar were be.lieved to be the targets.11 
When Murphy returned to Algiers on October 16, he was 
10Murphy, op. cit., p. 127. The message ·broad-
cast on the BBC inFrench was 11Allo, Robert. Franklin 
arrive." It was received shortly before-midnight, 
November 7, thus enabling Murphy to give the "Group of 
Five" only a few hours notice. They had learned the date 
of November _7-8 at Cherchel, but the fact that the invasion 
was postponed: from 2 a.m. until 5 a.m. was still unknown. 
11Docteur, op. cit., p. 157. 
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confronted by General Mast, representing Giraud, and 
soon afterwards by Admiral Raymond Fenard, representing 
Admiral Darlan. 11The Darlan proposal did not come- as 
any bolt from the blue, he had been making discreet 
overtures to us f·or thirteen months. 1112 Fenard had 
been instructed to contact Murphy by office_rs in 
Admiral Darlan's entourage owing to the fact that the 
political situation-in Vichy was very fragile and 
might collapse at any moment. Fenard informed Murphy 
that Darlan was convinced the Germans were going to 
make their move for North Africa before November 1 and 
under the circumstances, Darlan 
••• is faced with a decision. 
If Darlan could be informed that should 
he as Commander-in-Chief of French armed 
forces decide to come to Africa entrain-
ing with him the Fre~ch Fleet that the 
u. s. would" be willing ••• to supply 
immediate large scale aid ••• there is 
a strong possibility that Darlan would 
undertake such cooperation. If he did 
the military and naval forces in French 
Africa would-undoubtedly obey his command. 
This is obviously of the greatest 
importance and my French friends and I 
are convinc1d of reliability and sincerity of contact .• 3 
12 · Murphy, op. cit., p. 113. Although Murphy had 
known the Admiral casually for .several years, their last 
meeting had been at Vichy in March, 1941. Murphy states 
that after Leahy 1 s departure from Vichy on May 1, 1942, 
Darlan made overtures to the Allies throught Fenard and 
Alain Darlan. Darlan 1 s son confirms this throughout his 
work, L1Amiral Darlan Parle, op. cit • 
. 13Foreigh Relations of the United States, 1942, 
£!?.• cit., Vol. II, p. 393. 
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Murphy favored encouraging Darlan 1 s overtures, and felt 
that somehow this could be reconciled with any promises 
made to Giraud, He then proceded'to notify Giraud's 
representative, General Mast, of Roosevelt 1;s directive 
(to justify the invasion on the grounds of imminent 
Axis occupati'on) and the possibility of Darlan 1 s 
involvement, Mast accepted the terms with a warning 
which Murphy immediately dispatched to Washington: 
Mast also told me bluntly that 
Giraud contemplates that we deal with him 
and not with Darlan, Mast has learned 
that Darlan is seeking to climb on the 
bandwagon but in his opinion Darlan could. 
not be trusted. I replied that we hoped 
the French would demonstrate some unity, 
that Darlan is the Commander-in-Chief of 
French Armed Forces, that the admiralty 
comm.ands the ports and coastal batteries 
in French Africa. Mast reported that 
Giraud will command the Army which is 
loyal to him and not to ·Darlan and that 
the Navy in French North Africa would fall 
in line 1,i th the Army. I urged that 
success of the operation is the cardinal 
point and that we wa1_r~ the French to 
consolidate with us. 4 
Mast also pressed Murphy for a decision on the long-
awaited meeting between the conspirators and the U, S, 
military man from Eisenhower's staff, While discussing 
the date of the meeting, Mast pointed out that Giraud 
had hopes of being able to seize and·hold part of the 
occupied zone of France, at the time of the North 
14 Ibid,, p. 394, 
African landings and fC!t' the first time openly raised 
the question of the Torch command, The conspirators 
expected this to fall to Giraud, as did the General, 
Murphy tried to avoid discussion of the question, 
hoping to work out some solution to salve the wounded 
French pride, A solution that would not hamper 
Eisenhower's overall control of the operation, 
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Murphy then made arrangements to slip Eisenhower's 
deputy commander, Brig, Gen, Mark Clark, into North 
Africa to meet with Mast and the conspirators, 15 This 
meeting·was set for the night of October 21, but in 
the meantime, other matters had arisen that complicated 
the situation, ·on October 18, Admiral Darlan 1 s son, 
Alain, entered an Algiers hospital suffering from 
infantile paralysis, 16 Secondly, General Alphonse 
Juin, Weygand I s replacement in North Africa·, ·sounded 
out American intentions concerning Germany's forcible 
entry into North Africa, for he was anxious to gain 
American military support. Murphy assured him of 
support, and in turn was informed that Darlan, who 
was expected in Algiers shortly, would favor resistance 
to Axis agression. 17 
l5Murphy, op• cit,, p. 119, 
16 cit,, 184-185, Darlan, 2E.• pp. 
17Murphy, op• cit,, p. 129, 
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On the night of October 21-22, at Cherchel some 
sixty miles west of Algiers, General Clark was landed by 
. 18 
submarine. Clark was under definite instructions from 
Eisenhower not to mention Admiral Darlan at the meeting 
since 
to be 
selection of the French commander was 
. 19 
handled by the French themselves. 11 
"a matter 
He emphasized 
that French administration would not be interfered with 
and that the question of a French commander would be 
. 20 
settled after the operations accomplished. At this 
meeting Mast was.informed that a large American force was 
preparing to land in Africa at a future date, and he 
responded by suggesting the establishment of a bridgehead 
in France at the same time, in accordance with Giraud's 
plans. It was also agreed that Giraud would be informed 
by letter of the Allied intentions and his role in their 
plans. A letter was prepared for Eisenhower's approval 
guaranteeing the restoration of France's pre-war bound-
aries, acceptance of France as an ally, and the transfer 
of the supreme command in North Africa to a French officer 
11at the appropriate time. 1121 
18 
Mark W. Clark, Calculated~ (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1950), pp. 78-79. 
19 
George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing .lli 
I~itative in The West (Washington, D.C., Department of 
the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), 
p. 81. 
20Ibid. 
21~., p. 82. 
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The French in North Arrioa were not told 
the date or the coming invasion, as the Allies 
reared a breach or security. In raot, Clark lert 
the conspirators with the impression that the 
operation could not take place berore the end or 
November. As General Clark was leaving the rarm-
house to board the submarine to return to Gibraltar, 
an inrormer in the conspirators:•. hire phoned to warn 
them that Police were on their way to investigate a 
report that strangers had been seen on the beach the 
night berore. 22 General Mast and his party lert 
immediately ror Algiers, while Clark and Captain 
Godrrey Courtney, who had piloted the small boat 
ashore, hid in the wine-cellar. Murphy and M. Henri 
Teissier remained in the dining room, where the 
oonrerenoe had been held, to greet the polios. They 
convinced the police orrioial~ that the remains or the 
conrerenoe, American cigarette butt~ and empty whiskey 
bottle~, were in raot the result~ or an innocent 
party being thrown by the American Consul in Algiers, 
when Murphy produced his identirioation papers. 23 
22 Clark, 2.E• cit., pp. 80-81. 
23 
Murphy, .2E.• cit., pp. 119-120. 
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Murphy played his bluff to the hilt, begging the police 
not to embarrass the girls who were upstairs changing 
clothes. The police departed and Clark's submarine 
put to sea heading for Gibraltar. 24 
The Cherchel meeting had not clarified the 
question of French command. Even worse it had 
further muddled French preparation for Torch. 
Previously the conspirators assumed they had months 
to prepare, while in reality they now had but sixteen 
days and they were even ignorant of this fact. Although 
ordered not to do so, the discussion of Darlan•s role, 
if any, could not be avoided at the talks. When Mast 
pressed Clark for reassurance that Giraud would be 
given over-all command of the operations, Clark agreed 
that Giraud would be given over-all command 11as Boon 
as possible 1125 -- a purposely vague.phrase. Mast 
realized immediately that it was Darlan 1 s status 
which prevented a clarification of the political and 
military affairs surrounding the Torch operation. 
He brought up the question of Darlan and Clark out-
24clark,. op. cit., p. 86. For his account. of the 
Cherchel conference, including his picturesque description 
of how he lost his pants and moneybelt boarding the sub-
marine for the return trip to Gibraltar, see pages 78-79. 
The Clark group included two officers who later gained military 
renown, the then Brig. Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, who later served 
as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Captain (later 
Admiral) Jerauld Wright, chief naval commander of NATO and of 
U.S. forces in the Atlantic. For Wright's account of the 
episode see 11 Clark 1 s Secret Mission" Life Magazine, Vol, 13, 
No. 26 ( January 14, 1946), pp. 75:.8o.--
25Murphy, op. cit., p. 119. 
lined Eisenhower's proposal, by which Giraud and 
Darlan might work as a team, dividing the top French 
command between them with Giraud heading the Army 
and Darlan rallying the Navy to the Allied cause. 
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Mast objected vigorously to the inclusion of Darlan, 
accusing the Admiral of being nothing more than a 
belated opportunist. Clark explained that the question 
of command was impractical during the preliminary 
operations, and left the status of African military and 
political affairs to be s_ettled after the invasion was 
accomplished. 
Although the problem of General Giraud's role 
in the operations had not been settled, the General 
had definite ideas of his own. "We don't want the 
Americans to 0 free us; we want them to l;l.elp us free 
ourselves, which is not quite the same. "26 But Giraud 
could not afford to set his price too high, for there 
was the possibility that the Allies would- give considera-
tion to Darlan 1 s overtures, and these overtures were in 
fact already being studied in the State Department. 
·Shortly after Admiral Fenard and Colonel Chretien had 
approached Murphy in Algiers, in mid-October sounding 
out-the possibility of Darlan 1 s cooperation, Mr. Paul 
Guerin, an economic adviser in the French Embassy in 
Washington told State Department officials that: 
••• Admiral Darlan was bitterly 
hostile to Laval and that he could be 
expected to interest.himself in any 
movement which might react against his 
enemy, ••• The chief argument in any 
movement to influence Admiral Darlan 
• , •• was the argument of military 
and naval strength, and if the United 
Nations could produce proof of adequate 
strength, Admiral Darlan might be pre-
pared to render assistance, • , at a 
critical time such as this, no harm 
could be done in approaching Admiral 
Darlan and the attempt might su~Qeed 
with highly gratifying results, r 
Meanwhile, to Giraud the results were not so 
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gratifying, as M, Iiemaigre-Dubreuil arrived in Ly,cins on 
October ·24-25 to relay to the General the events at 
Cherche1, 28 Giraud was very dissatisfied at the turn 
of events, for his plans call.ed for a revolt of the 
French Army in metropolitan France as well as in 
North Africa, with early spring of 1943 being the 
earliest possible date for operations. Now the Allies 
were asking him to forget :,about the bridgehead in 
France and concentrate llll efforts on a North African 
invasion. The North African venture had always been 
incidental to the revolt in France, but Giraud still 
maintained hopes of establishing the bridgehead ,in 
southern France. He decided to go along with the Allies 
Vol, 
27
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, 
II, 21?.• £!.!,, p. 404, 
28A ron, 21?.•--ill•, pp, 397-398, 
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plans, especially since he was led to believe that the 
Allies were massing an invasion force of half a million 
men and that he would be its commander-i~-chief. 29 
Murphy informed.Eisenhower on October 26 of Giraud's 
tentative approval of Allied plans, but Eisenhower 
wishing to clarify the matter of command in North Africa, 
submitted the following changes in a letter Murphy 
proposed sending Giraud. Eisenhower stated: 
••• during those phases of the 
operation that involves the landing, establish-
ing the security of French North Africa, and 
providing the necessary bases, it is considered 
essential that the American Command and 
organization which has been set up with so 
much effort and difficulty for this special 
operation, should remain unchanged. By the 
time this has been accomplished it is to 
be assumed that the French Forces •••• 
will be. sufficiently strong to insure the 
complete security of French tepritory. 
Thereafter the primary interest of the 
American Commander lies in the use of the 
area as a base of further operations 
against the Axis, and the defense of French 
North Af~~ca will be turned over to French 
Command.> 
At the same time Eisenhower gave Murphy authorization 
to inform Giraud and Mast on November 4 of the date 
of the invasion and the name of the commander-in-chief. 
- ' 
?9Aron, 2E• cit., pp. 397-398. Clark had hinted 
at Cherchel tha~ the invasion force would consist of 
500,000 American troops, although leaving Giraud's 
role unsettled. See Clark, 21?.• cit., 'pp. 81-82. 
3°Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, 
.2£• ~., Vol. II, p. 406. - --
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While these instructions were being forwe.I'.ded 
to Algiere, Murphy had sent a long letter to Giraud 
giving the same guarantees the Allies had made pre-
viously, and Giraud signed what he called 11an agree-
ment in principle" and forwarded it to Murphy.31 Still 
laboring under the illusion that he was to be commander~ 
in-chief of the invasion forces Giraud dispatched a 
lengthy·letter to Murphy, in which he stated: 
It is quite normal and it is under-
stood, that all landing operations will 
be regulated by the General Staff of the 
Ame'ri can Army •. ; 
The Inter-Allied Command will 
begin to function after the landing, 
forty-eight hours after the 'hour set 
for the beginning of the first convoy. 
With respect to subsequence operations, 
the American troops will come under 
the Inter-Allied
3
~0imnand as soon:a:s 
they are landed. 
It is clear that when Giraud used "Inter-Allied 
Command" he was referring to himself. This is 
further confirmed in the :l'inal paragraph of the 
document: 
Vol. 
To sum up, the Inter-Allied 
Commander-in-Chief in North Africa 
accepts the propositions of the 
American General Staff for the debark-
ation in Algiers and Morocco, provided 
he himself sets the date for landing, 
following American advices ]hat 
preparations are completed. j 
31Murphy,c.2E_. cit,, p. 120. 
32Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, 
II, p. 420. 
33Ibid., p. 422. 
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Giraud was well aware of the widespread Anglophobia 
in North African military circles, so he wrote 
Murphy the following day insisting that the invasion 
force consist solely of American troops, under American 
command. 
Such obvious and wide divergence between Giraud's 
and the Allied plans quickly led to difficulties. 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil returned from his visit to Giraud 
and found Algiers in a state of confusion. Mast had 
been notified that the invasion was imminent and that 
a submarine had been sent to take Giraud out of France. 
Since Clark had indicated at Cherchel that the invasion 
would not come until the latter part of November, the 
French felt they were being pushed into a situation 
without consideration for their own plans. Mast de-
manded that the Allies show confidence in Giraud and 
delay the operation several days or even weeks to give 
the conspirators time to complete arrangements in 
North Africa as well as France. At this time Murphy 
wired Washington, requesting a delay in Torch operations,34 
but any delay was of course out of the question. He 
was told to deal with Giraud as best he could. Murphy 
34For the text of this request see MurRhY,£E_. cit., 
pp. 120-121. He states that in the years since he hacr-
learned enough about military operations to realize 
how "ridiculous" this must have seemed to General 
George Marshall and General Eisenhower. 
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again repeated the formal assurances that he had pre-
viously given the General. In an effort to pacify 
Giraud in his demand to be named Allied Commander of 
the operation, Murphy included in these assurances 
essentially the same solution Eisenhower had proposed, 
and threw the problem back to Ike. Murphy told Giraud, 
I am communicating your suggestion 
to the General Staff of the American 
Army and I am certain an agreeable solution 
will be found • .• , While the equipping 
and organizing of the French Army will 
thus be accomplished, the details con-
cerning the coll'lllland can be complet%d 
so that the French will be in a positlon 
to take ?ver
35
he Supreme Command at the 
proper time. 
The time for arguing with Giraud and the 
conspirators had passed for Allied troop convoys 
bound for North Africa were already at sea, and there 
was very little the French could do except fall in 
line with the Allied plans. The French complained 
that their plans and preparations were ruined for 
the invasion would be taking place sooner than they 
had expected. They further protested that the Allies 
would have to take the responsibility if the invasion 
was opposed by great force. Mast informed Murphy 
that in the short time remaining the conspirators 
would only have time to complete their coup in Algiers 
35Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, 
2£• ~., Vol. II, p. 417. 
·, 
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and pointed out that landing forces would have to deal 
with local authorities at the other sites, 36 
Giraud was waiting in Marseilles for the sub-
marine to take him to Gibraltar, where he hoped to 
iron out the question of command with the Allied Staff, 
After several narrow escapes he managed to elude the 
local police and boarded the submarine on the night 
of November 4-5, to discover that it was a British, 
not an American vessei,37 Nevertheless, he arrived at 
Gibraltar during the afternoon of November 7, But his 
verbal confrontation with Eisenhower, deep within the 
bowels of the Rock, was not a pleasant one. 38 On 
entering the command post Giraud informed Eisenhower 
that he had arrived to take command of the Allied 
expedition: 
I wanted him to proceed to Africa, 
as soon as we could guarantee his safety, 
and there take over command of such 
French forces as would voluntarily rally 
to him • • , • General Giraud was 
adamant; he believed that the honor 
of himself and his country was in-
volved and that he could not possibly 
accept any position in the venture 
36Murphy, op. cit., p, 120, 
37Eisenhower; .2E.· cit,, p, 99, The submarine was 
commanded for this trip by Captain Jerauld Wright of the 
United States Navy. 
38rbid, Although the interview was unpleasant, 
Eisenhower described Giraud, "though dressed in civilian 
clothes, looked very much a soldier ••• well over six 
feet tall, erect, almost stiff in carriage and abrupt in 
speech and mannerisms, He was a gallant if bedraggled 
figure, 11 
., 
lower than that of complete command. 
This, on the face of it was im-
possible •••• All this was 
laboriously explained to the General. 
He was shaken, disappointed, and after 
many hours of conference, felt it 
necessa39 to decline any part in the scheme. 
The Frenchman replied: 
General Giraud cannot accept 
a subordinate position in this 
command; his countrymen would not 
understand and his hsnor as a soldier 
--would be tarnished. 4 
H. Freeman (Doc) Matthews of the State Department 
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and W.H.B. Mack of the British Foreign Office, 
Eisenhower•s· political advisers, suggested that Giraud 
be given a nominal command for appearances, but 
Eisenhower rejected the idea, and insisted that Giraud 
would have to content himself with command of French 
forces in North Africa. Seeing that Eisenhower 
would not alter his position, Giraud finally gave 
in the following morning when he was promised that the 
Allies would deal with him as head of the French 
administration in North Africa, But this only settled 
the matter for the'time being.41 
39rbid., p. 100. 
40ibid. 
41c1ark, 2£• cit., pp. 95-102. Although Eisenhower's 
command of the French language was probably equal to Clark's 
Q~~era~ Clark relieved Mack and Matthews as interpreter 
periodically during the long and dr.awn out conversations. 
Clark adds that the job was not too difficult however, since 
the discussions merely repeated what had been said during 
the first hour of the meeting. 
116 
Meanwhile, Murphy was busy placating General 
Mast•s initial misgivings which soon turned to complete 
cooperation as he made final preparations for the 
coup in Algiers. On receiving the news of Giraud's 
decision to leave France, Murphy wired Washington 
that he was giving Mast the date of the landing on 
Novemper 4, ninety-six hours before H-hour. That 
evening Murphy was invited to visit General Alphonese 
Juin, Commander-in-Chief in North Africa. Juin 
assured Murphy that North Africa would be defended 
against all comers, but that in case of German attack 
he would ask for American support. If the Americans 
attacked, however, he would have to order his troops 
t9 resist.42 Juin added that Admiral Darlan might be 
interested in discussing the possibility of eventual 
American assistance. On the following day Murphy was 
visited by Colonel Chretien, Juin 1 s aide, who was also 
Darlan 1 s intelligence agent. Chretien told him that 
Juin would be glad to open discussions with a high-
ranking American officers concerning eventual, Franco-
American military cooperation. Murphy was relieved 
that neither Juin nor Chretien appreciated the immediacy 
of the situation: 11 They • • • indicated no immediate 
anxiety regarding our plans. 1143 
4
2
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, 
cit., Vol. II, p. 42$. 
43Ibid. 
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But the greatest surprise of all came later in 
the day with the arrival of Admiral Francois Darlan in 
Algiers. The Admiral's son, Alain, had been hospitalized 
since October 27 with infantile paralysis and it was 
reported that he was dying. The Allies found Darlan•s 
presence at this particul$r moment embarrassing, and 
hoped that he would return to Vichy before North 
African D-Day. 
1. Darlan in North Africa 
The Allies were completing final preparation 
for the landings when Admiral Darlan arrived in Algiers, 
late in the afternoon of November 5. It was believed 
that the fears of Vichy officials would have to be 
calmed, at the outset of the invasion, and to this 
end Roosevelt had prepared a series of messages to be 
delivered to Petain and the North African governors. 
After a few objections to the original drafts by 
Churchill,41-~ the messages remained the same in 
substance, expressing sorrow at the suffering of 
France under the heel of the Nazis and concluded wi.th 
this -final paragraph: 
Today, with greedy eyes on that 
empire which France so laboriously 
constructed, Germany and Italy are 
proposing to invade and occupy French· 
North Africa, in order that they may 
execute their schemes of domination 
and conquest over the whole of that 
continent • • ·• • In the light of all 
the evidence of our enemy's intentions 
and plans, I have, therefore, decided 
to dispatch to North Africa powerful 
American armed forces to coopera!;,e 
with the governing agencies of Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco in repelling this 
latest act in the long litany of German 
and Italian international crime •••• 
I am making all of this clear to the 
~Churchill, 
.£!?.• cit.:, Vol, 
The History of the Second World 
IV, p, 528 • 
French authorities in North Africa, 
and I am calling on them for their 
cooperation in repelling Axis threats. 
My clear purpose is to support and aid 
the French autho45ties and their administrations. 
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In the early morning hours of November 8, 
Allied f'orces landed in strength at Algiers and Oran. 
By dawn other landings had taken place ·on the Moroccan 
coast and Torch was underway. The outcome of this 
operation had depended largely on the French reaction 
to the unexpected turn of events in North Africa. As 
the Allied troops hit the beaches, General Mast's 
group of conspirators and irregular partisans seized 
control of a number of key points in Algiers (the 
police stations, communications centers, government 
administrative offices and the Vichy garrison in the 
city).46 They succeeded in holding these posts until 
about 7 a.m., 'on the assumption that Allied forces 
would relieve them. But troops were still some dis-
tance away, having landed east and west of Algiers 
by several miles. Meanwhile, Murphy called on General 
Juin to inform.him of the landings and ask him to 
45Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: 
An Intimate History, (New York: Harperand Company, 
1948), pp. 476-477-
46For a detailed account of partisan actions on 
the night of November 7-8 see Murphy, .QE• cit., pp. 130-1'33, 
Tompkins, .QE• cit., pp. 73-82, and especially Pender, 
.2E• cit., pp, 102-116. 
place himself under General Giraud's command in an 
effort to bring France back into the war.47 Juin 
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was sympathetic, but explained that he could make no 
move on his own owing to the presence of the. Commander-
in-Chief of French Forces, Admiral Darlan. Murphy sent 
for Darlan, who arrived a short time later. The 
Admiral was extremely irritated by the news of the 
Allied landings, for he suddenly realized·the pre-
carious position in which the invasion placed him. He 
had no way of knowing the size of the landing force 
and felt that premature cooperation with the Allies 
would certainly lead to severe Gernian reprisals against 
Vichy. The Admiral argued that he was under obligation 
to consult with Marshal Petain and Murphy agreed that 
he might report on the situation. Until this time 
Juin 1 s residence had been surrounded by Mast's 
irregulars but troops loyal to Vichy suddenly arrived 
and took control. Murphy and Pender were placed 
under arrest. Juin and Darlan proceeded to naval 
headquarters and by this time regular Vichy troops 
had also seized control of Algiers. By the time 
Allied troops had fought their way into the city they 
found that the rebellion had been-crushed-and Vichy 
forces were in complete control of the situation. 
47Murphy, ~- ·cit., pp. 128-129. 
At 9:10 a.m. the American Charge d 1Affairs at 
Vichy, Pinkney Tuck, delivered Roosevelt's message 
to Marshal Petain. The Marshal replied by handing 
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him a prepared statement denouncing the Allied landings 
and announced that the French Empire would be defended 
against any aggressor. Tuck was also informed that 
these instructions had been .-sent to North Africa. He 
noticed, however, that the Marshal was in an extremely 
affable mood: 
As I rose to take my leave he 
took both my hands in his looking at 
me steadfastly and smiling. He 
accompanied me to the ante-chamber 
and turned briskly back
8
to his office 
humming a little tune.4 
Despite the dangerous ambiguity of their position, 
Frenchmen loyal to Vichy and Marshal Petain could 
look to the future with a cert~in degree of optimism, 
for it appeared that the turn of the tide was at hand. 
For the first time in the war Allied forces were 
striking back in force. It was a crucial moment in 
the history of France. Vrchy leaders, Darlan and 
Petain, did not want France to become a battleground 
and their sympathy for the Allied cause was only 
secondary to their loyalty and love of France. Even 
sympathizers and supporters still lay with Petain and 
Vol. 
48Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, 
II, p. 432. 
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his government, their support of the Allied.cause subord-
inated to their loyalty to Petain, Many Allied observers 
lacked the necessary subtlety to appreciate the .fact that 
loyalty to Vichy did not make a Frenchman pro-Axis or 
pro-fascist, Many of Petain 1 s strongest supporters were 
violently anti-German, but for some reason·this fact was 
never clearly understood iri the Allied camp,49 
For these reasons, Vichy had already decided on its 
policy. On the one hand it would continue to play .the 
delaying game with the Axis, and the game got underway 
immediately, for Laval was .summoned to Munich on the 
evening of November 8. His major objective was to avoid 
definite commitments which might lead to co-belligerency 
with the 
meeting. 
Axis and Laval was at his best during this 
50 He conceded nothing. On the other hand, 
affairs in North Africa would be left to the discretion 
of Darlan, who was expec.ted to play much the same game 
with the Americans, On the morning of November 8, a 
message to this effect had been sent to Darlan by Petain: 
I have received your message through 
the Admiralty and am glad you are on the 
spot. Take what action you like and keep 
me informed~l You know you have my complete 
confidence,;; 
49Huddleston, .2E• cit., pp, 174-181. 
50Aron, .2.E• cit,, pp, 402-405, The author states 
that Vichy was 11as usual, trying to reconcile the irrecon-
cilable, to play off the Americans against the Germans." 
-'1Ibid., p, 401, 
This was as far as the Marshal was prepared to go, for he 
believed that stronger action would lead to the total 
occupation of France by German, forces, Weygand had arrived 
at Vichy on November 8 and was urging Petain 
armistice with the Allies and declare war on 
to sign an 
52 
the Axis, 
The Marshal did not wish to take such drastic steps, for 
he prefered to play the waiting game, 
Things continued badly with the Allied landings in 
North Africa owing to their failure to maintain their pro-
posed schedule, The conspirators' plans at Oran and 
Casablanca had failed and American forces were meeting 
strong resistance at both sites, Control of Algiers had 
reverted to Vichy troops early on November 8 before Brig, 
Gen, Charles Ryder 1 s forces could enter the city. A man-
ifesto broadcast in.General Giraud's name (the General had 
had to go into hiding immediately upon his arrival to avoid 
arrest)53 failed to rally the French Army's support. Thus 
the Allies were forced to deal with Admiral Darlan, who.had 
all of North Africa under his command, Darlan was further 
determined to have nothing to do with Giraud, whom he con-
sidered to be a rebel, 
Time was running out for Darlan, however, for by the 
afternoon of November 8, Algiers was surrounded by Allied 
troops and it was apparent that further resistance would be 
52 
Ibid., p, 402. 
53G. Ward Price, Giraud 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 
and the North African Scene 
1944 ~ P • 6 e • 
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useless, The Allies were informed shortly after 4 p.m. 
that Darlan had authorized General Juin to negotiate the 
surrender of Algiers. Juin met with General Ryder and 
agreed to surrender Algiers before midnight and it soon 
became apparent that Darlan was prepared to di,scuss a 
settlement for all of North Africa. 
By this time both General Giraud and General Clark 
were on the scene and it was proposed that a general arm-
istice meeting take place the following day, November 10, 
Although fighting had ceased in Algiers, the Allies were 
meeting resistance in both Oran and Casablanca. Clark 
hoped to conclude an armistice that would lay the ground-
work for securing French cooperation in keeping the Axis 
out of Tunisia, as well as securing the French fleet for 
the Allied cause, Still Darlan was playing a cautious 
game, insisting he could do nothing without the Marshal's 
approval. As Darlan attempted to evade the question of 
an armistice for the whole of North Africa, Clark exploded: 
"I _do not propose to wait for any 
word from Vichy. 11 
''Darlan replied, "I can only obey the 
orders of Petain. 11 
11 Then I will end.these negotiations 
and deal with someone5who can act,
11 Gen-
eral Clark concluded.~ 
Seeing that the discussions were getting nowhere, ·Juin 
drew Darlan aside and warned him the Germans would probably 
.54Clark, 212.• cit., p. 109, 
force Petain to disavow the Admiral.for his surrender of 
Algiers two days earlier, and if the Marshal made such a 
move, Darlan 1 s authority would be ended. Thus the Allies 
would have no choice but to turn to Giraud. Murphy states 
that Juin .convinced Darlan to sign before the danger mat-
erialized and cease-fire orders were sent to French mili-
tary commanders throughout North Africa. 
This should have settled matters, but owing to the 
indecision which reigned at Vichy, the cease-fire order 
only complicated the issue. Weygand was pressing Petain 
to retreat to the empire and wage a war of revenge against 
the Axis, but the old Marshal would not quit France. Fail-
ing this, Weygand wished to have the Marshal reply to 
Darlan 1 s earlier request for instructions with orders to 
assist the Allies. While this meeting was being held 
they received the news of the North African cease-fire 
and all were pleased.5'5' Another difficulty developed 
at the same time when Laval telephoned from Munich threat-
ening to resign if Darlan 1 s move was supp~rted by Petain. 
Laval was resisting Germany's demand for co-belligerency 
and his task was further complicated by the apparent . 
free-hand given Darlan in the empire. In order· to avoid 
antagonizing the Germans further, Petain publicly announced 
5'5' 
Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French.Na5y in World War II (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 19 9), 
p. 238. Admiral Auphan was in attendance at the conference 
when his secretary brought the news. 
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that his orders for resistance in the empire were still 
in force and shortly thereafter placed all French forces 
under his own command, thus by-passing Darlan. All of 
this was designed for German comsumption, however, since 
the Marshal had sent an entirely different message to 
Darlan by means· of a top secret code: 
You have all my confidence. Act for 
the best. I eutrust to you the interests 
of the Empire.'.> 
Petain 1 s public pronouncements failed to relieve the 
pressure on Laval at Munich, however, and perhaps what 
was the most impressive performance and exercise in 
double-talk of the shrewd politician's career was to 
no avail. The following morning, November 11, German 
troops moved across the demarcation line and entered 
the Unoccupied Zone of France. Since the policy of an 
·occupied country is necessarily shaped to satisfy the 
invaders, Petain sent an official message to North Africa 
appointing General Auguste Paul Nogues as his personal 
representative. This message was nullified by another 
secret communication intended for Darlan which 
st~ted: 
56 Jacques de Launay, Ma.jor Controversies of 
Contemporart History, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, Ltd., 
1965), p. 2 4. 
Inf'orm Admiral Darlan 
Marshal I s decision • • • has 






Vichy was no longer a f'actor in the situation, being 
occupied by the Germans and with control of' the empire 
seemingly out of' her grasp, the sole remaining trump 
card was the f'leet. 
A period of' conf'usion f'ollowed in North Af'rica 
·owing to the collapse of Vichy and there was some 
doubt as to whether Admiral Darlan or General Nougues 
should be considered the legitimate head of the 
French administration. Also there was the problem 
of' how to deal with General Giraud. Allied calcula-
tions had miscarried, and Algiers had not been taken 
"without f'iring a shot" as Murphy had hoped. The 
"Group of Five" had only succeeded in further com-
plicating an already desperate situation, making the 
invasion only slightly less hazardous than it might 
have been. The French Army had totally ignored 
Genera:l Giraud since his arrival in Algiers on November 9. 
?.[Ibid., p. 267. Although the historical fact of 
the secrettelegrams isn•~ in dispute, there exists no 
trace of the actual documents and the wording varies from 
one witness to another. The originals were destroyed owing 
to the impending occupation of France. The code was known 
only to a Commander Jouannin and an Admiral Battet. Jouannin 
was on the staf'f of' Admiral Auphan in the Secretary of State 
f'or the Navy at Vichy and Battet was in Algiers. Both men 
were permanent assistants on Darlan 1 s staf'f after the 1940 
armistice when the code was conceived. Jouannin inf'ormed 
Admiral Auphan, a staunch supporter of' Darlan, of' the code 
on the morning of November 8, thus enabling Darlan and 
Petain to maintain secret liasion at a most dif'f'icult time. 
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In order to redeem himself from the charge of treason 
and add whatever assistance he could, Giraud decided 
to join with Darlan and accept the Admiral's authority 
over all French forces in North Africa, 
The air in Algiers was finally cleared on 
November 13 when Clark, Mu~p~y-arld Darlan succeeded 
in reaching a settlement satisfactory to all con-
cerned,58 According to this agreement Darlan would 
serve as High Connnissioner in North Africa and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, while Giraud 
would be Commander-in-Chief of the Ground and Air 
Forces, Juin and Nogues were given divisional army 
commands respectively, and all Frenchmen agreed to 
assist the Allies in driving the Axis forces out of 
Tunisia, This was made possible because of the 
military men being willing to subordinate themselves 
to Darlan, Eise-nhower flew in to approve the agree-
ments and stated: 
5SClark, .£E• cit,, pp, 12'7-132, Although Clark 
devotes a full chapter of his memoirs to what he called 
"the Darlan deal", he has almost nothing to say about 
what formal agreements were reached, Certainly agree-
ments were reached with Darlan on November 13, but the 
formal document was not signed until November 22, and 
it is believed_ that Murphy and then Colonel Julius 
Holmes handled negotiations for the .Americans while 
General Jean-Marie Bergeret presented the French views, 
For a complete text of the formal agreements see Arthur 
Layton Funk, "The Cl ark-Darlan Agreement, November 22, 
1942" Journal of Modern History, Vol, XXVI, No. 3, 
(September, 1954), pp, 246-254, 
There is no commitment to engage our 
governments in any political recognition 
or any kind and Darlan was simply auth-
orized, by voluntary action of the local 
officials, and with our consent, to take 
charge of the French affairs of North 
Africa while we were clearing the Ger-
mans out of that continent ••• Theo-
retically we were in the country of an 
ally. The actual effect of Darlan 1 s 
commitment was to recognize and give 
~ffect to~~ position of dominating. 
influence. 
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In the end Darlan proved to be the military man 
that had to be reckoned with in North Africa. Admittedly, 
during their fifth column activities in North Africa, the 
Allies did not know where the Admiral fitted into their 
plans. Even as late as a month.prior to the invasion, 
Darlan 1s representatives had made overtures to Murphy in 
Algiers. But it was hard to find a place in such a venture 
for a man who had been vilified for almost two years as 
the blackest of opportunists. He endeavored to walk a 
tightrope between warring powers, yet the Allies were 
aware of the fact that they would need all the help they 
could get in such a precarious undertakin5 as the invasion 
of North Africa, and when the time came they had no serious 
qualms whatsoever in dealin5 with Darlan. The Allies con-
tinually had their eyes fixed upon the French fleet at 
Toulon which remained under the Admiral's control. Eisenhower 
later recalled the words of Prime Minister Churchill at 
59Eisenhower, 2E_.-cit., p. 108. 
the London conference only two'months before Torch: 
If I could meet Darlan, much as I 
hate him, I would cheerfully crawl on my 
hands and knees for a mile if by doing 
so I could get him to bring that fleet 
6 of his into the circle of Allied forces. O 
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Thus in thrashing-out the Clark-Darlan agreements 
the Allies quickly ran aground of the French military 
tradition of cloaking with legality their every order 
and action. With Darlan in Algiers during the invasion, 
it looked as if one opportunist_had simply beaten another 
to the scene of action. 
60I!?l!i,, p. 105. 
2. Darlan 1 s Administration In North Africa 
The fact of Darlan in North A,frica was indeed 
beset with all kinds of difficulties. None of the Allies 
really trusted Darlan, in view of his intense dislike of 
the British, and Prime Minister Churchill bemoaned the 
fact that De Gaulle had been left out of the picture. 
With Darlan entrenching himself in North Africa, President 
Roosevelt found himself severely criticized in the world 
press for committing himself to a new edition of the Vichy 
regime, Both Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hµll 
continued to emphasize the military considerations as the 
determining factors of the North African situation, with 
Hull going so far as to question the wisdom of leaving 
Darlan in the picture at all, now that his usefuJmes s1 
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was apparently at an end. Following a meeting with 
De Gaulle 1 s representatives in Washington, President 
Roosevelt jokingly suggested that the solution to the 
problem was to "place Admiral Darlan, General Giraud, and 
a De Gaullist representative in one room alone and then 
give the government of the occupied territory to the man 
who came out. 1162 The President continued in a serious vein, 
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stating that if no innnediate solution was forthcoming he 
was prepared to give Murphy veto power over any act of 
the French administration in North Africa, The Free 
French would not deal with Darlan, nor the Admiral with 
De Gaulle's representatives and the criticism continued 
in the press, Roosevelt was bombarded with connnunications 
from Great Britain as Churchill stated concerning the 
Darlan deal: 
The more I reflect upon it the more 
convinced I become that it can only be a 
temporary expedient justifiable solely by 
the stress of battle. We mus_t not over-
look the serious political injury which 
may be done our cause •• , 
· Darlan has an odious record, , , 
Now for the sake of power and office 
Darlan plays turncoat. A permanent 
arrangement with Darlan or the formation 
of a Darlan government in French North 
Africa would not be understood by the 
great masses of ordinary people whgje 
simple loyalties are our strength. 
Churchill's connnunique was accompanied by a letter from 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden recommending that the 
Allies adopt a policy that would "necessarily entail 
the elimination of Darlan, 1164 Eden• s plea was much 
like Churchill 1 s: 
It may well be that Darlan 1 s collab-
oration is indispensable for military 
reasons as an interim measure, But 
neither he (Churchill) nor I feel sure 
that the United States Government could 
6.3 . 
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have any confidence in him as 
permanent head of a North African 
administration. Darlan•s record 
needs no emphasis. He is universally 
distrusted and despised in Frgnce 
and throughout Europe ••• 67 
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But British advice was somewhat belated, for the President 
had already been forced to take ~ction to pacify his critics. 
He had received from Eisenhower a note which explained the 
necessity for coming to terms with Darlan, and Robert 
Sherwood states that Roosevelt was so impressed with it 
that when he read it aloud to Harry Hopkins, "he sounded 
as if he were making an eloquent plea for Eisenhower be-
fore the bar of history. 1166 Eisenhower justified his 
actions, and rightly so, on the grounds that the political 
situation was vastly different from what Murphy had led 
him to expect: 
Existing French sentiment here does not 
remotely agree with prior calculations ••• 
The name of Marshal Petain is something to 
conjure with here ••• The resistance we 
first met was offered because all ranks be-
lieved this to be the Marshal's wish •• 
All concerned say they are ready to help us 
provided Darlan tells them to do so, but 
67 they are not willing to follow anyone else. 
The public criticism President Roosevelt encountered 
forced him to issue a statement to the press on November 17. 
In this statement he emphasized the temporary nature of the 
agreements with Darlan, stating: 
65 
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I have accepted General Eisenhower's 
political arrangements made for the time 
being in Northern and Western Africa. I 
thoroughly understand and approve the 
feeling in the United States and Great 
Britain and all the other United Nations 
that in view of the history of the past 
two years no permanent arr~ngement 
should be made with Admiral Darlan ••• 
The present temporary arrangement in 
North and West Africa is only a temporary 
expedient, justified solely by the stress 
of battle •••• Temuorary arrangements 
made with Admiral Darlan apply, without 
excep~~on, to the current local situation 
only.6 
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The President then indicated his approval of the action 
Eisenhower had taken, in a letter to the General, but 
warned him to keep in mind that, 
(I) we do not·trust.Darlan. 
(2) it is impossible to keep a 
collaborator with Hitler and one with 
whom we believe to be a fascist in civil 
power any longer than is absolutely 
necessary. 
- ( 3 ) and his ( Darlan I s ) movements 
should be watched carefulll and his 
communications supervised. 9 
The British were pleased to see that President 
Roosevelt's statements corresponded so closely to 
their own, for Darlan 1 s position was "weakened with the 
French factions. 1170 The confusion in North Africa had 
68sherw6od, ~- ci tl, pp. 653-654. 
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been compounded by.Roosevelt's temporary and expedient 
statement which undermined the Admiral I s position, so 
Darlan wrote Clark on November 21: 
Information coming from various 
parts tends to give credit to the opinion 
that 1 I am but a lemon which the American 
will drop after it is crushed •••• 1 
I have acted neither through pride, 
nor ambition nor intrigue, but because the 
place I held in my country made i-t my duty 
to act. 
When French sovereignty in its in-
tegrity:,ris an accomplished fact ••• I 
firmly intend to go back to civilian life 
and retire to end a life during which I 
have eagerly served my country. If this 
is the way I can interpret the decl._aration 
attributed to President Roosevelt, accord-
ing to which an agreement with me can be 
but a temporary one, I completely· agree •• 
Things being thus, the work of re-
uniting all Frenchmen, which I am under-
taking for a common aim, would be very 
difficult for me if France's allies were 
themselves to spread doubts among the 
Frenchmen concerning the i~terest and the 
scope of that work. 
I hope I can trust that the 
United States government will realize 
that, and ••• will not give Frenchmen 
the impression that the authority of the 
Chief who makes it struggle again is a 
diminished one.71 
Even at this time Roosevelt was considering sending 
American and British representatives to Algiers to 
direct the.civil administration from behind the 
scenes. Such action proved unnecessary, however, 
71c1ark, op. cit., pp. 126-127. 
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in view of the fact that the Clark-Darlan agreements 
were finally signed on November 22.72 The provisions 
were essentially of a military nature designed to assure 
the full cooperation of the French and subordinate the 
North African· Army to Eisenhower's command. It was 
justified in view of Darlan 1 s cooperation in arranging 
a cease-fire on November 13, and provided a framework 
for Eisenhower to get on with carrying the war to the 
Axis in Tunisia with a minimum of interference from the 
French civil administration. 
Despite what appeared to be a general acceptance 
of his admini·stration for the time being, things became 
worse, rather than better, for Darlan and his government. 
The Ad:mftali remained a military figure and his only collab-
oration with the United States remained purely of a military 
nature. As December arrived, the Allies apparently in-
tended to approach the political problem with a less 
drastic solution than had been proposed. Roosevelt favored 
some kind of commission, which would include British, French 
and American representatives, on which Darlan would serve 
in a minor capacity. Eisenhower's dealings with Darlan 
were on the basis of the Admiral's position as High 
Commissioner of North Africa, although the Allies treated 
the French somewhat less than a full partner. In pursuit 
72 
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of a solution, Roosevelt elevated Murphy to the rank of 
Minister and the British sent Herold Macmillan to serve 
as Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters in North 
Africa. These moves did little except take the political 
responsibilities from General Eisenhower's shoulders. In 
effect, the problem of Darlan remained the same. The 
British hoped to bring about the Admiral's downfall via 
their continuing complaints concerning the internal situation 
in North Africa. They specifically complained about the 
continued existence of fascist-type organizations, the 
courts-martial of French soldiers who had attempted to aid 
the Allied landings, and the Vichy pro-Nazi officials who 
were allowed to remain in the government. Eisenhower was 
not happy in his dealings with General Nogues and Yves 
Chatel, the Governor-General of Algeria, believing he was 
getting less than their full cooperation in military matters. 
But Darlan was not happy with these men either, and in turn 
complained to Eisenhower: 
I don't want them either, but the gov-
erning of Arab tribes is a tricky business 
that requires much experience with them. 
As quickly as you can produce any men, of 
your own choice, who are experienced in 
this regard and are loyal Frenchmen, I will 
instantly dismiss t~3 incumbents' and appoint the men you desire. 
While the United States dealt with its problems of 
Darlan and his administration, Churchill was busy justifying 
73 Eisenhower, .QE.• cit., p. 130. 
138 
the situation in North Africa-to his anti-Darlan opposition 
in Great Britain, "The Almighty in His infinite wisdom did 
1174 not see fit to create Frenchmen in the image of Englishmen, 
he said. The Prime Minister explained how the authority of 
the French State was vested in the illustrious and venerable 
old Marshal, and reminded his countrymen of the highly leg-
alistic habits of the Frenchman's mind, stating that, "If 
Admiral Darlan had to shoot Marshal Petain he would no doubt 
do it in Marshal Petain 1 s name, 1175 Churchill urged the dis-
sident De Gaullist elements to bide their time, that their 
day was coming, possibly sooner than they expecte.d. 
Roosevelt's statement of policy and the continued 
press attacks against Darlan forced action, Darlan soon 
came to believe that a more liberal policy statement from 
himself on behalf of his government would be in order to 
try to forstall further difficulties, In a statement issued 
on December 16 in Algiers, he said: 
Once France and the French Empire is 
free from the Axis yoke, the French people 
themselves will decide freely the form of 
government and national policy they desire, 
In actual accomplishment the High 
Commissioner has already granted full and 
complete amnesty to all against whom any 
action had been taken because of sympathy 
to the Allies, , , He is now organizing 
a body of representative private citizens 
to work with him in an advisory and con-
sul te.tive capacity in carrying on official 
business, , • 
74churchill, .21?.• cit,, Vol, IV; pp, 556-558, Also 
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The High Commissioner has begun the 
restoration of rights to those persons from 
whom these had previsously been taken be-
cause of race ••• His announced purpose 
is to give just treatment to all elements 
making up the complex North African pop-
ulation to the end that all can dwell and 
work together under laws insuring mutual 
tolerance and respect for rights, , • 
I have stated emphatically and re-
peate·dly to the Commander-in-Chief, General 
Eisenhower, that ••• I seek no assistance 
or support for any personal ambitions. I 
have announced that my sole purpose is to 
save French Africa, help free France and 
then retire to private life with a hope 
that the future leaders of France may be 
selected by· the Fre17-@h people themselves 
and by no one else, 
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This was all Darlan could do and it appeared that things 
might quiet down. Secretary of State Hull praised the 
Admiral's comments, 77 and even the British appeared sat-
isfied when Lord Halifax called Under Secret~ry of State 
Sumner Wells to report that Churchill was apparently 
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satisfied with the Admiral's statement, Churchill had 
pacified his political opposition with the secret session 
speech concerning Darlan on December 10. But things were 
not going as well as they seemed, for on December 19, 
Captain Butcher·noted in his diary that the overseas 
press opin""si.on 
••• indicates that the reaction to 
Darlan is savage, but we don't )mow what 
effect, if any, Darlan 1 s 'liberalization' 
statement may have had -- perhaps none, as 
the pr7~s, particularly British, is skep-
tical. 
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While Darlan 1 s difficulties increased in Algiers, 
' 
the Allies continued to probe for a suitable replacement 
in North Africa. President Roosevelt made tentative 
arrangements to meet with General Charles De Gaulle in 
Washington sometime in early January, hoping to iron-out 
a satisfactory solution to the problem of civil adminis-
tration in North Africa. The Allies appealed for unity 
in the struggle against the Axis, but gave no indication 
that they were prepared to changE. their attitude towards 
Darlan and replace him with a De Gaul+ist. A De Gaullist 
representative, General Francois d 1Astier de la Vigerie, 
the brother of one of the "Group of Five", jotirneyed to 
Algiers to meet with French, American and British officials 
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on December 19. The mission seemed ill-fated from the 
start when no one was at the airport to meet him and Murphy 
had neglected to notify Darlan of his impending arrival. 
As a result, Darlan ordered d 1Astier arrested. The emissary 
of De Gaulle then lost his temper and emphatically stated 
that he would have no dealings with Darlan. Murphy inter-
vened to prevent his arrest, although d 1Astier was still 
a virtual pris0ner, for the hotel was surrounded by Darlan 1 s 
troops. About midnight Darlan and Giraud appeared at 
Eisenhower's headquarters insisting that the De Gaullist 
80Tompkins, .2E.• cit., p. 180. 
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be expelled from North Africa, but Eisenhower refused on 
the grounds that it was a purely French problem and would 
c1ave to be settled by the French. 
Butcher, Eisenhower's naval aide, records the sub-
stance of Eisenhower's conversations with d 1Astier the 
following morning: 
During lunch Ike said that d 1Astier 
was reluctant to see Darlan, but wanted to 
have ca~te blanche, and expected to have 
it from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, to 
visit and talk with De Gaullists all over 
French Africa, North and West. This was 
too much. Ike reviewed the whole circum-
stances,, and arranged, after much parlez-
vooing, that d 1Astier talk unofficially 
with Darlan this afternoon. If d 1Astier 
travels over A~rica, this being Fr~£ch 
administration, it's up to Darlan. 
Although the closing comment might be taken to be a 
classic example of military buck-passing, d'Astier agreed 
to meet the Admiral. On the afternoon of December 20 he 
privately talked with Giraud and Darlan, and listened as 
the Admiral emphasized the stability of his regime and 
explained that his sole ambition was to unify all French 
elements for prosecution of the war against the Axis. He 
also announced once more his intentions to retire after the 
war. Darlan insisted that he alone was capable of rallying 
all Frenchmen to the cause of continuing the war and d 1Astier 
pointed out that French public opinion apparently did not 
bear this out.
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Darlan became angry and accused d 1Astier 
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of stirring up trouble in Algiers. When Giraud attempted 
to intervene, Darlan angrily replied that this was his 
affair and he would handle it. The conversation ended 
when d 1Astier accused Darlan of being the chief obstacle 
to French unity. Shortly afterwards d 1Astier received 
word from the Allies that he would have to leave Algiers. 
Yet in d 1Astier 1 s eyes the mission was not a 
complete failure, for he gained the distinct impression 
that the French if not the Americans, were willing to 
work with De Gaulle, Giraud was receptive to the idea of 
De Gaulle as Minister of National Defense in a government 
headed by himself, but the De Gaullists recognized that 
Giraud was not the man to carry out a successful coup 
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against Darlan. D1Astier also lear:hea·· that the Count of 
Paris, pretender to the French throne from the House of 
Orleans, was also interested in Darlan 1 s dismissal. Prince 
Henri d 10rleans, then living in Morocco, expressed hope 
that the French could unite to carry on the common struggle 
against the Axis and was interested in finding a place for 
himself in such unification. But Darlan 1 s opposition realized 
that their supporters were too few and widely scattered to 
of'f'er any hope f'or change in the immediate:: future. The Allies 
seemed to be playing the waiting game as well, for the sit-
uation was so nebulous that President Roosevelt's Darlan 
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policy continued to be a day to day affair. 
In the end, neither the Free French nor the Allies 
had to act to remove Darlan from the North African political 
scene. On the'night of December 24, 1942, the State Depart-
ment in Washington received the following telegram from 
London: 
Radio Algiers has just announced that 
Admiral Darlan was attacked and subsequently 
died this afternoon and that his asgassin 
was caught and is being questioned. 
8
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CHAPTER VI 
ASSASSINATION IN ALGIERS 
Admiral Darlan had begun the last day of his 
life in a conference with Robert Murphy. After a 
dinner given in honor of the Allied High Command 
and the American Consul Murphy, at his residence, 
Darlan took Murphy into his study to discuss his 
possible successor in the event the Admiral decided 
to retire. Darlan produced a list of pos•sible successors, 
which included General De Gaulle, Pierre Flandin, Paul 
Reynaud, Edouard Herriot, the Count of Paris and a 
number of lesser officials. 
As if by omen the Admiral said, "You know, there 
are four plots in existence to assassinate me. 111 
Continuing in a detached manner, as though he were 
talking about the death of someone else, "Suppose one 
of these plots is successful? What will you Americans 
do then? 112 
Then turning again to his alleged goal of re-
tiring, the Admiral stated, "Please tell your President 
that anytime he decides I am more of a liability than 
1
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an asset to him, I will gladly step down. All I ask 
is the privilege of visas and transportation to the 
United States for myself and my wife. n3 His reason-
ing seemed easy to comprehend for the Admiral may 
have wanted to come to America as his son Alain was 
at Warm Springs, Georgia, undergoing treatment at the 
infantile paralysis clinic made famous by President 
Roosevelt. Polio, had in fact, played a rather 
important role in the Allies decision to deal with 
Darlan, for his son's illness was generally believed 
to be the reason Darlan was in Algiers at the time of 
the invasion. When Murphy notified Admiral Leahy of 
the circumstances surrounding Darlan•s presence in 
Algiers, two days before the invasion, Leahy promptly 
informed Roosevelt, Describing the incident in his 
memoirs, Leahy wrote: 
The first thing that impressed· 
Roosevelt was the nature of the boy's illness 
and proposed that we send a letter to 
Darlan, I replied I thought it would 
be a very nice thing to do. Later 
Roosevelt sent Darlan 1 s son to Warm 
Springs and kept him there for a con-
siderable time. Darlan was most grate-
ful, and it is my belief that this 
thoughtfulness on the part of the 
President helped us in the cr.iwical 
situation that was developing.4 
3Ibid. 
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Despite the charges and counter-charges involving 
the Admiral 1 s character, he had given some stability 
to the internal situation in North Africa, thus 
assuring the safety of the long Allied supply lines, 
Such safety would be of the utmost importance in the 
campaign to expel the growing German force from Tunisia, 
In mid-December, Eisenhower 1 s political advisors, 
Freeman Matthews and W.R. Mack, had returned from 
London, reporting that growing animosity toward 
Darlan in Britain was such that it'would-0e wise, as 
soon as Tunis could be captured, if Darlan was dis-
missed, But if Darlan was to go, who could replace 
h . ? llll. The Allies now faced the problem which Darlan 
himself had proposed that very Christma'S. Eve morning. 
Dressed in his everyday dark suit, the stocky, 
poker-faced Admiral strode from his car through the 
ever-present honor guard and into the luxurious 
summer palace that overlooked Algiers harbor.5 It 
was shortly after 3 p.m. the day before Christmas, a 
radiantly sunny, crisp afternoon; a seemingly ideal 
day for anything but a coup d 1 etat, A variety of 
French patriots saw an obstacle in the fact that 
5wes Gallagher, Back Door To Berlin: 
Story of the .American Coup in North Africa, 
Doubleday, Doran and Company. 
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Darlan was becoming more firmly intrenched as Chief 
of State and High Commissioner of French North Africa 
with each passing day, The Admiral had already backed 
-one losing horse in the war when he had supported 
Hitler, and although the British and American did not 
like him, what did it matter? Offhand he could not 
think of anyone who liked him, but he was in power, 
and that was all that mattered, 
As he approached his office neither he nor his 
aide gave more than a passing glance towards the slight 
figure standing in the anteroom, There was always a 
caller, perhaps s.omeone wanting a political favor, 
But Fernand Oliver Eugene Bonnier de la Chapelle a 
twenty year old university student, was not there for 
a political favor, He stepped close to the Admiral, 
raised a pistol and fired two shots, One struck the 
Admiral in the mouth, another in the neck, As Darlan 
sank to the floor, blood pouring from his mouth, his 
aide, Captain Hourcade, grappled with the assassin 
and was wounded in the thigh, Palace guards subdued 
the youth as he attempted to escape through an open 
window, Meanwhile, the Admiral's body had been placed 
in a car and the driver ordered to rush to the Maillot 
Hospital, despite the !Tact that there was a clinic only 
a few blocks from the Admiral's office. Maillot was 
the same hospital where his son had lain ill with 
polio. Here within the hour the Admiral was deadl 
Who was the assassin? Rumors abounded in the 
military and governmental offices but the only factyal 
knowlegge was the description presented by the eye-
witnesses to the murder. The investigation was to 
show that the assassin, Bonnier de la Chapelle was 
an unstable youth given to violent, short-lived 
enthusiasms., 6 His father was French and worked for 
an Algiers newspaper while his mother, an Italian, 
was residing in Italy. The youth 1 s parents had 
divorced and ·:the boy had gone to live with an uncle 
in Paris. He was but eight years of age at the 
time. When the Germans overran France, Bonnier was in 
the French equivalent of the Boy Scouts and helped with 
ambulance work, 7 He joined an underground youth group 
working against the Nazis, but was finally forced to 
flee the German occupied section of France in December, 
1940, At Marseille he fell in with De Gaullists and 
tried to make his way to London, but then changed his 
mind and decided to go to Algiers to finish high school. 
6 
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Becoming dissatisfied with his studies, he joined the 
French Flying Corps at Blida, but his enthusiasm for 
flying was short-lived, and his father obtained his 
release, He then joined the Chantiers de la Jeunesse 
to serve his required period of military training, 
During this time he served as liaison officer to 
Henri d 1Astier, the Algiers chief of police who was 
an original member of Murphy's "Group of Five. 11 But 
again Bonnier 1 s tenure was brief and he returned to 
school to study law, During this time he made speeches 
before student groups, in which he condemned the Axis 
powers, Had the Allied landings been one day later, 
Darlan•s life ~y have been saved, After hearing the 
news of the landings, Bonnier d~cided to cancel passage 
to Lyons which he had booked for November 8,8 He had 
planned to return to school to study law, 
There is reason to believe that a group of older 
men, self-seeking, grasping politicians, were using 
the youth's idealism for their own ends, 9 General 
8
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Giraud expressed the belief that the fanaticism of 
Bonnier de la Chapelle had been exploited, "I 
would like to believe that the murder was the work 
of a lunatic, but such men must not be lead by those 
with ideas and perhaps other plans, ,.lo he said. 
Immediately after the shooting Bonnier was taken to 
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the basement of the palace for questioning. He in-
sisted that his name was Morand, exibiting a regulation 
identity card and a passport bearing •:this name. 11 
He insisted that he had acted alone, without the help 
or backing of !,Ilyone. Seemingly he was made the dupe 
of underhand intrigue, a victim of sinister motives. 
Afterwards, when taken to the central police station 
the boy kept insisting that he had acted alone and 
did not regret it. The police had no dossier in 
the name of Morand ~d by nightfall had determined 
that the addresses on the identity card and passport 
were false. By this time the true identity of the 
young man had been established; he was the twenty 
year old son of the law reporter of the Depeche 
Algerienne, to whose name he had added that of his 
Italian mother (della Cappella, who lived in Venice, 
separated from her husband). 
10 Gallagher, op. cit., p, 121. 
11Tompkins, op. cit., p. 189. 
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On Christmas Day, as Admiral Darlan 1 s body lay in 
state at the Government House, a court-martial convened 
at 6 p.m. to try his murderer. An order had already 
been put through channels for the boy's coffin. Standing 
before the court, Bonnier insisted once more that he had 
acted alone, without accomplices, and that all he had 
done was "to bring justice to a traitor who stood in 
the way of the union of France. 1112 After a short delib-
eration, the tribunal of the XIXth Military Region con-
demned Bonnier de la Chapelle to military degradation 
and to death, the sentence to be carried out by shooting 
at dawn the following day. His defense lawyer, a M. San-
sonetti, hired by the boy's father, argued that the inquest 
and trial had been too short. The tribunal declared it-
self to be sufficiently informed of the facts, for as 
evidence they had the body of the late Chief of State, 
and a killer, with a weapon still hot in his hand who 
duly acknowledged the crime. 
Placed in a cell in the same building where he had 
been tried, Bonnier was again questioned by police. The 
youth expressed the opinion that a mysterious hand would 
come that night to free him. He is reported to have said, 
"I am calm, London has been advised. 1113 He wanted to 
know if anything unusual was going on in town, if there 
12
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had been any trouble, any changes? As late as midnight 
Giraud reaffirmed his order to have the execution carried 
out. The hope for a stay of execution was gone. 
During th~ night, the full impact of his position 
struck Bonnier, Something_had gone wrong. There was no 
commotion in the streets; no news of a take-over. Towards 
11 p.m. on the night of the 25th, a Lieutenant Schillings 
of the Garde Mobile entered the boy's cell where Captain 
Gualar.dof the Algiers police was already questioning the 
youth. Bonnier talked of powerful personages who would 
come to free him if he said nothing. But as the hour of 
execution drew nearer, and the expected coup did not take· 
place, the boy became panic stricken and blurted out 
a confession: 
I killed Admiral Darlan because he 
was a traitor who was selling France to 
Germany for his own profit; I had in my 
hands the proof of his treason; it is the 
same as with Laval, they want power for 
themselves. I decided to kill the Admir-
al a few days ago, I learned that acer-
tain person, who came from General De 
Gaulle, had asked to be received by the 
Admiral. The Admiral refused to receive 
General De Gaulle's envoy, showing he 
wished to keep for himself the power. 
Certain people spoke before me of 
this fruitless demarche and said: 1 Dar-
lan must disappear.• So I said to my-
self: 'Then I will undertake to make 
him disappear,• 
I came to the Palais d 1Ete on the 
morning of December 24th but could not 
accomplish the deed, vJhen I reported this 
fruitless attempt I was told: 1 Time is 
running short, Darlan must disappear.' 
So I went back in the afternoon. I 
did not kill the Admiral's adjutant; I 
could have easily done ao if I had wanted 
to, as I had his head five centimeters 
from my pistol; it would have been silly. 
I had no reason for animosity against 
him. I shot at his legs to defend myself, 
The pistol was given to me, I had 
been given another, but either the ammuni-
tion was defective, or the pistol was no 
good; when I tried it out it would not 
work; I could have taken a submachine gun, 
but it was too bulky under my coat. 
I was told that after the deed I 
would be caught, condemned to death and 
reprieved. 
However, they have tried me too fast. 
My friends needed two days in which to 
intervene. 
I know my lawyer, M. Sansonetti, is 
trying hard. 
Furthermore, the Comte de Paris, whom 
I know, has been here for several days, 
twenty minutes from Algiers. 
I also know d 1Astier de la Vigerie; 
they are several brothers, one of who is 
with De Gaulle, another was with me in 
the Chantiers. 
In the end if they do not reprieve 
me and shoot me tomorrow morning, it will 
be because my friends could do nothing. 
Henry IV said that Paris was worth a mass; 
I say that France is worth my skin. For 
I know Germans; that famous November 11 
(1940) I was in Paris, on Boulevard Saint-
¥.dchel; if the person for whom I made Darlan 
disappear did not take power, we would be-
come Anglicized or Americanized; this, for 
France's sake, must not be. 
Though my name sounds royalist, I have 
been so barely two months; and I am a good 
believer; I confessed before the murder and 
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told the priest I was going to kill; clearly 
the Ten Commandants forbid killing, but there 
are moments when one must go so fast that 
the death of one who stands in the way of 
the general good is a necessity, This is 
such a time, You cannot understand me, be-
cause, despite my youth I know a great deal. 
One thing worries me now, I was made 
to sign several papers; among them there was 
one which put some friends of mine en cause; 
I 1m afraid that the person who mademe sign 
it may use it, not to betray our cause, but 
to blackmail my friends,_ 
So, either I am reprieved and this will 
have no more meaning, or, I am shot and my 
friends IlfNe let me down, But I don't 
think so, LI-
Unfortunately for Bonnier, the details of this con-
fession, after going through proper military channels, did 
not reach authorities until three days later, on the 28th, 
According to Darlan 1 s son, Lieutenant Shillings and Captain 
Gualard thought the confession implicating the Algiers 
police chief and a Jesuit_ priest was simply that of a 
maniac grasping for a straw that would save his life, 
There is also evidence to indicate that Bonnier made a 
full confession to Commissioner Garidacci during his first 
hour of captivity at the central police station.1.5' The 
boy supposedly made a statement to the commissioner in the 
intimate conversation they had in Garidacci 1 s office, but 
the confession was so revealing that it; is said to have 
16 
been burnt. rt· is also thought that the boy wrote a 
14 . 
Ibid,, pp, 202-204, 
l.5'~., p. 222. 
16cole, .2E.• cit., pp, 236-237. Tompkins states how-
ever, that ~aridacci merely withheld the confession incrim-
inating d 1Astier, from fear that revealing d 1Astier 1 s role 
might endanger his own life if d 1 Astier became Minister of 
Interior in the Count of Paris government, or the fear that 
he would not become minister if it was :revealed prematurely, 
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list of his accomplices on the back of a visiting card 
engraved with the name of Henri d'.Astier de la Vigerie. 17 
.Apparently Garidacci convinced the boy that his only hope· 
for a reprieve was to repeat his original confession that 
he had acted alone in the interests of France. Thus 
Bonnier 1 s full confession was placed in the dossier that 
was later handed to General Giraud three days after the 
assassin 1 s execution. 
At dawn on December 26th a chaplain entered Bonnier 1 s 
cell, In a last desperate attempt to save himself, Bonnier 
pleaded for.permission to write a note. But no one had 
any paper to give him. Fumbling through his pockets, he 
found a visiting card, not of his own, but that of'!Jis 
uncle in Paris, and addressing it to Abbe Cordier, 2 rue 
Lafayette, he ecr:j.bbled, "Please intervene immediately. 
I believe it is absolutely vital. I have full confidence 
18 in you, but you must act fast, very fast.II. Abbe Louis 
Pierre Marie Cordier was a thirty year old Jesuit, an 
army chaplain, who acted as Henri d 1Astier 1 s secretary and 
confessor. It was promised that the note would be delivered, 
In-:the ?treats the dawn tented the sky. The young 
prisoner -- exac~ly twenty years and fifty~six days old 
stood firmly before the firing post. At precisely 7:45 a.m. 
17cole, .21!.• cit., p. 237. 
18
T k" it 7 omp ins, .21?.• _c_., p. 19 • 
l;:,b 
he received the last rites of his church. 
A few hours later his body was buried in an un-
marked grave. Church bells tolled, but not for Bonnier. 
At almost the same moment the remains of Admiral Darlan 
were being quietly interred in a secret plot in the naval 
cemetery. As one reporter was to write, the members of 
the North African War Council, "composed of octa.genarian 
reactionaries with no hope in the world but to hold on 
to their present positions, would quickly try to bury 
. 19 
the Admiral, bury the boy, and bury the story. 11 
1. The Aftermath 
Rumor begat rmnor. Everyone was involved. No 
one was involved. Yet each bit of hearsay warranted 
investigation. Prominent names were becoming the 
main subjects of discussion. One tale spread that 
there was a vast plot to gain power at the turn of the 
year by killing off Giraud, Murphy and Yves Chatel, the 
Governor-General of Algiers. At the same time came the 
report of Bonnier 1 s confession during the night of Dec-
ember 25-26. When Giraud was awakened in the middle of 
the night of December 28-29th, he could not believe the 
dossier handed him. Everyone on the list had been part 
of the November 7th plot to place the general in power, 
and to this list had been added the names of others whose 
lives were in danger, including his own, Murphy, Chatel 
20 
and many others. General Jean-Marie Bergeret, as Minis-
ter of Interior, ordered the Gardes Mobile to arrest the 
conspirators, claiming they were· Axis agents. 1-{ith Rigault 
as Secretary of Political Affairs and d 1Astier as chief 
of police, as well as four other policemen named in the 
dossier, Bergeret could hardly trust the job to the Algiers 
police. Those arrested included Dr. Henri Aboulker, and 
20
Ibid., pp. 206-207. Tompkins states that an Algiers 
police ~issioner named Esquer, who was the only other 
officer who knew that Bonnier had made a lengthy second 
confession believed that this whole scheme was an imaginary 
plot devised by Rigault, Chatel and others to give themselves 
new virginity in the Allies' eyes. 
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his nephews, Marcel, Raphael and Jose; Jacques Brunel, 
son of a former mayor of Algiers; Dr. Fernand Morali, 
who had assisted Allied landings on the beaches; Andre 
Achiary, chief of Algiers security under Darlan; Achiary 1 s 
assistant commissioner Bringard, who along with Pierre 
Alexandre had tied up communication centers on the night 
of November 7-8; and Louis Joxe, who along with Rene 
Capitant were De Gaullist propaganda agents in Algiers. 
In all fifteen were arrested. Rigault 1 s and d'Astier•s 
names were striken from the list when Joxe was immediately 
sent to the Tunisian front and Pose escaped by virtue of 
his position as head of Darlan 1 s Economics Ministry,· 
The involvement of Pose, Rigault and Lemaigre-Dubreuil 
has given rise to the belief that Darlan 1 s assassination 
was part of a larger plot engineered by Synarchists. 
21 
Synarchy was the name given to a group of economists, 
bankers, industrialists and businessmen who held posts in 
the Vichy government under Darlan and were rumored to be 
the power behind the government, The Synarchy was depicted 
as a secret society wtth international political and econ-
omic ramifications. According to these stories, it was 
the political instrument of a combine of French banking 
and industrial interests, in league with large chemical 
21 
The Synarchist 1 s plot is the thesis of Peter 
Tompkins 1 , The Murder ·or Admiral Darlan, .QE.• cit., passim., 
as well as Root•s contention in The Secret History of the 
~ • .2£• cit., Vol. II, pp • .544-%ff. Both accounts stress 
the large volume of francs transfered to North Africa. immed-
iately proceeding the Allied invasion. In this transaction, 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil and Pose are key figures, for through -them 
the conspirators hoped to take out insurance against any 
eventuality. Pose would protect their interests with Ger-
many, and Dubreuil in the Allied camp. 
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and metallurgical firms in Germany, Great Britain and 
the United States, Although such stories are common 
political rumor in Europe, the Synarchist idea cannot 
be dismissed as patently absurd, Conceivably there 
might be some truth behidethe Synarchy, but as yet ample 
evidence to support the theory has not been produced, 
Of the fifteen arrested, two were released owing to 
advanced age, and the others carted off in chains to 
Laghouat, 200 miles into the Sahara, General Bergeret 
planned a hasty military trial, a la Dreyfuss, to dis-
pose of the prisoners, 
Then came the surprising turn in the st~ry of 
Darlan 1 s murder, Commissioner Garidacci, despit.e his 
ppssession of Bonnier 1 s confession, had never been arrested, 
Garidacci reported to the pre-feet of Algiers, a M, Temple, 
that the four policemen being held were innocent, Garidacci 
felt he could only discuss the matter with Giraud, The 
General referred him to Bergeret, but in the meantime, 
Temple had learned from Garidacci of d 1 Astier 1 s and 
Cordier 1 s involvement in the plot~ 22 This story was 
corroborated in a formal depostion signed by Achiary, 
taken by the Civil Tribunal of Algiers on January 23, 1943, 
22Evidence of their involvement in the plot is 
abundant, and Kenneth Pender, Murphy's Vice-Consul in 
North Africa states that he personally saw telephone 
recordings, police reports, manifestos and newspapers 
which had actually been printed ahead of time, and held 
in readiness, They announced that, upon Darlan 1 s death, 
the Count of Paris had assumed control of French destinies 
and the French Empire, See Pender, 2.E• .£il., pp. 126ff; 
The statement read: 
I accuse two persons of being the 
direct instigators of the murder of Ad-
miral Darlan: They are: the Abbe Cordier 
and Henri d 1Astier de la Vigerie, Assist-
ant Secretary General for Political Affairs 
at the High Coillil')issariat, both residing at 
2 rue Lafayette. 
These two persons had Admiral Darlan 
assassinated on behalf of the Count of 
Paris, who according to a statement of 
M. Jacques Brunel, made to me at Laghouat 
on January 7, urged them to be quick about 
carrying out the crime. The presence in 
Algiers of the Count of Paris at the .time 
of the murder, which appeared to be fortu-
itous, as well as the luncheons and con-
tacts he had with high personalities such 
as General Giraud, General Nogues, and M. 
Pose, constitute an element of proof to 
the above accusation, and the Count of 
Paris most certainly tried to have him-
self named High Commissioner in the place 
of Darlan. 
On this last point I can .,i.dduce_ the -
following personal testimony: The·Count 
of Paris, counting on obtaining the post 
of High :Commissioner, had promised M. 
d 1Astier de la Vigerie the portfolio of 
the Interior. The latter sounded out my 
schoolmate M. Jacques Brunel to see if he 
would fill the role of head of the police 
in North Africa. The Saturday following 
the murder (December 26), Brunel asked me , 
to call on him to discuss a complete change 
of political life in the country as a result 
of the murder of Darlan, 
In the course of this conversation, 
·which took place in M. Brunel 1.s flat at 
26 rue Michelet, the latter avowed that 
the Count of Paris was about to assume 
power and that d 1Astier had offered him 
the job of police chief, Before accepting 
he wished to have my accord, I refused, 
categorically, and tried to show Brunel 
that he had been led on; I then gave him 
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proof that d 1Astier and his friends were 
actually maneuvering against his father, 
a known republican, who was then a candid-
ate for the post of Governor-General of 
Algiers. 
Jacques Brunel seemed shaken by my 
remarks, and when M. Luizet, ex sub-prefect 
of Tiaret, arrived on the scene he made 
the following remarks to me: 1 I know who 
you are·and esteem you, and would like to 
demonstrate to you that the Count of Paris 
can save the country.• 
Very ~iolently I rebelled at this 
opinion, branding it as the attitude of 
people who wanted to indulge in low pol-
itics when they should be thinking only 
of fighting the Germans. I must add, 
·however,, that I believe in the absolute 
sincerity of M. Luizet in this affair. 
At the end of this conversation I in-
sisted on giving my opinion directly, and 
in their presence, to M. d'Astier de la 
Vigerie, whom I made an appointment for 
1700 chez M. Langlois at 119 rue Michelet. 
The:i:?esM;. d 1Astier confirmed that the 
Count of Paris was about to take power, and 
in the face of my refusal to collaborate, 
and the reproaches of Jacques Brunel with 
regard to his father, M. d'Astier seemed 
extremely ill-at-ease and·expressed the 
desire immediately to return to the High 
Commissariat. 
That same· Saturday afternoon, before 
seeing Jacques Brunel, I found Abbe Cordier 
and expressed to him my feeling about the 
crime. 
On the day before Bonnier 1 s execution 
I had a meeting first with Cordier and then 
d!Astier (at the Paris restaurant), where-
they confirmed to me that Bonnier was 
their envoy. They also affirmed they 
intended to get him out of his predicament 
and asked me to help in arranging an es-
cape. I answered that this was absolutely 
impossible, that special police measures 
had most certainly been taken. It was 
then that Cordier asked me to take·a 
piece of paper to the prisoner on which 
he had wr,i tten his signature, saying, 
'with this piece of paper Bonnier de la 
Chapelle will understand that the bearer 
comes on my behalf. 1 
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I left them in front of the 
Paris restaurant and it was then that 
:d 1Astier said to me: 'The Count of 
Paris is here, everything will work 
out, don't worry. 1 
If I did not report this con-
versation earlier it was for two rea-
sons: Firstly, M. d 1Astier de_la 
Vigerie was still, in my eyes, the 
ardent combattant, and comrade, who 
had proved at my side that he had 
faith in a final v1ctory of France 
and her Allies against the GeI'.lllans. 
Also he was considered by all our 
friends as a sort of chief of the 
resistance movement against the 
Germans; secondly, he was the Chief 
of Police at the High Commiss.ari!l-t, 
and so considered; in all of what he 
did he gave- the impression of acting 
in the name of the government. 
. I must add that I violently 
reproached the Abbe Cordier for the 
criminal role he played, and in the 
face of my indignation he went away 
without saying a word. 
The same Saturday, at·1430, 
I went to the headquarters of the 
Corps ~anc d' Afrique at the in-
vitation of Captain Castaing, chief 
of its Deuxieme Bureau. This officer 
and General Monsabert were afraid 
there might be suspicion about the 
Corps Franc because of Bonnier's 
belonging to it. In the course of 
the conversation, Captain Castaing 
told me he believed the weapon used 
in the crime had been obtained·by 
Bonnier from another member named 
Sabatier, who had, I believe, reported 
the weapon was stolen.23 
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At 6 a.m. on January 10, Cordier and d 1Astier 
were arrested. Charges of plotting against the state 
were brought against Alfred Pose, who was charged with 
23Tompkins, ~- cit,, pp. 212-214, 
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with leading the plot and influencing the others. In 
addition Marc Jacquet was accused of being Pose 1 s lia-
ison man and Gilbert Sabatier was charged with furnishing 
the murder weapon. 24 During a police interrogation Cordier 
admitted knowing Bonnier and of having heard his confession 
on the morning of the murder. The priest insisted he had 
learned of the murder only by chance that evening and of 
having asked Achiary to intercede in Bonnier 1 s behalf. 
Cordier said he was a monarchist and felt no affliction 
over the death of Darlan. He believed also that the 
Count of Paris could play a political role in North Afr-ica, 
but doubted if the monarchy could be established before 
the end of the war. But the priest would add no more, 
taking shelter behind the privilege of sacerdotal secrecy, 
saying he could not reveal what the boy had said during 
confession. 25 
The next day Commissioner Garidacci was arrested 
and produced the "true confession" of Bonnier•s which 
he said ran as follows: 
In the year 1942 and the 24th of the 
month of December, before us, Garidacci, 
Commissioner of Police Mobile, officer of 
the P,J., M. Bonnier de la Chapelle, Fernand, 
student, 20 years old, resident of Alger, 56 
rue Michelet, declares: 
I affirm having killed Admiral Darlan, 
High Commissioner in French Africa, after 
24 
~-, p. 215. 
25Ibid. 
having told Abbe Cordier I would do so 
in the form of a confession. 
It was M. Cordier who gave me the 
plan of offices at the Commissariat 
and of the office of the Admiral. It 
was through him that I was able to 
execute the mission I had assigned my-
self which was to dispose of the Admiral. 
When I joined the Corps Franc I re-
cruited on my own initiative men of action 
from among the NCOs and troops of who 
M. d 1Astier might have need, though M. 
d 1Astier was never informed of my personal 
actions. 
I lmow that Mssrs. Cordier and d 1Astier 
have recently received the Count of Paris, 
as well as other personalities. Finally, 
I have the impression that M. de la Vigerie 
is no,t on excellent terms with M. Rigaul_t, 
whose activities for the Admiral ~6e a hindrance to him and his friends. 
26
Toid., pp. 216-217. 
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2. The Day of the-Assassination 
1 Darlan must go! 1 This was the feeling of many 
of the conspirators after Darlan had taken their vic-
tory on November 8. Whether it was Darlan 1s refusal 
to deal with De Gaulle's envoy, or Eisenhower's refusal 
to unite Giraud and De Gaulle under Prince Henri d 1 Orleans, 
December 19 seems to be the day the decision was made.· On 
that day General Francois d 1Astier de la Vigerie, a De 
Gaullist representative and the brother of Henri d 1Astier, 
arrived in Algiers, Although fighting with the Free 
French, Francois also paid allegiance to the royalists, 
During his stay in Algiers he was continually in contact 
with his brother and Abbe Cordier, Later, $35,OOO was 
found in the hands of four De Gaullists, which d 1Astier 
had apparently left behind for Free French propaganda 
efforts when he departed Algiers on the morning of Dec-
ember 
27 24 •. 
Francois d 1Astier 1 s political affiliations implicated 
two new factio,ns in the maze of Algerian rumors: General 
Charles De Gaulle and Comte de Paris. Both Henri d'Astier 
2qibid,, p. 184. Tompkins states that it was 
$38,000, but this was thought to be the original sum 
left behind, Both Pender and Cole agree that the amount 
found by Algiers police was $35,O00. Docteur, QE.• .£ii., 
pp. 247-248 states that the assassination was decided 
that morning by De Gaullists. 
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and Cordier were devout royalists. Royalist feeling 
was still alive in France, and may felt that all Frenchmen 
might resolve their differences by rallying to the pre-
tender. Various provisional governments had been dis-
cussed and lists drawn up with De Gaulle serving as 
Premier in North Africa.and the Count as Chief of State. 
Other lists had De Gaulle as Minister of War and the 
Count as Premier. Positions were also to be given Giraud, 
Henri d 1Astier, Lemaigre-Dubreuil, and one proposal even 
advised giving Darlan a post as Ambassador to the United 
28 
States. The Comte de Paris agreed to a coup on two 
conditions. On that the take-over be Qioodless, and sec-
ondly that the Allies approve. Under the pseudonym of 
M. Robin, the Count was whisked from Spanish Morocco on 
December 10 and motored to Algiers with the assistance of 
Abbe Cordier and Mario Faivre. In conversations held 
during the two weeks before the assassination, the Count 
assumed to his satisfaction the support of a number of 
men surrounding the Admiral, including Giraud, Nogues, 
Pierre Bisson, the Governor-General of French West Africa, 
and General Jean-Marie Bergeret, of Darlan 1 s staff. These 
men agreed to support the Count in the event Darlan removed 
himself or was removed from the scene. This in no way 
28
Tompkins, .212.• cit., p. 185. 
implies that they actively participated in plans for a 
coup or in the assassination of the Admiral, for the 
Count 1 s conditions remained that the take-over be blood-
less as well as approved by the Allies, A frequent 
visitor to M, Robin in Algiers was Robert Murphy. The 
plot failed to materialize when Eisenhower presented the 
argument that even a palace revolution might endanger 
public order, With this the Count gracefully retired 
from the scene, 
On the same day that General Francois d 1Astier 
arrived in Algiers, December 19, two attempts were made 
to choose Darlan' s would be assassin, by drawing lots, 
Both drawings proved abortive, resulting in Bonnier de 
la Chapelle volunteering for the task, He was given a 
floor plan of the Palais d 1Ete, a window in the building 
was left open for his escape to the car waiting at the 
curb and he had excellent papers and a valid passport 
to escape to Tangiers, 
M-Day was to be Christmas Eve, Cordier, who had 
been Henri d 1Astier 1 s right hand man, reminded the youth 
it was time to put himself !:E_ regle ~ le bon Dieu, 29 
They made a date for 10 a,m, on December 24. 
Meeting in a side street a short distance from 
Cordier 1s dwelling on rue Lafayette, the assassin-to-be 
confessed the deed he was preparing to perform. He wa~-
29Ibid,, p. 219. 
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given absolution before the crime and it amounted to a 
double precaution of safety spiritual for the boy, 
temporal for the priest -- who was protected by the 
secrecy of confessional, The priest and youth then 
went off to have lunch with Henri d 1Astier and d 1Astier 1 s 
son Bernard, 
For what transpired during lunch, the testimony of 
an anonymous witness at the Paris restaurant on that day 
was published exactly three years later, December 24, 1945, 
ink Figaro, The witness was lunching with a friend at 
a table near Cordier, d'Astier, Bernard and another young 
man, The witness states that a few days earlier Cordier 
had asked his companion if he could put him in touch with 
someone who was willing to assassinate Darlan, This 
anonymous witness already knew of a larger plot to assass-
inate Darlan, so he was not surprised at the request, So 
on this day (December 24) Cordier informed the two that 
he had found his man and introduced Bonnier de la Chapelle,
30 
Cordier sug~ested they drive the boy out in the 
country where he could test his pistol, since it had a 
tendency to jam, On the outskirts of Algiers the weapon 
did indeed jam and Bonnier borrowed the pistol of one in 
the group, The witness does not name his luncheon companion, 
but since the confession of the assassin stated that the 
30rbid,, pp. 220-221, 
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weapon and shells were obtained through Cordier and since 
the priest knew the individuals well enough to reveal the 
assassin and their plans, it is quite possible that the 
gun was furnished by Mario Faivre, who had assisted 
Cordier in bringing the Count of Paris to Algiers from 
Spanish Morocco. In any case, continues,the witness, 
they then drove Bonnier to the Palaia d 1Ete: That is, 
Sabatier, Bonnier 1 s companion from the Corps Franc, 
d 1Astier 1 s son Bernard, and Mario Faivre, There the 
assassin accomplished his deed. 
Although Bonnier admitted that Cordier and d 1Astier 
had put him up to the murder and had provided him with 
the weapon, he played the role requested of him at his 
court-martial -- insisting that he had acted alone and 
in the interests of France. 
And so he went to his death. 
3. A Year Later 
On the first anniversary of his execution homage 
was paid to young Bonnier de la Chapelle. 
A group of about fifty persons, the 
majority of whom fill official positions 
under the orders of General De Gaulle, 
celebrated the anniversary of the death 
of Fernand Eugene Bonnier de la Chapelle, 
who assassinated Admiral Darlan, by 
placing a wreath on his tQib and obser-
ving a minute of silence.j 
.Among them was Ennnanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, brother 
of Henri and Francois d 1Astier, who had financed an 
underground movement with leftist leanings, in France, 
after the German occupation in 1940. He was now Sec-
retary for the Interior in North Af'rica. 
Later, an Algerian Court of Appeals was to annul-
the sentence against the assassin, citing in part as its 
reasons "documents found after the liberation of France 
which showed conclusively that Admiral Darlan had been 
acting against the interests of France and that Bonnier•s 
act had been accomplished in the interests of the liber-
32 ation of France. 11 
Now that he was morally and legally rehabilitated, 
Bonnier 1 s crime disappeared from the record. As a conseq-
31
New York Times, December 26, 1943, p. 5. The 
youth's father, step-mother and teenage sister also 
attended the ceremony which was performed in a pouring 
rain that reduced the expected attendance. 
32
Tompkins, .2E.• cit., p. 271. 
uence, so did the guilt of his alleged accomplices. 
In September of 1943, only three months after 
De Gaulle's arrival in Algiers, Giraud rendered a 
!!QB-lieu in favor of Henri d 1Astier, Cordier, and 
Garidacci, who were released. 
The day he was released from jaU;_, d 1Astier 
received the Croix de guerre with palms from Giraud, 
and the following day the Medal of the Resistance 
from De Gaulle. Two days later he was named a 
member of the Consultative Assembly. 
Cordier was awarded the Croix de guerre. 
Garidacci was fired. 
Of the twelve men who had been arrested for 
conspiracy in the murder of Darlan, Muscatelli be-
c.ame Prefect of Algiers, Jacques Brunel, Prefect 
of Police--with Jose Aboulker as his chief of 
cabinet--Bringard the Chief of Police of Algiers, 
and Achiary Assistant Prefect of Batna. Of the 
other conspirators some went even further: Rene 
Capitant became a minister in De Gaulle's cabinet 
_and Louis Joxe became Ambassador to Moscow. 
Following the liberation of France Rigault 
and Lemaigre-Dubreuil slipped across the border to 
Spain where they were promptly arrested for having 
negotiated with a foreign power. By this time 
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Murphy held the rank of Ambassador, and was Eisenhower's 
special political advisor for most of Europe. In this 
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capacity he interceded on their behalf and the cbarges 
were dropped. Rigault set about recording the events 
that transpired in North Africa in a two volume history 
written under the pseudonym of 11 Charnine~1,' He later 
became editor of a Paris financial paper along with 
Pierre Flandin. 
On July 12, 1955, Lemaigre-Dubreuil was shot 
to death by unkno,m assailants on the doorstep of his 
Casablanca home, The Ydnister of Moroccan Affairs 
announced that he had been the victim of counter-
terrorists. 
EPILOGUE ••• 
What k:Lnd of man was ~dmiral Jean Francois 
Darlan? Was he the ambitious politician, .opportunist 
and collaborator he has been accused of being, or 
was he really serving the best interests of France? 
From the day of his accession to power in Vichy to 
the d/J,y of his assassination in Algiers he was the 
great enigma of the war. The political arena brought 
him dishonor and ridicule both in France and abroad. 
Cruel accusati,ons were made 13,gainst him in every 
political camp. The Admiral was stripned of his 
French nationality by Petain and declared a rebel by 
De Gaulle. In the end he was felled by the shots of 
a young fanatical patriot, Fernand Bonnier de la 
Chapelle, who believed he was serving France, 
Darlan was born into a family of sailors and 
had always loved the sea. He was responsible for 
creating the modern French Navy. Many naval per-
sonalities considered it a magnificent fleet. The 
Admiral believed in his fleet, in France arid in 
Darlan, To serve these three wl:!,s his raison d 1 etre. 
Thus he navigated the waters of political life as 
if at the head of his fleet which had to be brought 
to port by using or cheating the currents. What 
Darlan really wanted to achieve was results. As a 
realist who was contemptuous of political and in-
tellectual labels, he was concerned only with the 
goals to be attained. Through the attainment of 
these goals the Admiral revealed his true colors--
he was a blatant opportunist. 
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Despite his exceptional gift for organization 
and capacity for work, the Admiral also had obvious 
eccentricities which he was apt to display to excess. 
He was a vain, contemptous man and people around h:im 
knew how to play upon his vanity and his contempt 
for political enemies to their own advantage. His 
vanity, contempt and eccentricities, however, regard-
less of their notoriousness, are not enough:to ex--
plain the hatred in which Darlan has been held. 
The Admiral's overweaning ambition and the 
deep vein of authoritarianism in him will lead his 
critics to conclude that he was the crafty, scheming, 
self-seeking egotist that they have already labeled 
him to be. The Admiral's critics recognize no enigma 
at all, but sum him up in the one word 11trai tor 11 • 
Even the sympathetic accounts of the man's career 
have been damaging beyond the dreams of his worst 
enemies. In their atl;empts to show the Admiral to 
be a true patriot, his admirers contend that the 
Admiral was alw_ays right, always acting in the best 
interests of France. But by design, rather than 
coincidence, these acts were also in line with Darlan•s 
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own ambitions which lead to the conclusion that the man 
was no more than an opportunist. 
In the general collapse of France in 1940 the 
fleet remained France's supreme asset. So long as it 
remained in being, France had a bargaining point with 
Hitler -- and with the Allies. It is only through the 
mistaken belief that Darlan retained command of the 
fleet until his death that any case at all can be made 
for the dynamic little Admiral. If' Darlan was patriotic 
he was a patriot of the Hitlerian authoritarian school. 
This represented the very kind of fanatical patriotism 
we were fighting to defeat. He was ambitious for self 
and country. He was ruthless and unscrupulous. He hoped 
to be the Fuhrer of France. 
Darlan was hated because of his refusal to bring 
the navy to the side of the Allies. When France fell, 
both Churchill and Roosevelt desired Darlan to become 
the leader of Frenchmen who would continue the war against 
Germany. It is true that he had but to sail to any Allied 
port to become the leader of France. His error and mis-
calculation was the belief that Great Britain as well as 
France was beaten. When the opportunity presented itself, 
Darlan attempted to rectify his mistake. But he had waited 
too long. He was more than two years too late. His self-
ishness, ambition and desire for political power led to 
his assassination in Algiers on December 24, 1942. 
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THE MYSTER IOUS DARLAN 
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Thesis Abs tract 
Director ~f Thesis : Dr . w. Edmund Hicks 
While metropolitan France lay .plunged in a state 
of numbed confusion , the government of the armistice 
moved to the health resort at Vichy. Although the 
I 
regime began in a spirit of despair , many of its sup-
porters found conso l ation in t he defeat t hat brought 
an end to the Third ~epublic . Marshal Petain , ~ feebl e , 
fri ght ened old man , declared himself Chef de 1 1Etat 
francais . The Marshal was surrounded by self- seeking 
conspirators and opportunists . This s t udy concerns one 
of these opp ortunists -- Admiral J ean Francois Darlan 
the Commander- in- Chief of the French Navy from the 
beginning of t he war . 
The French Fl eet , by the r emarkable capacity and 
long administration of Admi ral Darlan had been brought 
to the highest s tr0ngth and degree of efficiency since 
the days of the monarchy . Undefeat ed, although its 
record was s l i gh tly blemished, the navy ' s presti ge i n-
creased by its exploits against the Germans before t he 
armi stice end against the Brit ish after , the French Navy 
2 
was in good shape and morale was high. Despite the 
armistice Darlan had managed to keep control of the navy . 
The Admiral ' s first political office was the V.in-
istry of ¥arine in Petain ' s cabinet . In pol i tics Darlan 
was a complete opportunist . He had decided that since 
the Germans had won the war, an understanding with them 
was the best poli cy , possibl y for France and certainly 
for his own personal ambit i ons . Desp ite his continuing 
efforts to collaborate with the Nazis , the Germans seeking 
somethin~ for nothing , and Vichy , in general, willing to 
sell its aid only at a price , this policy worked against 
him. As a result both the Allie s and Nazi s became in-
creasingly discontented with Darlan during his fourteen 
months (February, 1941 - April, 1942) as Vichy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and Vice - Premier . 
The next turning point in the history of war- time 
France came not in France itself but in North Africa . In 
preparation of the North African invasi on the Al l i es 
undertook a most complicated diplomatic maneuver in the 
autumn of 1942 . This mission , headed by Robert D. Murphy , 
was des i gned to produce a friendly French reception to 
the invasion and reached its quite unexpected climax three 
days after the landings with the so- called 11Darlan deal " 
which became one of the most controversial decisions 
of the war. 
The Allies were aware of the fact that Darlan 
had an unsavory record . The important fact was that 
3 
in November, 1942 , Darlan and only Darlan, c oulc bring 
about an effective cease- fire order and swing t he a r med 
forces and civil administrat i on of French North Africa 
to the s i de of the Allies . In such a vast military 
enterprise, squeamishness c oncerning the source of such 
help was not a factor . 
In the last about- face of his life , the nan who 
had pursued a vigorous p0licy of collabor ati on with 
the Germans aligned hi mself with the Allies following 
th..:~:..· ::.andings in French North Africa . Admiral Jean 
Francois Darlan was assassinated in Algiers on Christmas 
Eve, 1942, by a young misguided patriot who thought he 
was serving only the interests of France in his deed . 
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